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The following dissertation, “In Search of Adequate Faith: Religious Skepticism in German Letters 
(1750–1800),” is an interdisciplinary study exploring the religious writings of Klopstock, Lessing, 
and Novalis. During the mid- to late-eighteenth century the struggle to articulate a distinctly 
modern faith becomes audible across the literary and aesthetic works of writers who were 
committed to making the biblical tradition more appealing to an increasingly skeptical age. Rather 
than driving a wedge between sacred and secular cultures, these writers promised greater spiritual 
cohesion. Instead of simply yielding to the authority of tradition and scripture, their works strove 
to articulate more adequate means of forging religious bonds. This study investigates how a 
number of writers turned the spirit of religion into a weapon, which precipitated a second 
reformation in the latter half of the eighteenth century. How did literature and aesthetics challenge 
the authority of the five Lutheran Solae? How might they offer more effective strategies for 
reconciling faith and reason than philosophy and theology? What role did material and visual 
culture play in mediating religious experience at this time? 
To answer these questions, I analyze a constellation of documents associated with each 
writer. My first chapter interrogates the poetic methodology of Klopstock’s Der Messias by 
 exploring his extensive amplification of the New Testament figure Doubting Thomas. In my 
analysis, Klopstock's poetics inadvertently reproduce Thomas’ tragic “mistake” by doubting the 
efficacy of unaided scripture to communicate religious truth; a doubt that he attempts to resolve 
by intensifying the reader’s affective experience of the gospel narratives. My second chapter 
argues that Lessing develops a more powerful defense against religious skepticism than Klopstock 
by appealing to the spirit of religion rather than to the authority of its letter. By reorienting faith 
around the spirit of religion, Lessing sparks a Copernican turn in religious consciousness that 
helped emancipate modern believers from theological regimes that had become increasingly 
normative in their approach to the letter of scripture. My final chapter considers how Novalis 
confronts the ways in which Lessing and the Protestant tradition deminishes the value of sensible 
forms of religious mediation by “spiritualizing” modern faith. Unlike Lessing, Novalis insists that 
revealed knowledge demands material mediation like images and symbols in order to (re)shape 
and (re)generate religious experience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Search of Adequate Faith: Religious Skepticism in German Letters (1750-1800) 
 
 
This dissertation has taken on a much larger scope than I initially anticipated.  What began 
as a focused investigation into the ways in which religious poetry indexed a shifting landscape 
between religious and secular cultures from the mid-to-late eighteenth century, sent me searching 
for answers in unexpected places.   Finding myself immersed in the writings of the Early Church 
Fathers, the theology of medieval mystic saints, and the polemics of the Reformation, I quickly 
realized that to gain any insight into how the central figures of this study––Klopstock, Lessing, 
and Novalis––intervened against the religious traditions and institutions of their day required a 
much broader outlook.  Thus, my project offers close-readings from the works of this constellation 
of writers and it reflects on their literary and theological contributions from a variety of disciplinary 
standpoints that include theology, aesthetics, literature, philosophy, art history, hermeneutics, and 
rhetoric.    
To both throw light on what this study is ultimately about and to frame its major arguments 
and theses, I will begin by closely reading two images that are freighted with a significance running 
through the following pages.  The first (fig. 1), by Heinrich Göding (1531-1606), pinpoints what 
became the center of the theological universe within Protestant thought all the way up to the mid 
eighteenth century, namely, the bible.  At the heart of Göding's Mühlberg Altarpiece (1568) stands 
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an open bible whose letters appear visibly present yet stubbornly illegible.  It was a common trope 
of sixteenth-century artworks to depict reformers clutching a bible, as if visually capturing the 
Reformation's core argument that "true" religion is grounded on scripture alone (sola scriptura), 
rather than on a set of inherited traditions and customs that, in the sixteenth century, were 
increasingly seen to be at odds with the ethical content of scripture.  And yet Göding's altarpiece 
stands out from other reformation artworks for several reasons.  In the painting, two ministers, 
who presumably just read from scripture, stand with their backs to the altar as they perform the 
sacrament of the eucharist, while a third figure can be seen in the background with his hands 
piously folded as he appears to gaze upon the bible.1 In fact, this third figure, as well as the female 
figure adjacent to him, were recently deceased patrons from the Mühlberg church who 
commissioned the artwork.  So what we actually see are two framed portraits commemorating the 
lives of these individuals who move from the flanked wings of the triptych into the center of the 
composition, which implies both their presence (i.e. the memory of the patrons persisting into the 
world of the painting) and their absence since they no longer participate in the eucharist.  Yet more 
important for this study than the two figures, is the mirror effect or mise en abyme that the painting 
produces. The image represents an infinitely recurring sequence of altars and open bibles that 
essentializes a self-referential world, which stands averse to new phenomena from entering the 
scene.2  Significantly, in the third iteration of the sequence the bible completely vanishes and the 
                                               
1 The image included here is actually just the predella of a much larger series of images that compose the 
entire altarpiece.  The reason I include only this part of the altarpiece is because it attempts to depict the 
"present day" (i.e. sixteenth-century), whereas the other images call back to earlier scenes and events 
occurring at the times of the old and new testaments.  For a full reading of the altar see Koerner, Joseph 
Leo. The Reformation of the Image. University of Chicago Press, 2008. pp. 429-440. 
2 In many ways, Luther embodies this aversion to external forces and novelty.  For example, in his 
polemic against Jerome Emser, Luther expresses an opposition to humanist theologians seeking to 
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imagination must take over at precisely this moment when painting reaches its formal limitations 
to fill in a content that appears to be lacking–to imagine the book (or letter) that is no longer visible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Heinrich Göding, Mühlberg Altarpiece (1568) 
My dissertation explores this vanishing point with respect to the letter of religion during 
the latter half of the eighteenth century, in which the contents of scripture itself (as opposed to just 
tradition) began to appear as offensive to popular morality and a general effort to expand the 
biblical tradition becomes discernable across the literary and aesthetic writings of Klopstock, 
Lessing, and Novalis.  From Klopstock’s extensive amplification of biblical scenes in his Christian 
epic Der Messias (1748-73), to Lessing’s engagement with apocryphal texts and “heretical” 
figures of the Early Church and Medieval Ages during the Fragmentenstreit (1773–1780), to 
                                               
amplify the scope of scripture by supplementing it with "human doctrines."  In Luther’s polemic 
“Concerning the Letter and the Spirit,” written against the humanist theologian Jerome Emser, he writes: 
"If he [Emser] could at least show where the Holy Spirit teaches too little and where Scripture needs the 
additions of men, there would be some appearance of reason […] My cause does not need [human 
additions] because it is well grounded in scripture.  [But] yours certainly does, because it is built upon 
human dreams.” Luther, Martin, Basic Theological Writings, third edition, ed. Timothy F. Lull and 
William R. Russell, Minneapolis, 2012. p. 68. 
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Novalis’ optimistic reading of the spirit of Church history in Die Christenheit oder Europa (1799) 
each writer (knowingly or unknowingly) seeks to transcend the limitations of the letter by taking 
recourse to the spirit of religion––making it the primary site of interpretation rather than the letter 
alone. As a result, these authors helped usher in a participatory regime of faith that insists on 
developing new interpretations of the spirit of religion rather than blindly obeying the formulas 
passed down, for example, from Luther’s Der Kleine Katechismus that attempts to clarify every 
“Was ist das” [what is that] of scripture with a prescriptive (and definitive) “Das ist” [that is] 
statement. By 1750, I argue, the letter of religion alone no longer served as a sufficient foundation 
upon which to rest confessions of faith, and the search for more adequate forms of faith began with 
attempts to harmonize popular morality and culture with the spirit of religion, which inevitably 
produced a new letter promising to outperform its predecessor(s) that assumed the spirit to be 
accessible only through rigorous hermeneutic labor.3 Such efforts broke with older theological 
paradigms that considered the spirit of religion to be hidden or contained within its letter.4  Instead, 
later generations (especially the early German Romantics) came to view the theological concept 
of spirit in secular, aesthetic, and ethical terms.  Whereas Fichte and Kant described the concept 
of “Geist” in terms of it being an animating principle of the human mind that helps raise inchoate 
                                               
3Johnathan Sheehan’s book The Enlightenment Bible shows how the translation practices of the eighteenth 
century were invested in forging an “Enlightenment Bible” through a “sustained and serious engagement 
with the place of the Bible in the Modern world [which was] produced by a complex set of practices whose 
most sophisticated instruments were scholarship––philological, literary, and historical––and translation” 
(xii). Sheehan, Johnathan. The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005. 
4 Henri de Lubac describes these earlier traditions in his book Medieval Exegesis, claiming that the Pauline 
tradition “seeks the spirit in the letter, [which] is thought to result from a Platonic prejudice that makes the 
body the prison house of the soul” (xiv). Lubac, Henri de. Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, 
Vol. 1. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998. 
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feelings and intuitions to a higher level of consciousness, thereby conferring the labor of revelation 
to the human spirit, Lessing, by contrast, understood the “Geist” of religion to refer to its ethical 
content (i.e. the “inner truth” of scripture) that the letter could never fully express.   
Before moving to the next image, however, the foreground and background of Göding's 
image requires further attention.  At the foot of the altar are thatches of grass and just to the right, 
standing behind the altar, a tree emerges, two details that essentialize Luther's pronouncement that 
Christianity can exist "wherever the word is preached and heard.”5  Yet, a more radical reading of 
these details is possible, for they also anticipate the desire for religion to move out into nature, 
leaving behind the traditional walls of the church and allowing for greater freedom with respect to 
how religious experience can be occasioned.  In one of their most direct confrontations, Lessing 
criticized Klopstock and his disciples from the moral weekly Nordischer Aufseher6 for assuming 
“dass man ohne Religion kein rechtschaffener Mann sein könne”7 [that one cannot be a morally 
upstanding person without religion].  Against the idea that religion is the ultimate source of all 
moral life Lessing argues: “Man kann sich einer Sophisterei schuldig machen, ohne ein Sophist zu 
sein; so wie man eine Unwahrheit kann gesagt haben, ohne darum ein Lügner zu sein; so wie man 
sich betrinken kann, ohne darum ein Trunkenbold zu sein”8 [One can be guilty of a sophistry 
without being a sophist; just as one may have spoken something untrue without being a liar; just 
as one can get drunk without being a drunkard].  Even though religion may ideally help cultivate 
moral life, according to Lessing’s humorous response, it would be absurd to believe that morality 
                                               
5 Luther, Martin. The Complete Sermons of Martin Luther.  Vol., 3. Ed. John Nicholas Lenker & Eugene 
F. A. Klug.  Grand Rapids Michigan: Baker Books, 2000. p. 238. 
6 Here I am referring to the editors of the Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724-1790) and Johann Andreas 
Cramer (1723-1788) 
7 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Briefe die Neueste Literatur betreffend. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1987. Letter XXI, 
May 22, 1760. English translation mine. 
8 Ibid, letter XXI, May 22, 1760. 
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cannot be expressed by individuals independent of their belonging to a religious congregation. 
Novalis also becomes a figure of this study who exhibits a desire to dissolve distinctions that only 
insulate the biblical tradition from supossedly “external” discourses like poetry, which he thought 
could help revitalize religion for the modern world.  For instance, in his Fragmente und Studien 
from 1799, he writes “Über die heilige Geschichte überhaupt—ihre Poësie, ihre innre Evidenz. 
Wer hat die Bibel für geschlossen erklärt? Sollte die Bibel nicht noch im Wachsen begriffen seyn? 
Der Biblische Vortrag ist unendlich bunt—Geschichte, Poësie, alles durcheinander”9 [About 
biblical history in general, its poetry, its inner evidence. Who declared the Bible closed? Should 
not the Bible still be growing? Biblical discourse is infinitely colorful: history, poetry, all mixed 
up].  Novalis was confident that, in showing how poetry and biblical history were intimately 
related, he could assuage the skeptical objections raised by a previous generation of Aufklärer 
[enlightenment thinkers]. Furthermore, Novalis often uses the term "Religiosität" [religiosity] in 
his writings, which opens up the door to a more fluid conception of religious experience that 
refuses to limit itself to prescribed forms of worship.  One outcome of this change in perspectives 
was that the line between religious and aesthetic experience began to dissolve, which becomes 
observable in the works of other Romantics like Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773-1798), 
whose writings suggest that the value of a religious experience should be based on how much 
aesthetic pleasure it affords a “believer.”10 
The next image (fig. 2), also from the sixteenth century, exposes a tendency within 
Protestant theology that would eventually become a major source of controversy by the 1770s, 
                                               
9 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und 
Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 97. p. 766. English translation mine. 
10 Wackenroder, Wilhelm Heinrich. Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders. Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1964.  
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namely, its fetishization of the “Buchstabe” [letter] of religion. The image, entitled Augsburg 
Confession (1590), commemorates Charles V’s signing of the Augsburg peace treaty. In this 
socially stratified scene, emperor Charles V (the largest represented figure) can be found at the 
center of the composition.  His signing of the treaty granted local princes the authority to decide 
which system of faith––Catholicism or Protestantism––their region wished to officially recognize.  
Of interest to this study is less the complex historical nuances of this particular event and more the 
details of the painting itself, which depicts the figures assembled at the center as arguing over the 
meaning of the words on their respective bibles, all looking to persuade the emperor that their 
interpretation is more correct. That these central figures appear to be debating is made evident by 
the fact that not everyone’s hand is raised to show the sign of benediction, a gesture used to give 
someone your blessing but whose etymology also means “well spoken”––as though some 
members of the group remained unmoved by a rival’s interpretation of the text.  Off to the right 
just under the crucifix, one encounters yet another scene in which clerical figures appear engaged 
in a dispute over the words of scripture.  Details like these speak not only to the newly developed 
schism that divided the Church into Protestant and Catholic sects, but they also anticipate the 
attempt by enlightenment theologians to build an entirely coherent system of faith (i.e. a science 
of religion)11 founded on nothing but historical “facts” that help support a “correct” interpretation 
of scripture, an effort that both Lessing and Novalis criticize for transforming faith into a matter 
of hermeneutics rather than moral education.  The painting, which is saturated with words that 
attempt to explain every visual detail, also exhibits a hostility towards other religious phenomena 
from communicating autonomously.  This aspect of the painting suggests that the word has a 
                                               
11 In chapter 2, section 3 of the following study I discuss enlightenment theology’s desire to forge a science 
of religion chiefly through the work of Siegmund Baumgarten, the older brother of Alexander Baumgarten. 
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powerful function: it is there to intervene whenever doubts emerge.  And yet, using the word to 
pre-emptively strike against any possible doubts comes at the cost of not allowing viewers to arrive 
at an understanding on their own terms.  It eschews the very process of (self) discovery that will 
come to define what I call “modern” faith.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Anonymous, Augsburg Confession (1590)  
This study contributes to larger debates about the continued relevance of God and religion 
in secular culture. It demonstrates that, rather than surrendering to religious skepticism, both 
Enlightenment and Romantic writers hastened to use aesthetics and literature to build more fluid 
conceptions of faith that can accommodate the changing spiritual needs of modernity.  Specifically, 
aesthetics and literature help break apart a tradition of faith oriented around duty by coordinating 
newly emergent discourses into religious thought and practice.  For example, the discourse on 
freedom that became central to many philosophical treatises across the eighteenth century had to 
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contend with the longstanding theological doctrine of grace, which accorded human freedom little, 
if any, role in achieving salvation. What is unique to this research is that it considers confrontations 
like this from the standpoint of literature and aesthetics rather than solely through the lens of 
philosophy and theology. To mention only one recent example, John Smith’s book Dialogues 
between Faith and Reason––while offering extremely insightful readings into how canonical 
figures negotiated their religious beliefs in a highly skeptical age––limits itself to a dialogue 
between philosophy and theology. My work attempts to bring literature and aesthetics into that 
dialogue by showing how it became fully conversant in the problems and questions that occupied 
philosophy and theology.  Additionally, my research challenges the assumption that secular 
literature is simply a hostile "other" seeking to supplant religion in the eighteenth century. Against 
this view, my research recovers the dialogical negotiations between faith and reason that were 
staged across the literary and aesthetic writings of the period, which, I claim, developed alongside 
religious discourse rather than counter to it. Far from simply “replacing” religion, literature and 
aesthetics, I argue, help to usher in new configurations of spiritual life that promise to modernize 
faith by unmooring it from duty-based paradigms of belief.   
As I mentioned, the two paintings above allude to many of the questions I pursue in this 
dissertation, yet my actual point of departure begins with the figure of Doubting Thomas in 
Klopstock’s Der Messias.  For his persistent skepticism and refusal to believe without visual proof 
of Christ’s resurrection in the Gospel of John, Doubting Thomas can easily be thought of as the 
patron saint of enlightenment theology, which also desired more powerful evidence to justify its 
faith in Christianity. Indeed, as I will show, the problem of Doubting Thomas is restaged in all 
three authors of this study in some fashion. In my first chapter, I interrogate Klopstock’s essay 
“Von der heiligen Poesie” in which he appears to fall in line with the Lutheran tradition by 
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attempting to maintain (ostensibly) the integrity of the letter; claiming to merely “walk in the 
footsteps of scripture" by filling in a few missing details here and there––as if he were an 
apprentice painter tasked only with bringing the master’s work into a final state of completion.  
After an analysis of Klopstock’s poetics, I then conduct a close reading of his amplification of 
Doubting Thomas in Gesang [book] XIV of Der Messias and conclude that his poetics 
inadvertently reproduces Thomas' “tragic” flaw by doubting the efficacy of unaided scripture to 
communicate religious truths.  The underlying assumption of Klopstock’s poetics is that without 
the help of poetry, religious truths like the one Christ communicates to Thomas in the Gospel of 
John (i.e. “it is better to believe than to see”12) would not reach modern audiences.  In addition to 
constellating Klopstock’s poetics with his representation of Doubting Thomas in Der Messias, I 
use this chapter to show how his poetics were in dialogue with the methodological practices of the 
so-called Neologen or “new theologians” (c.1740-1780), who developed a historical-critical 
approach to the biblical tradition that promised to transform older doctrines and dogmas so that 
they were less offensive to popular morality. The Neologen, who I treat more systematically in 
Chapter 2 (sections 1 & 3), accomplished this through several different strategies, but chief among 
them was a form of paraphrastics that allowed them to empty out the offensive historical content 
of revelation and refill it with rational content.13  While Klopstock was more interested in 
conjugating scripture into the idiom of affect poetry than he was in “rationalizing” its contents,14 
                                               
12 See John 20:29.  
13 One of the best studies on the Neologen remains Karl Aner’s Die Theologie der Lessingzeit (1929).  Aner 
claims, “Der Inhalt, von dem die Neologie den Offenbarungsbegriff entleert, ist der historische; der Inhalt, 
den sie neu einfüllt, ein rationaler” [The content that neology empties out from the concept of revelation is 
historical; the content that it refills it with is rational] (4). English translation mine. 
14The clearest expression of Klopstock’s aversion to rationalizing the content of scripture or reducing its 
contents to moral precepts can be found in his “Von der besten Art über Gott zu denken,” in which he 
argues that the best mode in which to “think about God” is not a “cold” metaphysical one, but rather through 
a poetic mode. 
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he was nevertheless drawn to the kind of paraphrastics that the Neologen were engaged in.  Like 
the Neologen, Klopstock’s epic poem interprets historical events in an idealized way in order to 
express an ethos that was more commensurate to the customs and traditions of the mid-eighteenth 
century.   
My second chapter explores how Lessing develops a more substantive response to religious 
skepticism than his predecessors by introducing an aesthetic mode of thinking that welcomes a 
participatory regime of faith.  Lessing's reorientation of Protestantism around the spirit rather than 
letter of the bible, sparks, I argue, a Copernican turn in Protestant consciousness that authenticates 
religious experience through the active criticism of the biblical tradition rather than a passive duty 
to believe [Glaubenspflicht].  The Fragmentenstreit also contains its own Doubting Thomas 
moment as soon as Lessing begins to critique enlightenment theology for investing historical 
evidence with more epistemic power than it has to offer.  For Lessing, historical truth is always 
firmly rooted in the particular and can never rise to the status of a general truth of reason.  Like 
Thomas, the eighteenth century must also trust in the witness testimony of biblical history and 
settle for a form of knowledge that is mediated rather than immediate.  That history is mediated, 
however, does not pose any serious threat to modern faith.  According to Lessing, the stories of 
the bible can still have an immediate effect on their audience, and this contributes to a “spiritual 
proof,” which suggest that confessions of faith need not rest on the logos of scripture, but instead 
on its ethos. This chapter begins with a general introduction into the historical context of the 
Fragmentenstreit, pointing to its prehistory and also to its reception up through Kierkegaard.  I 
then explore how the aesthetic logic of Lessing’s Laokoon finds expression in later theological 
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concepts like his “Fingerzeig” [pointer], which “weder ganz verhüllt noch ganz entdeckt”15 
[neither wholly conceals nor wholly reveals] its speculative vision.  I am especially interested in 
how his concept of the “pregnant moment” offers a useful heuristic for understanding how the 
visible, or outward, “letter” of religion interacts with the invisible “spirit” in Lessing’s religious 
thought. After discussing the theological relevance of his Laokoon, I then consider the three main 
theological systems that become an object of criticism for Lessing and also include an excursus 
into pietism and how Lessing stands within that tradition.  The next two sections explore more 
systematically the negative and positive moments of Lessing’s theology, starting with how his 
critique of the letter of religion left him searching for a cataphatic theology that he eventually 
locates in the spirit of religion.  
My final chapter explores how Novalis critiques Lessing by recuperating the miracles, 
signs, and intuitions that Lessing's Erziehung dispensed with. By mobilizing intuitive forms of 
language like fairytales to express religious truth, Novalis makes room for a model of faith that 
engages the senses. In my analysis, Lessing’s preference to discursively grasp the world around 
him was not shared by Novalis, whose writings exhibit an eagerness to spar with his predecessor 
by developing a theory of religious education that seeks to redeem the “outside” for its role in 
mediating spiritual life. Whereas, Lessing finds sensible forms of religious experience (i.e. images, 
miracles, prophecies) to be unnecessary props for modern faith (i.e. something to grow out of once 
a certain age of “maturity” is reached), Novalis believes they are the future of religion––that 
without religious phenomena modernity will never regain its lost “sense for religion.”  In many 
ways, Novalis stands with Doubting Thomas by demanding that religion be visible rather than 
                                               
15Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und Briefe: In Zwölf Bänden. Band 10. Hrsg. Von Arno Schilson und 
Axel Schmitt. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985.  p. 74. 
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invisible, and his Die Christenheit oder Europa develops a nostalgic image of the Medieval world 
to show how outward forms of Christian life contributed to a peaceful cosmopolitan order that was 
only interrupted once the Reformation relativized all religious life to the standpoint of philology. 
By framing his Die Christenheit oder Europa as a kind of fairy tale sermon, Novalis displays more 
honesty than Klopstock with respect to how his poetry engages the letter of religion.  In fact, 
Novalis explicitly criticizes Klopstock in one of his fragments for being an “unpoetic philologist,” 
writing that "Klopstocks Werke scheinen größentheils freie Übersetzungen und Bearbeitungen 
eines unbekannten Dichters durch einen sehr talentvollen, aber unpoetischen Philologen, zu sein"16 
[Klopstock's works largely appear to be free translations and adaptations of an unknown poet by a 
very talented but unpoetic philologist.] In other words, Klopstock was too preoccupied with 
preserving the letter of scripture, busied himself too much with the metrical composition of his 
verse to produce true works of genius.  This chapter begins with an investigation into several 
theoretical concepts––above all his concept of a “geistige Gegenwart” [spiritual present]––that 
become relevant for discussing Novalis’ religious thought, and then I use the opening scene from 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen to show how Novalis was engaged in a polemical debate with Lessing 
over the status of images in his theory of religious education.  I conclude this chapter with a close 
comparative reading of Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa and Lessing’s Erziehung. 
 
 
 
                                               
16 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und 
Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 97. p. 766. English translation mine. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Doubting Klopstock: The Problem of Thomas in Der Messias 
I. Heilige Poesie as a Poetics of Skepticism  
“Der Freigeist, und der Christ, der seine Religion nur halb 
versteht, sehn da [in der Offenbarung] nur einen großen Schauplatz von 
Trümmern, wo der tiefsinnige Christ einen majestätischen Tempel 
sieht.”17 
 
[The free spirit, and the Christian who only half understands his 
religion, sees in scripture only a great scene of ruins, where the profound 
Christian sees a majestic temple.] 
 
—Klopstock, Von der heiligen Poesie, 1755 
Thomas, the New Testament figure famously known for refusing to believe in Christ’s 
resurrection without empirical evidence, was almost written out of the canon by the synoptic 
                                               
17 Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” in Klopstocks Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10 
Leipzig: Göschen, 1854–55, pp. 237–38. Unless otherwise indicated all English translations of 
Klopstock’s writings are mine. 
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tradition (the Gospels of Mark, Luke, and Matthew18). These texts, which represent the earliest 
and most consistent reports of Christ’s life and teachings, only mention his name as one minor 
figure among a list of others,19 and instead of concentrating doubts about Christ’s resurrection in 
him they develop it in radically different ways. For example, the Gospel of Mark inadvertently led 
to the grave-robbing theory in which Christ’s body was stolen rather than resurrected;20 Luke’s 
Gospel left open the possibility that the grief-stricken apostles were delusional and saw only a 
                                               
18 Much of what we know of Thomas actually comes from outside the canon, in gnostic literature. The 
most significant texts are: The Infancy Gospel of Thomas, which documents the miracles performed by 
Christ when he was a child; The Gospel of Thomas, which is another gospel said to be composed by 
Thomas; The Book of Thomas the Contender, a collection of stories that record Christ’s teachings; The 
Acts of Thomas, which document his missionary work in India; and The Apocalypse of Thomas, which 
reports on Christ’s views about the end of the world. All of these sources can be found together in The 
New Testament Apocrypha: A Collection of Apocryphal Christian Literature, trans. J.K. Elliot, Oxford, 
2009. 
19 All biblical references are from The Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Version, 3rd ed., Oxford UP, 
2001. See Mark 3:18; Luke 6:15; Matthew 10:3. Glenn Most makes a similar claim: “It is almost as 
though the canonization of the New Testament was achieved, in part at least, by systematically excluding 
Thomas.” Most, W. Glenn, Doubting Thomas, Cambridge, Mass. 2005, p. 90. 
20 In the Gospel of Mark an unidentified youth (not an angel) sits at the empty tomb and tells a group of 
female mourners that Christ “has been raised; he is not here. Look, there is the place they laid him” 
(16:6). The youth instructs the women to tell the other apostles of Christ’s resurrection, but instead they 
“fled from the tomb, for terror and amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to anyone, for they 
were afraid” (16:8). In the original ending (as opposed to the shorter and longer endings of Mark added 
later in the second century) nobody actually sees Christ, which leads to the more likely scenario that 
Christ’s body was stolen and the author fabricated the resurrection to legitimize the authority of the 
Church. The grave-robbing theory was renewed in the eighteenth century by Samuel Herman Reimarus 
(1694–1768) in his essay “Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte” (1777), published posthumously during the 
fragment controversy (1773–80) by Lessing. Reimarus used the Gospel of Matthew to reinforce the 
theory, identifying the gardener of the story as Joseph of Arimathea, the person responsible for Christ’s 
burial: “Es war ganz möglich, daß der Körper Jesu des Nachts heimlich aus dem Grabe gestohlen, und 
anderwärts verscharret werden konnte. Das Grab war in einem Fels, gehörte dem Joseph von Arimathia, 
einem heimlichen Jünger Jesu, und der Zugang zum Grabe war in dem Gehege seines Gartens” [It was 
entirely possible that the body of Jesus could have been stolen secretly out of the tomb at night and buried 
elsewhere. The tomb was in a rock, it belonged to Joseph of Arimathea, a secret disciple of Jesus, and the 
entrance to the tomb was in the enclosure of his garden.] In: Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Werke und 
Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 283. 
English translation mine. 
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ghost of Christ;21 lastly, the Gospel of Matthew communalized the problem of doubt by explicitly 
stating that there were “still doubters among” the apostles even after they saw the risen Christ at 
Galilee.22 But only the Gospel of John—a text composed much later than the other gospels—
decided to flesh out the figure of Thomas and give him a lead role. In this version of the story, 
Thomas was given the ambitious task of sweeping away the residual skepticism left over from the 
three previous gospels.23 The clearest expression of what is at stake if doubts about Christ’s 
resurrection prevail was articulated by Paul, who, in trying to persuade the Corinthians of the story, 
wrote: “if the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.”24 In other words, if 
there is no resurrection, which by extension means no eternal salvation, then hedonism offers a 
more relevant ethos than Christianity. John was acutely aware of this and summoned all his talents 
as a storyteller to put Thomas’s disbelief into the service of faith so that posterity would never 
forget the proverb “it is better to believe than to see.”25 However, posterity does not remember 
“Believing Thomas,”26 but rather “Doubting Thomas,” the apostle who refused to ground his faith 
                                               
21 In the Gospel of Luke Christ actually appears to two apostles, and their reaction is telling: “They were 
startled and terrified, and thought that they were seeing a ghost” (24:37). Jesus becomes insecure about 
their reaction and asks, “why are you frightened, and why do doubts arise in your hearts? Look at my 
hands and my feet; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have flesh and bones as 
you see that I have” (24:38–39). But, according to Luke, the apostles still doubted: “While in their joy 
they were disbelieving and still wondering […]” (24:41). In an attempt to further prove the material 
existence of his risen body, Christ offers to eat food to demonstrate that he is no mere apparition: “have 
you anything here to eat? They gave him a piece of broiled fish, and he took it and ate it in their presence” 
(24:41–43). 
22 See Matthew 28:17: “And when they saw him they worshiped him, but some doubted.” 
23 See Most, pp. 27–28: “all three of the synoptic Gospels make great efforts to leave us with faith, but the 
very means they employ cannot help but leave us with questions. In the Gospel of John, all the issues of 
doubt and belief that, in different ways, haunt the three synoptic Gospels converge to form an unsettling 
climax [and] the various strands of the whole discourse of doubt and conviction are intertwined into the 
texture of a single character [i.e., Thomas].”  
24 See Paul, I Corinthians 15:32. 
25 See John 20:29.  
26 See John 20:28 for Thomas’s proclamation of faith, where after seeing the wounds he says to Christ: 
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on hearsay alone; the one who demanded to see and touch the wounds of Christ for himself27—a 
demand that would shroud his reception throughout cultural history in ambiguity.28 That ambiguity 
ensured that John would not get the last word with respect to the Thomas story.  
Looking ahead to the eighteenth century, the problem of Doubting Thomas would be 
restaged in a number of powerful ways.29 More so than any other apostle, Thomas lives up to 
Kant’s “motto of the enlightenment” insofar as he exhibits the courage to use his own 
                                               
“My lord and my God.” This response marks the only occasion in the New Testament Gospels where 
Christ is explicitly referred to as God. Earlier in John (20:15), Mary Magdalene mistakes the gardener for 
Christ; an intertextual reference that calls back to Genesis and suggestively elevates Christ to the status of 
Creator. Most, pp. 27–28, suggests that Thomas refers to Christ as God because Christ singled him out to 
honor his request to see and touch the wounds. Martin Buber indicates that John’s version of Thomas 
proclaims a faith that transcends the faith of the other apostles, and uses this moment in the Gospel of 
John to further distinguish between a Jewish “type” of faith (i.e., the faith of Abraham) and a Christian 
one: “But [Thomas] does not only believe that Jesus is risen; he believes also that he is ›his God.‹ Did the 
other apostles also believe that? Till then they have not said anything which might be so understood […] 
What [Thomas] thinks in this moment is apparent: since no man can rise as an individual, then this is no 
man, but a god.” See Buber, Martin, Two Types of Faith, trans. Norman P. Goldhawk, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003, p. 128. 
27 See John 20:25 “Unless I see the nail marks in his hands and put my finger where the nails were, and 
put my hand into his side, I will not believe.” 
28 For a survey on how Thomas was treated by theologians from the Early Church up to the counter-
reformation see Most, pp. 122–54. 
29 To my knowledge there is no secondary literature that specifically uses Thomas as a crucible for 
analyzing the development of the religious enlightenment. Kevin Hilliard briefly discusses the figure of 
Thomas in Klopstock’s Messias, though he subsumes Thomas’s relevance under the discourse of 
“freethinking” and does not venture a comparison between the underlying poetics of Der Messias and the 
figure of Thomas as I do here (Hilliard, Kevin, Freethinkers, Libertines and Schwärmer: Heterodoxy in 
German Literature, 1750–1800, London: IGRS Books, 2011). In Hilliard’s analysis, “Klopstock used the 
[Thomas] episode in a way that is both orthodox and exegetically conventional” (pp. 63–68), though I 
would argue that the magnitude of Klopstock’s amplification of Thomas rules out the possibility of an 
“orthodox” reading, by taking liberties that are incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of sola scriptura. 
See also Hilliard, Kevin, Philosophy, Letters, and the Fine Arts in Klopstock’s Thought, London 1987, 
pp. 68–113. Steffen Martus analyzes Klopstock’s version of Doubting Thomas, but limits his 
investigation to showing how the Thomas scenes establish an environment of “critical communication,” 
which puts the reader into the position of an apostle or disciple and Klopstock into the position of a 
Messiah. See Martus, Steffen, Werkpolitik. Zur Literaturgeschichte kritischer Kommunikation vom 17. bis 
ins 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2007, pp. 279–81.  
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understanding by not blindly assenting to the authority of others.30 For Thomas does not merely 
think that eternal salvation awaits humanity, he knows it.31 His religious knowledge is constitutive 
rather than regulative,32 which means that he does not need to think and act as if God exists and 
will reward the virtuous because he has seen the promise fulfilled in Christ.33 Of course, no such 
faith was available to enlightenment theologians,34 who nevertheless defiantly strove to forge 
systems of faith that were consonant with the newly minted natural-scientific method.35 Their 
                                               
30 On Kant’s “motto of enlightenment,” see Kant, Immanuel, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
Aufklärung?,” in Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1, Band XI, 
Hrsg. von. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main 2014, p. 53.  
31 On the distinction between thinking (denken) and knowing (erkennen), see Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft I, Band III, Hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel, Berlin 2014, p. 30. 
32 On Kant’s distinction between knowledge that is regulative and constitutive see Kant, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft I, p. 219. 
33 On Kant’s moral proof of God, see Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten, Band VII. Hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel, Berlin 2014, p. 51. For the aesthetic 
underpinnings of Kant’s moral proof, see Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Band X. Hrsg. von 
Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main 2015, p. 420. On the relation between aesthetics and religion in 
Kant’s works, see Smith, John H., Dialogues Between Faith and Reason. The Death and Return of God in 
Modern German Thought, Ithaca NY 2011, pp. 68–94. 
34 The best source on Neologie is Karl Aner, whose book Die Theologie der Lessingzeit (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 1927) continues to be a valuable resource for scholars like Henry Allison (Lessing and the 
Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and its Relation to Eighteenth-Century Thought, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1966) and Gerhard Kaiser (Klopstock: Religion und Dichtung, Gütersloh, 
1963). For sources on Deism, see Lucci, Diego, Scripture and Deism. The Biblical Criticism of the 
Eighteenth-Century British Deists, Bern: Peter Lang, 2008, and Gay, Peter, Deism: An Anthology, 
Michigan: Van Nostrand Press, 1968. For sources on Orthodox Lutheranism during the enlightenment, 
see Sorkin, David, “Reclaiming Theology for the Enlightenment: The Case of Siegmund Jacob 
Baumgarten,” Central European History, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2003, pp. 503–30, and The Religious 
Enlightenment. Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna, Princeton, NJ, 2008. Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen, 1960 offers excellent readings of pietism during the 
enlightenment. For a source on Judaism and enlightenment, see Goestchel, Willi, The Discipline of 
Philosophy and the Invention of Modern Jewish Thought, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
35 One early attempt to apply the natural-scientific method to biblical exegesis is Spinoza’s Theological-
Political Treatise. He writes: “The [correct] method of interpreting nature consists above all in 
constructing a natural history, from which we derive the definitions of natural things, as from certain data. 
Likewise, to interpret Scripture, we need to assemble a genuine history of it and to deduce the thinking of 
the Bible’s authors by valid inferences from this history, as from certain data and principles.” See 
Spinoza, Benedict de, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, 
New York 2007, p. 98. For a more general account of the translation and exegetical practices of 
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efforts to establish a more certain faith implicitly indexed the figure of Doubting Thomas, and 
many of their methodologies would not be called into question until the Fragmentenstreit. By 
publishing the fragments of Samuel Herman Reimarus (1694–1768) Lessing held up a mirror to 
theologians and showed them how their hermeneutics turned scripture into a Tower of Babel,36 
and how the desire to deduce necessary truths of reason from the gospels only renewed the problem 
of Doubting Thomas in the realm of historical judgment.37 Rather than confessing its faith upon 
the logos of the letter, Lessing recommended modernity look for evidence in the spirit of religion 
(i.e., the underlying ethos embedded in the stories themselves).38  
Yet before these inquiries turned Thomas into a figure of grounded knowledge, Klopstock 
attempted to succeed where John had failed. In his Christian epic Der Messias, Klopstock 
conjugates the story of Thomas into the idiom of epic poetry in the hopes of making the moral 
lesson of belief more communicable to an increasingly skeptical, enlightened age. However, at 
least one moment in the epic poem threatens to unravel the pious intentions of its poetics: Doubting 
                                               
eighteenth-century Germany and England, see Sheenan, Jonathan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, 
Scholarship, Culture, Princeton 2005. 
36 See § 51 in Lessing’s Gegensätze des Herausgebers, in which he allegorizes the state of modern 
theology through the figure of the child, writing: “Man muß die Anspielungen und Fingerzeige zu viel 
suchen und machen, die Allegorien zu genau ausschütteln, die Beispiele zu umständlich deuten die Worte 
zu stark pressen. Das gibt dem Kinde einen kleinlichen, schiefen, spitzfindigen Verstand; das macht es 
geheimnisreich, abergläubisch, voll Verachtung gegen alles Faßliche und Leichte.” [One must look for 
and invent too many allusions and pointers, extract too much from the allegories, interpret the examples 
too circumstantially, and press the words too hard. This gives the child a petty, warped, and hairsplitting 
understanding; it makes the child secretive, superstitious, and full of contempt for everything 
comprehensible and straightforward.] Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, 
Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 346. 
37 See Lessing’s Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft. Ibid., p. 440. 
38 See Lessing’s Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft: “Was verbindet mich denn dazu (Glauben an 
Christi)?—Nichts, als diese Lehren selbst […] Was kümmert es mich, ob die Sage falsch oder wahr ist: 
die Früchte sind trefflich.” [What, then, binds me to my faith? - Nothing but the teachings themselves … 
What does it matter to me whether the old legend is true or false? The fruits are excellent.] Ibid., p. 444. 
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Thomas.39 Whereas John’s exposition of Thomas involves only a few lines of verse,40 Klopstock 
expands the tale of incredulity to a staggering 1,400 lines—nearly all of Gesang XIV.41 Such a 
prolix adaptation of the Thomas scene demonstrates that Klopstock had very little trust in the 
revelatory power of the original story; that he found its truth too weak, too soft-spoken, too full of 
gaps to be of any service to the modern reader. As a result, he tried to supplement the original story 
by dramatizing the affects associated with skepticism, but in so doing created new gaps and new 
discrepancies that only intensify the ambiguity of the original story. To be clear, my intention is 
not to condemn or justify the Thomas of Der Messias or its author. Rather, I hope to reconstruct 
the theological and aesthetic difficulties that Klopstock must have confronted as he wrote his epic 
poem. In what follows, I will argue that the poetics of Der Messias reproduces the same tragic 
flaw as Thomas by doubting the efficacy of unaided scripture to reveal religious truths. In my 
analysis, Klopstock’s amplification of the figure of Doubting Thomas produces new ambiguities 
that undermine his general effort to clarify the status of skepticism within the Christian imaginary. 
To support this argument I explore Klopstock’s methodological approach to scripture as outlined 
in his 1755 essay “Von der heiligen Poesie,” though occasionally I refer to his other aesthetic 
writings as well. After identifying how Klopstock’s poetics are circumscribed by skepticism, I 
                                               
39 Kaiser, Gerhard, Klopstock. Religion und Dichtung, Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963, p. 9. For further 
scholarship on this topic, see Jacob, Joachim, Heilige Poesie: Zu einem literarischen Modell bei Pyra, 
Klopstock und Wieland, Tübingen 1997; Osterkamp, Ernst, “Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock: Der Messias, 
Der Teufel in der Aufklärung: Vernunftgebot und Entdämonisierung,” in: Lucifer. Stationen eines Motifs, 
Berlin 1979, pp. 131–79; Freivogel, Max, Klopstock. Der heilige Dichter, Bern: Francke, 1954. 
40 In addition to John 20:25 (cited above), there are only three other occasions where Thomas is given 
voice in the New Testament. See John 11:16; John 14:5, and John 20:28. 
41 Thomas also appears in Gesänge 3 and 17. See Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, Der Messias, in Werke 
und Briefe: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, Band 1/2 Hrsg. von Horst Gronemeyer, Elisabeth Höpker-
Herberg, Berlin 2000 (Gesang III/V. 263–72, pp. 51–52; Gesang XVII/ V. 1–85, pp. 192–94). 
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develop a close reading of Klopstock’s version of Thomas and identify the politics standing behind 
his adaptation.  
Most orthodox readings of Doubting Thomas tend to limit his significance to that of a 
negative example.42 In defending this view, commentators frequently cite Christ’s assessment of 
Thomas’s faith: “Because you have seen me, you have believed; blessed are those who have not 
seen and yet believed.”43 Early commentators like Augustine and Tertullian, for example, used 
this scene to mark out the limits of human reason, claiming that to grasp the miracles and 
prophecies of revelation required faith rather than reason.44 However, by the mid to late eighteenth-
century new discourses on freedom had been absorbed into popular morality, greatly diminishing 
the legitimacy of the obedience model of faith (Glaubenspflicht).45 As a result, older dogmas 
needed to be updated to fit the new environment of the enlightenment. For example, Johann August 
Eberhard (1739–1809) challenged a number of dogmas associated with Christian soteriology, 
especially those relating to predestination and grace, which tended to credit God with any 
                                               
42 See Most, p.145: “the orthodox exegesis sees in Thomas the proof that we should not try too hard to 
understand and should be prepared to believe even without understanding.” Most provides a detailed 
account of how a “standard” reading of Thomas developed in orthodox traditions, citing five exegetical 
tropes that were used to consolidate Thomas’s significance. 
43 See John 20:29. 
44 Of the resurrection, Tertullian writes “it is certain because it is impossible,” and Augustine writes: 
“where reason fails, that is where faith is constructed.” Quoted from Most, pp. 144–45. 
45 For example, in his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793) Kant describes 
compulsory regimes of faith as being “fetish-faiths”: “Wenn das [Pfaffentum] die gehorsame 
Unterwerfung unter eine Satzung, als Frondienst, nicht aber die freie Huldigung auferlegt, die dem 
moralischen Gesetze zuoberst geleistet werden soll, so mögen der auferlegten Observanzen noch so wenig 
sein, genug, wenn sie für unbedingt notwendig erklärt werden: so ist das immer ein Fetischglauben, durch 
den die Menge regiert, und durch den Gehorsam unter eine Kirche (nicht der Religion) ihrer moralischen 
Freiheit beraubt wird.” [If [clericalism] imposes obedient submission to rules, in the form of compulsory 
labor, but not free homage, to be given above all to the moral law, however few the imposed observances 
may be, it is enough that they are declared necessary: then that is always a fetish-faith, through which the 
masses are ruled and robbed of their moral freedom by obedience to a church (not to religion).] See Kant, 
Immanuel, Sämmtliche Werke, Vol. 6, Hrsg. von G. Hartenstein, Leipzig 1868, p. 279. 
 
 22 
instantiation of virtuous life in the world rather than attributing it to the freedom of the will. To 
dignify the moral labor of humanity, Eberhard attempted to naturalize the effects of God’s grace, 
arguing that all moral good arises naturally in the soul of mankind and that there are no 
supernatural events that determine this person will be virtuous while another sinful46. Eberhard 
also attacked dogmas about eternal damnation that fail to acknowledge the corrective function of 
punishment. That a human “soul” could spend eternity in hell for a sin undermines the idea of 
redemption and calls into question God’s assumed benevolence. To solve this problem, Eberhard 
developed a similar solution in which heaven and hell are relativized to the standpoint of mental 
states, making redemption and punishment a matter of free will. 
Ambiguous scenes like the one involving Doubting Thomas incentivized Klopstock to 
retell the passion story. In his essay Von der heiligen Poesie, which served as the preface to the 
1756 edition of Der Messias, Klopstock expressed his intention to amplify biblical scenes lacking 
sufficient details and circumstances to make the moral truths of the bible more audible:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Die moralische Wahrheit der Bibel, besonders da, wo sie eine Stufe höher, als die 
philosophische, steigt, muss in ihrer vollen Stärke gesagt werden; aber nicht 
mürrisch und trübsinnig. Die Offenbarung ist beides nicht. Sie ist Ernst. Einige 
heilige Begebenheiten lassen ebensowenig eine Ausbildung zu, als sie andre zu 
fordern scheinen. Die Stelle: ‚Die Gräber taten sich auf, und stunden auf viele 
                                               
46 Eberhard, J. A., and Walter Sparn, Neue Apologie des Sokrates oder Untersuchung der Lehre von der 
Seeligkeit der Heiden, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2001. See also: Aner, Karl, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit, 
Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964, pp. 285–95; Allison, Henry E., Lessing and the Enlightenment: His 
Philosophy of Religion and Its Relation to Eighteenth-Century Thought, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1966, pp. 40–42. 
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Leiber der Heiligen, die da schliefen; und gingen aus den Gräbern nach seiner 
Auferstehung, und kamen in die heilige Stadt, und erschienen vielen.‘ Diese Stelle 
ist von der letzten Art.47  
 
[The moral truth of the Bible, especially where it rises a step higher than the 
philosophical truth, must be expressed in its full strength; but not morosely and 
gloomily. Revelation is neither. It is serious. Certain sacred events allow less 
[interpretive] training while others seem to demand it. Consider the passage: ‘The 
tombs were opened, and many bodies of the saints who slept there stood up and 
went out from the tombs after his resurrection and entered the holy city and 
appeared to many.’ This passage is of the latter kind.] 
According to Klopstock, these lines from Matthew (27:52–53) index a religious truth 
concerning the resurrection of saints that was expressed in too feeble a manner to be effectual, and 
so Klopstock decided to add what he imagined to be their missing details, fabricating enough 
material for nearly three Gesänge (XI, XIII, XV)48 in Der Messias. More importantly, the passage 
provides insight into Klopstock’s religious thought, which links the moral truth of the bible to 
rhetoric, thereby forming an intimate bond between poetry and religion as the preeminent (not to 
mention archetypal) vehicle for communicating moral truth. By contrast, Klopstock finds 
philosophy inadequate for communicating religious truths because it cannot express such truths 
with the full emotional intensity they deserve.49 Yet merely asserting that certain events require 
                                               
47 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol 10, p. 235. 
48 In Gesang XI, Klopstock interprets the “Leiber der Heiligen” to be figures from the Old Testament. In 
Gesang XIII these figures congregate at Golgotha, the site of Christ’s crucifixion, to reflect upon the 
resurrection of Christ. In Gesang XV the figures appear to the elect among the living. 
49 Katrin Kohl develops a reading of Klopstock’s religious thought by comparing his essay “Von der 
besten Art über Gott zu denken” with Lessing’s criticism of it in his Briefe die neuste Literatur 
betreffend. Kohl’s inquiry seeks to delimit the borders between theology and literature at a moment when 
the autonomy of art was starting to assert itself. See her essay “Die ‘beste Art über Gott zu denken’? 
Auseinandersetzungen um das religiöse Potential der Dichtung im 18. Jahrhundert,” in: Literatur und 
Theologie im 18. Jahrhundert. Konfrontationen, Kontroversen und Konkurrenzen, ed. Hans-Edwin 
Friedrich, Wilhelm Haefs, Christian Soboth, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011, pp. 225–43. For a technical survey 
of the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and rhetoric in Klopstock’s thought see: Hilliard, 
Philosophy, Letters, and the Fine Arts in Klopstock’s Thought, London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 
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more poetic amplification than others implies that the events themselves call out for elaboration, a 
strategy that minimizes Klopstock’s role in subjectively selecting which biblical scenes to amplify. 
As it happens, Klopstock also cautions against too much poetic amplification: “Ich nenne schon 
Irrtum, wenn man zuweilen da hundert Schritte sehn will, wo man nur einige sehn sollte, und wenn 
man sehn will, wo man nur glauben sollte.”50 [I would already call it an error, if one occasionally 
wanted to see a hundred steps where one should only see a few, and if one wanted to see where 
one should only believe.] Considering the sheer scope of his amplification of the Thomas story, it 
becomes difficult to read this rule and not apply it to Klopstock himself.  
To want to see more in cases where one should simply believe in the available reports 
brings the poetics of Der Messias dangerously close to the figure of doubting Thomas. Like 
Thomas, Klopstock elaborates scripture on the assumption that there is a more forceful, immanent 
truth to be found, but in order to decipher that truth he must doubt scripture. Klopstock argues, 
“Gewisse Wahrheiten, deren völlige Erkenntnis uns in diesem Leben noch nicht notwendig ist, 
sind uns so offenbart, daß sie so viele Winke zu sein scheinen, weiter über diese Wahrheiten 
nachzudenken.”51 [Certain truths, whose full knowledge is not yet necessary to us in this life, are 
revealed to us in such a way that they appear to be many hints and suggestions  that we further 
contemplate these truths]. To contemplate the incomplete truths of scripture is also to contemplate 
perceived inadequacies contained therein.52 This might sound trivial today, but in 1755 the doctrine 
                                               
University of London, 1987. For a study on the relationship between rhetoric and religion in Klopstock’s 
poetry see Kohl, Katrin, Rhetoric, the Bible, and the Origins of Free Verse. The Early “Hymns” of 
Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, Berlin, 1990. 
50 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol 10, p. 234. 
51 Ibid., p. 234. 
52 For scholarship that relates the idea of adequatio (or adequate knowledge) in Baumgarten’s 
philosophical aesthetics to Klopstock’s Der Messias, see Berndt, Frauke, Poema/Gedicht: Die 
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of sola scriptura,53 which Luther used to oppose corrupt ecclesiastical traditions like the selling of 
indulgences,54 still exerted influence over the protestant community and greatly limited the ways 
in which theologians and commentators could engage the bible. Insofar as the doctrine of sola 
scriptura grants sole authority to the bible rather than any external commentaries—literary or 
otherwise—Klopstock’s “heilige Poesie” would not have met the approval of Luther, who argued 
“if something more than God’s word is presented to us, it is certainly erroneous, seductive, un-
Christian, lying and deceitful.”55 But Klopstock and other writers sympathetic to pietism took 
recourse to Philipp Spener’s (1635–1705) call for tota scriptura, which viewed non-canonical and 
apocryphal literature as an additional resource to expand and sharpen a congregation’s religious 
knowledge.56 Despite Luther’s warnings against adding to scripture, Klopstock used epic poetry 
                                               
Epistemische Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. 
53 For Luther’s use of sola scriptura against Rome, see “The Smalclad Articles” (1537) in Luther, Martin, 
Basic Theological Writings, third edition, ed. Timothy F. Lull and William R. Russell, Minneapolis 2012. 
Here Luther writes: “It will not do to formulate articles of faith on the basis of the holy Fathers’ works or 
words. Otherwise, their food, clothes, houses, etc., would also have to be articles of faith—as has been 
done with relics. This means that the Word of God—and no one else, not even an angel—should establish 
articles of faith” (p. 346). For Luther’s use of sola scriptura against humanist readings of scripture see his 
“Concerning the Letter and the Spirit,” in Basic Theological Writings, pp. 53–71. 
54 In his 95 Theses, Luther writes: “Injury is done the Word of God when, in the same sermon, an equal or 
larger amount of time is devoted to indulgences than to the Word,” Basic Theological Writings, p. 11. 
55 Luther, “Concerning the Letter and the Spirit,” in Basic Theological Writings, p. 65. To silence the 
“murderous noise [of] raging amplification” within humanist interpretations of scripture, Luther quotes 
from Deuteronomy 4:2: “You shall not add to the words I command you, nor take from them” (ibid.). 
56 Against sola scriptura, Spener argued: “all scripture, without exception, should be known by the 
congregation if we are all to receive the necessary benefit. If we put together all the passages of the Bible 
which in the course of many years are read to a congregation in one place, they will comprise only a very 
small part of Scriptures which have been given to us. The remainder is not heard by the congregation at 
all, or is heard only insofar as one or another verse is quoted or alluded to in sermons, without, however, 
offering any understanding of the entire context, which is nevertheless of the greatest importance.” See 
Spener, Philipp Jacob, Pia Desideria, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1964, 
p. 88. 
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to elevate the manner in which religious truths were communicated by introducing stronger affects 
that could (ideally) help facilitate confessions of faith.  
When Klopstock started to write Der Messias, epic poetry was still considered to be the 
privileged literary genre.57 It gained a portion of its authority by tapping into the empirical data or 
“facts” of biblical “history.” In his book Futures Past, Reinhart Koselleck observes that around 
1750 “the line dividing the camps of historians and creative writers became osmotically porous. It 
was demanded of the writer […] that he articulate historical reality if he wished to be convincing 
and have influence [and] like the writer, [the historian] was to distill from his history its meaningful 
unity.”58 By poeticizing the language of biblical history, Klopstock had to confront both demands 
so that his Christian epic would offer “experiences that readers [could] learn from and make their 
own by repeating virtuous deeds from the past and avoiding previous mistakes.”59 Yet perhaps 
Klopstock was drawn to history for a simpler reason. Unlike allegory, history does not require 
additional abstraction to grasp its moral truth: “Die beiden Hauptfehler der meisten allegorischen 
Gemälde sind, daß sie oft gar nicht oder doch sehr mühsam verstanden werden, und daß sie, ihrer 
Natur nach, uninteressant sind.”60 [The two most common mistakes of most allegorical paintings 
are: they often cannot be understood, or only with painstaking effort, and they are—by nature—
uninteresting.] Klopstock finds allegory “uninteresting” because the path to its moral truth is 
                                               
57 For instance, Breitinger values epic poetry above other literary genres because of its perceived 
effectiveness in edifying the public and its ability to establish a distinct national literature. Breitinger, 
Johann Jacob, Critische Dichtkunst, Band I, hrsg. von Paul Böckmann und Friedrich Sengle, Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1966, pp. 77–106. See also Payne, Charlton, The Epic Imaginary. Political Power and its 
Legitimations in Eighteenth-Century German Literature, Berlin 2012, especially chapter 2, “The Mimesis 
of the Epic and Epic Mimesis: Klopstock’s Theory of Hexameter as Darstellung,” pp. 61–74. 
58 Koselleck, Reinhart, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 206. Also see Lehmann, Robert, Impossible Modernisms, Stanford: 
Stanford Univerity Press, 2016, p. 2. 
59 See Koselleck, Futures Past, p. 27. 
60 Klopstock, “Eine Beurteilung der Winckelmannischen Gedanken über die Nachahmung der 
Griechischen Werke in den schönen Künsten,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol 10, p. 256. 
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always obviated by opaque symbols and signs that common sense cannot easily decipher. History, 
by contrast, is more pleasing because it directly appeals to the reader’s interest by claiming to 
represent real people and actual events. 
Of course, epic poetry is distinct from history in that it does not claim to be grounded in 
empirical facts, yet it still participates in a process of commemoration that is consistent with 
Cicero’s notion of “Historia Magistra Vitae,” in which history communicates virtues worthy of 
being socially reproduced. Not only does Klopstock’s epic poetry fulfill this function—as a kind 
of Poiesis Magistra Vitae that poeticizes history to achieve the same pedagogical ends—it also 
seeks to create authentic religious experiences through affective poetry. With this in mind, 
Klopstock’s Thomas should not be understood as an allegory pointing to the dangers of religious 
skepticism, for John’s version already accomplishes this to some degree. Rather, the reader should 
affectively experience Thomas’s historically grounded doubt as the narrative unfolds, and (ideally) 
become conditioned to suppress any residual skepticism about Christ’s miraculous resurrection or 
the prospect of eternal salvation that is entangled in it. 
In Der Messias, Klopstock dedicates large sections and almost an entire chapter to 
presenting the dramatic effects of Thomas’s doubt. By altering the sequence of events, representing 
the apostle’s inner thoughts, and placing Thomas in dialogue with his fellow apostles, Klopstock 
attempts to harmonize scripture and popular morality. Thus, his poetic amplifications are not 
without a political agenda.61 In many ways the politics of Klopstock’s Thomas correspond to the 
                                               
61 That epic poetry served political purposes is expressed by Breitinger, who argues that the “epische 
Fabel hat eine große und wichtige, meistens politische Wahrheit, an deren Beobachtung nicht nur die 
Wohlfahrt einzelner Menschen, sondern das Heil ganzer Völcker hängt, zur Haupt-Absicht” [The epic 
fable has as its main purpose a great and important, usually political truth, on the observation of which 
depends not only the well-being of individuals but the benefit of entire peoples] (p. 197).  
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politics of neology (1740–1790),62 a theological movement committed to forging a stronger unity 
between reason and faith. Neologians shaped their hermeneutics after Leibniz’s Theodicy (1710), 
which articulated one of the central problems the group strove to resolve:  
But since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention between them would 
cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of reason against any article 
of faith are insoluble, then it must be said that this alleged article will be false and 
not revealed: this will be a chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith 
will be capable of comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat.63 
Disharmony between faith and reason calls into question the perfection of God, which for 
Leibniz would be absurd, so the real problem must be linked to discord within human thinking 
itself—mistakenly grounding beliefs on false articles of faith. Leibniz was responding to Pierre 
Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697), which devastated the Christian imaginary by 
claiming that “history is simply a collection of the crimes and misfortunes of the human race,”64 
and that God was complicit in these crimes by doing nothing to prevent them despite his assumed 
omnipotence.65 Leibniz saw things differently. His Theodicy developed a popular counter-narrative 
that emphasized the “good news” of history.66 According Leibniz, all injustices recorded in human 
                                               
62 For information on Klopstock’s ties to Neologie, see Kaiser, Gerhard, Klopstock. Religion und 
Dichtung, Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963, especially the sections titled: “Neologische Freunde und 
Förderer” and “Vernunft und Offenbarung,” pp. 28–35. 
63 Leibniz, Gottfried, Theodicy. Essays on The Goodness of God and the Freedom of Man and the Origin 
of Evil, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E.M. Huggard, La Salle, Ill. 1990, § 39 / pp. 96–97. 
64 Bayle, Pierre, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H. Popkin, Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1991, p. 147. 
65 For sources on the philosophical history of the theodicy problem, see Nieman, Susan, Evil in Modern 
Thought. An Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton 2002; Marquard, Odo, Schwierigkeiten mit der 
Geschichtsphilosophie, Frankfurt am Main, 1982; Marquard, Odo, Skepsis in der Moderne philosophische 
Studien, Stuttgart, 2007; Marquard, Odo, Apologie des Zufälligen, Stuttgart, 1986. 
66 Within eighteenth-century literature, Leibniz’s Theodicy had a polarizing effect. For instance, it was 
thought to be a source of inspiration for one of the eighteenth century’s most cherished poems, Alexander 
Pope’s Essay on Man (1734). In 1755, Lessing and Mendelssohn entered an essay contest put on by the 
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history can be subsumed under the premise of a greater good, which makes “all the apparent 
deformities of our little world combine to become beauties […] God, by a wonderful art, […] 
makes evil serve the greater good.”67 The antinomy between faith and reason would become an 
enormous site of controversy within eighteenth-century discourse,68 and Klopstock’s version of 
Thomas seeks to subordinate his religious skepticism to the greater good of the religious 
community by having the apostle publicly acknowledge his transgression (something John does 
not do): “Thomas betet’ ihm [Christ] nach, stand auf, und ging zu den Jüngern, / Und zu den 
anderen Brüdern umher, und bat um Erlassung / Seiner Schuld.”69 [Thomas prayed to Christ, stood 
up, went to the apostles and the other brothers who stood around and asked them to forgive his 
sin.] 
The political urgency of Klopstock’s Thomas can be detected in his decision to present 
religious skepticism as more widely dispersed throughout the community of believers. In other 
words, Thomas’s incredulity (while extreme) is not exceptional, but appears to be a shared problem 
                                               
Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften that asked the public to compare a line from Pope’s essay that 
read “Everything is good” with Leibniz’s Theodicy. See Lessing’s essay “Pope ein Metaphysiker!” in 
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Werke 1754–1757, Band 3, Hrsg. von Conrad Wiedemann unter Mitwirkung 
von Wilfried Barner und Jürgen Stenzel, Frankfurt am Main 2003. Voltaire’s Candide (1759) was much 
more critical of Leibniz and ridiculed his naively optimistic religious views. 
67 Leibniz, Gottfried, Theodicy, p. 216. See also Leibniz, On the Ultimate Origination of Things (1697), 
which anticipates many of the arguments in his later Theodicy. Here he clearly seems to have Bayle in 
mind when he wrote: “the world appears to be a certain confused chaos rather than a thing ordered by 
some supreme wisdom, especially if one takes note of the conduct of the human race. I confess that it 
appears this way at first glance, but a deeper look at things forces us to quite the contrary view […for] as 
soon as you see the whole […] you will understand that what looked accidental […was] made with 
consummate skill by the creator.” See Leibniz, Gottfried, Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger 
Ariew and Daniel Garber, first edition, Indianapolis 1989, p. 153. 
68 See Beiser, Friedrich, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1987. 
69 Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, Der Messias, in Werke und Briefe: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, Band 
1/2, Hrsg. von Horst Gronemeyer, Elisabeth Höpker-Herberg, Berlin 2000, p. 193 (Gesang XVII, V. 64–
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that afflicts other apostles. For instance, Peter—the “rock of the church”—attempts to bring 
Thomas out of the “Betäubung seines Tiefsinns” [daze of his melancholy] by identifying with the 
apostle’s skepticism: “Auch ich zweifelte, Thomas.” [I doubted too, Thomas.] On the road to 
Emmaus, Kleophas and Matthias also sympathize with Thomas’s demand for empirical proof: 
“wenn wir ihn [Christ] sähen,/ O das würd’ uns noch mehr, noch mächtiger überzeugen, / Als der 
stillen Betrachtung Licht, das die Seele mit Wahrheit / Überströmt70!” [If we saw him, O’ that 
would convince us still more powerfully, like the light of tranquil contemplation that overflows 
the soul with truth.] Decentralizing skepticism so that it is not concentrated solely in the figure of 
Thomas politically situates Klopstock’s poetic amplification into an accommodationist framework. 
He wants to show that modest forms of doubt have a proper place within an economy of faith, 
while extreme forms are marked by the discourse of Schwärmerei [fanaticism]. 
The figure of the Schwärmer [fanatic] was often used pejoratively across discourses—by 
defenders of faith and reason alike—to critique “delusional” religious, philosophical, and 
theological assumptions and practices.71 Klopstock makes use of this discourse of Schwärmerei, 
though not to pejoratively condemn skepticism as such, but to diagnose and treat the spread of its 
most radical forms. The Thomas of Der Messias is not the imposter (Betrüger) Schwärmer 
attempting to usurp divine authority for personal advancement (though this aspect of it is indeed 
present in the witness testimony, of which I will have more to say later); rather, Thomas is the 
                                               
70 Ibid., p. 109 (Gesang XIV, V. 595–97). 
71 For scholarship on this topic, see Anthony La Vopa’s essay “The Philosopher and the Schwärmer: On 
the Career of a German Epithet from Luther to Kant,” in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650–
1850, ed. Lawrence Klein and Anthony La Vopa, San Marino, CA, 1998, pp. 85–117; Fenves, Peter, A 
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melancholic Schwärmer whose isolation and inclination toward excessive contemplation occasions 
further loss of faith.72 The danger of Thomas is that Klopstock deliberately represents his 
melancholic state as contagious, a true mark of the Schwärmer. Klopstock presents the skepticism 
of the other apostles as resulting from their sympathetic encounters with Thomas, as if they were 
being “infected” by his doubt. For example, the spread of Thomas’s “disease” can be found most 
emphatically in the apostle Lebbäus, who agrees with Thomas that the testimony of the witnesses 
does not add up to a real encounter with Christ; that what they saw were, at best, signs sent from 
Christ to assuage their overwhelming sense of grief; at worst, figments of their own overheated 
imaginations. Upon this recognition Lebbäus sinks into doubt and Klopstock intentionally brings 
the two apostles into the same semantic register to underscore the infectious nature of Thomas’s 
doubt: “Trübe verfinsternde Zweifel / Ließ in den Seelen, die schon verwundet waren, Lebbäus / 
Traurige Rede zurück.”73 [Lebbäus' mournful speech left bleak, darkening doubts in the souls that 
had already been wounded.] “Bleak doubts,” “wounded souls,” and a prevailing sense of 
“mourning” are qualities that consistently come to define Thomas’s psychological state throughout 
Der Messias, and Klopstock’s emphasis on the communicability of this state normatively invokes 
the discourse of Schwärmerei.  
More dangerous than the communicability of Thomas’s doubt and melancholy was the fear 
that it could deteriorate into atheism. Shaftesbury’s A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1707), which 
                                               
72 In the seventeenth century, Melancholy was thought to be a disease caused by an imbalance of humors 
(too much black bile); finding the right mixture of “jovial” humors, it was thought, could restore harmony 
to the afflicted. See Heyd, Michael, Be Sober and Reasonable: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the 
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Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn und Melancholie: Studien zur Geschichte der Naturphilosophie 
und Medizin, der Religion und der Kunst, Frankfurt am Main 1990. 
73 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 126 (Gesang XIV, V. 1224–27). 
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Klopstock was familiar with, argues that nothing “besides ill humour can be the cause of 
atheism.”74 Hilliard also reads the incredulity of Klopstock’s Thomas as a “prelude to atheism,”75 
which makes curing his “sickness” all the more urgent. But not just urgent in the sense of bringing 
resolution to the Thomas story; it is also urgent for Klopstock’s poetics, which are designed to 
affectively convince its readership of the truth of Christianity by invoking the “immortal spirits” 
of the Old and New Testaments who testify to that truth. This much is clear from the opening lines 
of Der Messias, which gives voice to the “unsterbliche Seele” [immortal soul] inhabiting biblical 
history. The problem for Klopstock’s poetics is that the atheist apathetically resists elocution 
altogether, thereby breaking the chain of enthusiasm that links poet, audience, and God.76 The 
communicability of enthusiasm—which literally means a god dwelling within—depends on the 
receptivity of the audience, which must acknowledge the theos in order to be moved [bewegt] in 
the first place. Without this the theos of Klopstock’s poetry has nobody to possess, no subject in 
which to dwell.77 In other words, the atheist would be unmoved by both scripture and heilige 
                                               
74 See Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. by Lawrence E. Klein, 
Cambridge, 1999, p. 13. 
75 See Hilliard, Freethinkers, Libertines and Schwärmer: Heterodoxy in German Literature, 1750-1800. 
London: IGRS Books, 2011, p. 62. 
76 Plato discusses this relationship in his dialogue Ion: “Well, do you see that the spectator is the last of 
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one into another.” Plato, Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton, 
2005, pp. 221–22. 
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1650–1850, ed. Lawrence Klein and Anthony La Vopa, San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1998, pp. 
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pp. 27–28, 365–79. 
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Poesie. The possibility that Thomas will convert to atheism constitutes a source of dramatic tension 
throughout Gesang XIV. For instance, the first description of him reads as follows: “Da erhoben 
alle [die Jünger] die Augen / Still gen Himmel; nur Didymus [Thomas] nicht.78 [And so all the 
apostles silently raised their eyes towards heaven, with the exception of Thomas.] Thomas’s 
skepticism prohibits him from being moved by the spiritual enthusiasm of his religious community, 
yet the bigger concern is that if he succumbs to atheism and that too is communicable, then the 
prospect of a thoroughly disenchanted world becomes possible. 
II. Amplifying Thomas 
 Klopstock harshly judges a writing style that he associates with philosophy because he 
believes it strips the healthy body of scripture down to its most naked moral precepts. He writes, 
“Die Religion ist, in der Offenbarung selbst, ein gesunder männlicher Körper. Unsere Lehrbücher 
haben ein Gerippe daraus gemacht.”79 [Revealed religion is by itself a healthy man’s body. Our 
textbooks have turned it into a skeleton.] In other words, translating the moral truths of scripture 
into philosophical language diminishes the force of those truths because it abstracts away from the 
rich particularities of scripture. Klopstock expresses his views on style more clearly in his essay 
Von der besten Art über Gott zu denken (1758) [On the best way to think of God], in which he 
concludes that poetry is the best way to think of God because it engages “die ganze Seele”80 [the 
                                               
78 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 99 (Gesang XIV, V. 224–25). translation modified. 
79 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke. vol 10. p. 232. 
80 Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, “Von der besten Art über Gott zu denken,” Sämmtliche Werke. 18 Bde. 
u. Supplementband (Bd. XIII-XVIII: Sämmtliche sprachwissenschaftliche und ästhetische Schriften). 
Hrsg. von August Leberecht Back & A. R. C. Spindler. Leipzig 1823–1830, Bd. 11, p. 211. 
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entire soul] and allows one to abandon “alle Arten von Zweifeln und Unruh über die 
unbegreiflichen Wege Gottes”81 [all forms of doubt and unrest about the incomprehensible path of 
God]. Poetry, he argues, prepares one “endlich mit der allertiefsten Unterwerfung […] Gott lieben 
können.”82 [finally to be able to love God with the deepest submission.] Here Klopstock’s critique 
of a “kalte metaphysische Schreibart” [cold metaphysical style] pejoratively calls into question the 
efficacy of moral precepts to guide an imagined public towards virtuous life. When recalling his 
own education at Schulpforta, Klopstock dramatizes his critique of this cold metaphysical style by 
personifying “die Sprache” [language], which, in the following passage, laments being narrowly 
confined by the stylistic conventions of scholasticism:   
Mich (denn heute darf ich von mir selbst reden) sollen Schulmethode, Armseligkeit 
am guten Ausdrucke, und jene überflüssigen Untersuchungen verstellen, die nichts 
weniger, als die Kenntnis der Menschen und ihre Verbessrung angehn. Ich sei nicht 
mehr die Führerin und die Freundin des gesunden Verstandes, sondern eine 
Grüblerin, welche die von ihr erhitzte Einbildungskraft vergebens zu fesseln 
sucht.83  
 
[I (for today I am permitted to speak of myself) am to be distorted by scholasticism, 
a lack of good expressions, and those superfluous investigations that concern 
nothing less than human knowledge and its improvement. I am no longer seen to 
be the leader and friend of a sound mind, but rather an excessive brooder attempting 
in vain to confine an overheated imagination.]  
                                               
81 Ibid., p. 213. 
82 Ibid., p. 214. 
83 Klopstock, “Von dem Range der schönen Künste und der schönen Wissenschaften,” Sämmtliche 
Werke, vol 10, p. 256. 
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The “Schulmethode” [scholastic methods] of the philosopher, or Grübler84 as Klopstock 
describes here, curbs the creative potential of a more poetically stylized language, which Klopstock 
regards as essential for communicating sublime religious truths. 
However, even if a poetic mode of communication enjoys greater freedom and has more 
success than philosophy, what can the poet possibly add to scripture if it already represents a 
‘healthy body’? 85 Klopstock evades this question through claims of piety and reverence, yet insists 
that some parts of scripture require poetic amplification. Some stories, Klopstock writes, are 
designed “mit so wenigen Worten, daß wir notwendig Umstände hinzudenken müssen, um sie uns 
vorzustellen.”86 [with so few words that we must necessarily think up added circumstances in order 
to imagine them.] Thus, from the standpoint of Klopstock’s poetics, certain scenes of the bible are 
more “healthy” than others, and poetry (rather than philosophy) should be called on to restore these 
missing circumstances.  
Neither the naked truths of philosophy nor the densely coded allegories of baroque poetry 
can adequately fill in the missing details of scripture. History, by contrast, supplies exempla that 
are “[...]für die meisten die einzige Reizung, die ihnen übrig ist, mindestens einige Stufen der 
Tugend zu ersteigen. Denn die Aussprüche der Pflicht sind ihnen zu kalt. Sie wirken nicht auf ihr 
Herz”87 [for most people the only stimulation that remains available to them, in order to climb at 
least a few steps toward virtue. For expressions of duty are too cold for them. They do not affect 
                                               
84 Klopstock also uses the word “Grübler” in describing Thomas: “Ihn [Jesus], ihn selber habt ihr gesehn? 
ihr alle? erwiedert / Thomas, und bleibt mit grübelnder Stirn, und ernsterem Auge / Stehn.” [Have you 
seen him, himself? all of you? answers Thomas, and stands still with brooding brow and a more serious 
eye] in Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 99 (Gesang XIV, V. 201–3). 
85 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10, p. 232. 
86 Ibid., p. 233 (emphasis mine). 
87 Klopstock, “Von dem Fehler Andere nach sich zu Beurteilen,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10, p. 299. 
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their hearts] History provides an affective route to grasping virtue that does not require any further 
abstraction. Essentially Klopstock’s Der Messias attempts to retie the knot between poetry and 
history that Aristotle severed,88 thereby drawing his poetics into a tradition of exemplarity. 
According to Aristotle, the poet and philosopher are related because both speak of general truths, 
whereas the historian can only speak of particular truths. Klopstock, however, finds that the 
particularities of biblical history (as exempla of virtue) already function as general truths insofar 
as they immediately communicate the actions and deeds worthy of social reproduction. Poetry can 
serve to amplify, intensify, or even repurpose the particular truths of history in novel ways.89 
Therefore, Klopstock does not limit himself to telling of what might happen, but instead tells of 
what is and of what has been; his task is to carefully follow in the “Fußstapfen der Offenbarung”90 
[footsteps of scripture] and express in more rich detail what the Evangelists already left behind:  
Der Teil der Offenbarung, der uns Begebenheiten meldet, besteht meistenteils nur 
aus Grundrisse, da doch diese Begebenheiten, wie sie wirklich geschahn, ein 
großes, ausgebildetes Gemälde waren. Ein Dichter studiert diesen reichen 
Grundriß, und malt ihn nach den Hauptzügen aus, die er in demselben gefunden zu 
haben glaubt.91  
 
[The part of revelation that reports of events to us consists mostly of mere outlines, 
since these events––as they actually occurred––were like great, well-formed 
                                               
88 See Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1 & 2, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 4979. 
89 Matthew Roller, for example, describes this process in his article on exemplarity in Roman culture: “To 
produce an exemplum, then, is to struggle constantly to establish or disestablish a particular interpretation 
of an action’s value, a monument’s reference, or an imitator’s success, and alternative readings threaten to 
(or do) proliferate at every instant. But far from undermining the ethical cogency of the exemplum, these 
ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse—this is how 
every example can be made anew, or deployed in a novel way, to meet the requirements of any new 
contingency” (p. 7). Roller, Matthew, “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and 
Cloelia,” Classical Philology, vol. 99, no. 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 1–56.  
90 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10. p. 233. 
91 Ibid., p. 224. 
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paintings. A poet studies these rich outlines and paints them according to the main 
features he believes to have found in them.] 
From this statement Klopstock does not appear to invent any new subject matter at all, but 
rather, like an obedient apprentice painter, he (re)presents stories already established by the 
master—only adding more details to those outlines that seem to call out for further elaboration.  
However, the relation between the “great painting” of biblical history and Klopstock’s 
poetic amplification becomes complicated if we again consider the case of Doubting Thomas. 
Klopstock’s amplification of the circumstances surrounding the “historical” Thomas can more 
properly be understood as an amplification that was derived from that of another poet, namely 
John, who developed his version of Thomas in response to the perceived inadequacies inhering in 
the synoptic gospels. So what exactly does Klopstock add to scripture?  
To my mind, Klopstock attempts to add “Darstellung” [embodiment]92 to scripture. 
Klopstock’s concept of Darstellung has been the subject of much scholarship,93 and it is primarily 
concerned with activating the sensibility (Empfindsamkeit) in the audience through novel 
expressions of language. Klopstock manipulates rhythm, meter, and tone to create movement 
(Wortbewegung) and liveliness (Lebendigkeit) that the audience experiences upon reception.94 The 
                                               
92 There are no adequate English equivalents to capture the ways in which Klopstock invokes this term. 
93 For scholarship on Klopstock’s theory of Darstellung, see Menninghaus, Winfred, “Klopstocks Poetik 
der schnellen Bewegung,” in: Gedanken über die Natur der Poesie. Dichtungstheoretische Schriften, 
Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 259–361; Menninghaus, Winfred, “Darstellung: Friedrich Gottlieb 
Klopstocks Eröffnung eines neuen Paradigm,” in: Was heißt “Darstellen”?, ed. Christian L. Hart 
Nibbrig, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, pp. 205–26; Behnke, Kerstin, “Toward an Understanding of Romantic 
Darstellung,” in The Spirit of Poesy, ed. Richard Block and Peter Fenves, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern, 
2000, pp. 60–74; Thayer, Terence K., “Rhetoric and the Rhetorical in Klopstock’s Odes,” Euphorian: 
Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte, Band 74, Heft 4, Heidelberg, 1980; Kaiser, Gerhard, “Denken und 
Empfinden: ein Beitrag zur Sprache und Poetik,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft 
und Geistesgeschichte, Band 35, Stuttgart, 1961, pp. 321–32. 
94 This aspect of Darstellung brings Klopstock very close Longinus’s theory of the sublime. See 
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expressed goal of Darstellung is the alienation (Täuschung)95 of the audience from familiar 
expressions in order to lead them into new horizons of thought and feeling. In this way, Darstellung 
distinguishes itself from the static mimesis of nature (Nachahmung der Natur) by prioritizing 
creative representations—as opposed to “bloße Vorstellungen”96 [naked representations]. 
Klopstock is more concerned with transmitting the affects of an object or state of mind than he is 
with presenting an object as such. However, this would suggest that the object, sacred history, is a 
means to an end, an end that seeks to enlist the sensibility of the audience towards rethinking the 
particular truths and exempla of scripture. The theory of Darstellung makes the political 
underpinnings of Klopstock’s epic more pronounced; it suggests that there are unmistakable 
calculations standing behind his amplifications of scripture, and the claim to piety or “necessity” 
only obscures the poetic and political agenda he brings to biblical history. The aim of these 
amplifications, therefore, is not just to restore the missing details of history, but also to extract 
what Klopstock believes to be the immanent meaning withheld from certain scenes of scripture. 
Further difficulties emerge once the primary objective of Darstellung is understood to be 
satisfying the audience’s desire to be moved. Klopstock writes, “dass ihn [den Zuhörer] etwas 
bewege, dies ist das heißeste Dürsten unseres Geistes; er liebt alles, was so ihn erquickt.”97 […that 
something should move the listener, that is the most urgent thirst of our spirit; it loves everything 
                                               
Longinus, On Great Writing, ed. Oskar Piest, trans. G.M.A. Grube, New York, 1957, especially § 39: 
“Does not the music of the flute stir the emotions of an audience, take them out of themselves, fill them 
with Corybantic frenzy, and by its rhythmic beat compel him who hears it to step to its rhythm and 
identify himself with its tune, even if he be quite unmusical?” (p. 51). 
95 “Der Zweck der Darstellung ist Täuschung.” See Klopstock, “Von der Darstellung,” Sämmtliche 
Werke, vol. 10, pp. 194–95. 
96 Ibid., p. 194. 
97 Klopstock, Werke und Briefe: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Abteilung II (Epigramme), hrsg. von 
Klaus Hurlebusch, Berlin, 1982, p. 54. Translation modified. 
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that refreshes it.] This does not square well with the discourse of exemplarity, given that there can 
be no guarantee one will be moved in the direction of virtue. If anything and everything can move 
the audience, then moral edification would be contingent given its subordinate position in 
Klopstock’s poetics.98 However, Klopstock remains confident that “höhere Poesie” is incapable of 
leading the audience to vice: 
Die höhere Poesie ist ganz unfähig, uns durch blendende Vorstellungen zum Bösen 
zu verführen. Sobald sie das tun wollte, hört sie auf zu sein, was sie ist. Denn so 
sehr auch einige sich selbst klein machen wollen, so können sie sich doch niemals 
so weit herunterbringen, dass sie etwas anderm, als was wirklich edel und erhaben 
ist, diese große und allgemeine Bewegung aller Kräfte ihrer Seele erlaubten.99  
 
[Sublime poetry is entirely unable to mislead us into evil by means of dazzling 
representations. As soon as she wanted to do so, she would cease to be sublime. 
For, as much as some want to make themselves small, they can never bring it down 
so low as to allow anything other than what is truly noble and sublime, this great 
and universal movement of all the powers of their souls.] 
While this passage may serve to diffuse objections against using scripture as material for poetic 
representations, the assumption that “höhere Poesie” cannot lead the audience to vice calls for 
further examination. It can be inferred from the passage that Klopstock assumes a pre-established 
harmony between virtue and the sublime. In order for the sublime to “move the entire soul” of the 
audience, there must be something recognizably virtuous in the sublime images. Moving the entire 
soul refers to the harmonization of the faculties: imagination, understanding, and the will (or 
heart): “Die Kräfte unsrer Seelen haben eine solche Harmonie unter sich, sie fließen, wenn ich es 
                                               
98 Menninghaus develops the idea that Klopstock’s notion of Wortbewegung fails to correspond to the 
ideal of “Moralische Schönheit.” See Menninghaus, “Klopstocks Poetik der schnellen Bewegung,” pp. 
306–318. 
99 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10, p. 227. 
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sagen darf, so beständig ineinander, daß, wenn eine stark getroffen wird, die andern mitempfinden, 
und in ihrer Art zugleich wirken.”100 [The powers of our souls have such harmony amongst 
themselves that, if I may be permitted to say, they consistently flow into each other such that if 
one is strongly affected, the others sympathize with it and act in kind.] If one of these faculties 
becomes powerfully affected, then the other faculties can sympathize (“mitempfinden”) and 
ultimately be “moved.” However, if virtue were a condition for the movement of the soul, then this 
would place a significant restraint on the sublime itself; it would shackle the sublime to an ethos, 
thereby curbing the spontaneity of the genius.101 It would also render the goal of alienation 
mundane insofar as the sublime must, in every instance, transport the audience to the sphere of 
virtue. In other words, heilige Poesie surrenders its autonomy. These tensions within Klopstock’s 
own poetics must be kept in mind when reflecting on the figure of Doubting Thomas, whose virtue 
can be understood as limited.102 If “höhere Poesie” strives to coordinate sublime writing with 
historical events to move the audience towards virtuous life, then why dedicate nearly an entire 
chapter to a figure who holds the status of a negative example? 
 In Der Messias, Thomas’s one conviction is that he will not believe. “Wenn ich,” Thomas 
proclaims, “mit bebendem Arm um deine Füße [Jesus] mich winde, / Und sie halte: dann will ich 
glauben! Ich werde nicht glauben!”103 [When I, with trembling arms, coil myself around your feet 
(Jesus) and hold them, then I will believe. I will not believe.] Klopstock often juxtaposes the 
                                               
100 Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10, p. 231. 
101 Klopstock asserts that “Die höhere Poesie ist ein Werk des Genie.” [Sublime poetry is a work of 
genius.] Ibid., p. 226. 
102 In the Gospel of John, Thomas’s faith has been interpreted as insincere insofar as it appears to be the 
result of Christ shaming him into conviction. See Bultmann, Rudolf, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, 
trans. G.R. Beasley-Murray, ed. R.W.N. Hoare and J.K. Riches, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971, 
p. 694. 
103 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 120 (Gesang XIV, V. 991–92). Translation modified. 
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subjunctive with the indicative to emphasize how Thomas’s desire to believe never triumphs over 
his demand for direct evidence. Doubting Thomas, as a negative example, shows how faith and 
reason will remain out of tune unless he allows indirect routes to harmonize his convictions. By 
indirect routes, I mean that he would have to allow witness testimony to make impressions upon 
his sensibilities (Empfindsamkeit)—not just his understanding (Verstand). Unlike Leibniz, who 
assigned the task of distinguishing between true and false articles of faith to human reason alone, 
Klopstock allows Empfindsamkeit to have a share in determining the validity of “alleged articles 
of faith.”104 In perhaps his most spiritually desperate moment—the point at which the apostle 
realizes that he is still unable to believe even after his guardian angel appears to him—Thomas 
asks himself: “Wer schmachtet so nach Überzeugung, als ich?”105 [Who yearns for conviction as I 
do?] On the one hand, this could mean that nobody yearns for conviction more than Thomas 
(comparative): nobody is more in need of external assistance, given that he is incapable of 
believing through his own powers. Yet, it could also mean that nobody yearns for conviction quite 
like Thomas does (modality). This reading suggests, by contrast, that Thomas’s skepticism 
displays a mode of thinking that closes off all other possibilities for conviction; reason alone 
provides the path. This extreme mode of thinking is cause for alarm, and, as I will argue, Klopstock 
negotiates the figure of the Schwärmer into his amplification of Thomas to make his political 
campaign against radical skepticism more audible for the modern skeptic.  
                                               
104 On this point Klopstock closely follows Quintilian, who also accords the orator’s rhetoric a proper 
share in convincing a judge of the truth by means of eloquence. Quintilian claims that the orator’s 
argumentative proofs “may make the judge think our cause the better, but impressions on his feelings 
make him wish it to be the better, and what he wishes he also believes.” See Quintilian, Institutes of 
Oratory or, Education of an Orator, trans. Rev. John Selby Watson, rev. and ed. Lee Honeycutt and 
Curtis Dozier, N.P., 2015, Book VI, ii, p. 5. 
105 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 99 (Gesang XIV, V. 987–88). 
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III. Treating Thomas’s Skepticism 
 Since it would have been too controversial to completely negate Thomas on the basis of 
his perceived Schwärmerei, Klopstock develops strategies for treating his excessive doubt, which 
mostly involve persuading him to “think differently.” Thomas’s initial response to witness 
testimony provides access to his thinking about Christ’s alleged resurrection:  
Itzt seyd ihr [die Jünger] zu lebhaft / Durch das alles getäuscht, was ihr [Maria 
Magdalene und andere weibliche Zeugen] erzählet. Ich werde, / Wenn ihr es erst 
zu tragen vermögt, der Zweifel Ursach, / Welche mir anders zu denken gebeut, euch 
offen entdecken, / Nichts verschweigen! Ihr glaubt, ihr Jünger Jesus, die Mährlein, 
/ Die sie erzählen, doch nicht?106 
 
 
[Now you [disciples] are too lively, deceived by everything they [Maria Magdalene 
and other women at the grave] speak of. If you are able to bear it, I will reveal to 
you the cause of doubt, which compels me to think differently, do not withhold 
anything! After all, you don’t believe, you disciples of Jesus, in the fairy tales that 
they speak of, do you?] 
From Thomas’s perspective the other apostles have been deceived by the reports of Christ’s 
resurrection and are too excited to think rationally about it. Thomas’s solution to overcoming his 
doubt is to find the true causality of what occurred; to find a natural explanation for a supernatural 
event—an attitude that corresponds with deism, which rejects both incoherent Church dogma and 
dubious historical facts.107 But more importantly, if Klopstock can indicate how Thomas’s thinking 
poses a threat to the greater good of his religious community, then he might be able to persuade 
his readers to renounce Thomas’s demand for a natural explanation and accept the revealed truth 
of scripture. As Hilliard pointed out in his study on religion and heterodoxy in German literature, 
                                               
106 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 99 (Gesang XIV, V. 206–11). Translation modified. 
107 See Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and its Relation to 
Eighteenth-Century Thought. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966, pp. 3–16. 
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a logic of the “Schwärmerkur” [cure for fanaticism] emerges in literature that attempts to 
rehabilitate “transgressive” figures. Hilliard defines his notion of a Schwärmerkur through 
Christoph Martin Wieland’s Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder die Abentheuer des 
Don Sylvio von Rosalva (1764), which is a reworking of Cervantes’s Don Quixote. Throughout 
Wieland’s Don Sylvio, the narrator identifies and condemns the pernicious aspects of Schwärmerei 
on the one hand, and isolates and celebrates its edifying qualities on the other.108 Much like the 
family and friends of Don Quixote, who, out of concern for him, burn his books of chivalry because 
they feed the flames of his wild imagination, Klopstock’s adaptation attempts to purge philosophy 
and excessive contemplation from Thomas’s mind so that he can finally experience joy in the 
edifying faith of his peers. In the third Gesang of Der Messias, readers get their first impression of 
Thomas through his guardian angel Umbiel, whose observations almost sound like a prognosis: 
Umbiel sprach ferner: Der dort voll Gedanken und einsam / Tief in dem Walde sich 
zeigt, ist Thomas, ein feuriger Jüngling. / Stets entwickelt sein Geist aus Gedanken 
Gedanken! Ihr Ende / Findet er oft nicht, wenn sie sich vor ihm, wie Meere, 
verbreiten! / Bald hätt’ er sich in dem finstern Gebäu des träumenden Saddok / 
Kläglich verloren; allein des Messias gewaltige Wunder / Retteten ihn, er verließ 
die labyrinthischen Irren, Kam zu Jesus.109  
 
[Umbiel spoke again: "He over there deep in the forest, full of thoughts and solitary, 
is Thomas, a fiery young man. His spirit is constantly developing thoughts from 
thoughts! Often he finds no end to them, as they spread out before him like a vast 
sea! He would have almost been miserably lost in the dark building of the dreaming 
Zadok; Only the powerful miracles of the Messiah rescued him, he left the 
labyrinthine, wayward paths and turned to Jesus.] 
                                               
108 See Hilliard, Freethinkers, Libertines and Schwärmer: Heterodoxy in German Literature, 1750-1800. 
London: IGRS Books, 2011. 
109 Klopstock, Der Messias, pp. 51–52 (Gesang III, V. 263–72). 
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Thomas’s melancholy is particularly pronounced here. He is not the imposter Schwärmer 
but the melancholic Schwärmer.110 Umbiel, Thomas’s guardian angel, rules out the possibility of 
him being an imposter by naming excessive contemplation (rather than deceit) as the cause of his 
disturbed psychological state. The poem provides even further evidence in support of this. When 
describing Thomas, Maria Magdalene states, “Er zweifelt aus Angst […] nicht aus bösem 
Herzen.”111 [Thomas doubts from fear and anxiety […] not from an evil heart]. Since Thomas is 
himself deceived, he does not intentionally deceive others. Rather, the driving force of his self-
deception is melancholic Schwärmerei, whereby the apostle becomes so withdrawn into himself 
that he loses his ability to distinguish what is true from what is merely a chimera of his imagination. 
For instance, after he encounters a disguised angel in a graveyard he believes that his grief-stricken 
state is responsible for conjuring up a false experience: “Ja, ich bin niedergesunken, bin 
eingeschlummert, und habe / Diesen Fremdling im Traume gesehen112!” [Yes, I have sunk down, 
fallen asleep and seen this stranger in dreams!] When reality is confused for a dream the figure of 
the Schwärmer emerges, and this politically marks Thomas’s “denkende Seele” [thinking soul] as 
especially dangerous for the Christian community. However, these lines also suggest a slight 
variation on a common theme in the discourse of Schwärmerei, for often the Schwärmer is 
someone who becomes so excessively inflamed by passions that an alternate reality appears. In 
                                               
110 The difference is worth emphasizing if one considers the more extreme responses to cases of the 
imposter. Mendelssohn, for instance, goes beyond Shaftesbury’s recommendation to let ridicule censor 
the bad kind of enthusiasm by calling for the state to intervene in more serious offences: “Soll man der 
einreißenden Schwärmerey durch Satyre oder duch aüßerliche Verbindung entgegenbringen?” in: 
Mendelssohn, Moses, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 3, hrsg. von Dr. G.B. Mendelssohn, Leipzig, 1843, pp. 
413–15. 
111 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 115 (Gesang XIV, V. 806–7). 
112 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 123 (Gesang XIV, V. 1106–7). 
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this case, however, it would be more accurate to say that Thomas’s melancholy does not so much 
produce an alternative reality as it misplaces reality. Within literature making use of the Schwärmer 
motif, it is always a much greater offense to conjure up false realities for deceptive ends than it is 
to lose sight of reality, which is crucial for understanding why Thomas is deserving of help as 
opposed to satire and ridicule.113 In Thomas’s case the goal is not satire, but to restore the reality 
he misplaces. 
Also embedded in Umbiel’s description of Thomas is that it foreshadows the dramatic 
culmination of his doubt: the moment in which he almost relapses into his prior Sadducee beliefs. 
The Sadducees were an elite Jewish sect that rejected the idea of revealed knowledge involving 
supernatural spirits, eternal salvation, and the resurrection of Christ.114 Peter becomes fatigued 
after repeated attempts to assuage Thomas’s “qualenvolle Gedanken” [painful thoughts] and tells 
him that his own doubts actually blind him from seeing the truth:  
Deine [Heftigkeit] blendet sich nur, mit der du zweifelst! Wir sahen! / Und wir 
wurden entzückt! […] Du siehst nichts! schaffest dir Schatten, / Bange Bilder von 
Gräbern und Nacht, erschreckende Zweifel! […] Geh zu den Sadducäern zurück, 
und glaube mit ihnen, / Daß kein Engel, noch Geist sey, noch Auferstehung vom 
Tode!115 
 
[Your vehemence blinds you only to that which you doubt! We saw and we were 
enchanted […] you see nothing! You create for yourself shadows, fearful images 
of graves and night, and terrifying doubts! […] Go back to the Sadduccees and 
                                               
113 Louise Gottsched’s Die Pietisterey im Fischbein-Rocke (1736) is one example of eighteenth-century 
satirical literature that tries to expose the moral depravity of the imposter Schwärmer Herr Scheinfromm. 
114 Relevant passages involving the Sadducee tradition in the bible include Mark 12:18–27, Matthew 
22:23–33, and Luke 20:27–40. A more historically detailed account that distinguishes the Sadducee sect 
from the Pharisee and the Essene sects can be found in Josephus, “The Antiquities of the Jews” and “The 
War of the Jews,” in The Complete Works, trans. William Whiston and Thomas Nelson, Nashville, 1998. 
115 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 115 (Gesang XIV, V. 820–23; 828–29). Modified Translation. 
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believe as they do that there are no angels nor spirits nor resurrection from the 
dead!] 
Thomas’s blindness is, according to Peter, willful given that all the witnesses claim to 
testify to Christ’s resurrection. The ultimatum is clear: if Thomas cannot accept the resurrection of 
Christ as the true reality, then he faces exile from the community of believers. This is precisely 
what Thomas opts for. The apostle remains adamant about having a personal experience with 
Christ, and, in a display of jealous confusion, asks: “Euch nur erschiene der Herr? nicht mir?”116 
[The Lord appears only to you and not to me?] Thomas, quite reasonably, rejects the notion that 
Christ would appear only to the others, and decides to search for peace in a nearby graveyard.  
The graveyard scene is a combination of prayer and soliloquy in which Thomas performs 
the kind of self-examination Shaftesbury prescribes for the enthusiast to determine whether their 
enthusiasm is of a “noble” or schwärmerisch type.117 Throughout Gesang XIV Thomas maintains 
that the witnesses were actually the ones who falsely mistook their dreams for reality: Ihr [die 
Jünger] wähnt ihn erstanden, / Und ihr freut euch nicht minder, obwohl ein Traum euch getäuscht 
hat.”118 [You disciples falsely suppose that he has risen und yet you are no less joyful, even though 
you have been deceived by a dream]. The aim of self-examination is to clear matters up; it involves 
observing one’s own humorous disposition to determine if it is even possible to act as an “impartial 
                                               
116 Ibid., p. 116 (Gesang XIV, V. 847.). 
117 On self-examination, Shaftesbury writes: “For to judge the spirits whether they are of God, we must 
antecedently judge our own spirit, whether it be of reason and sound sense, whether it be fit to judge at all 
by being sedate, cool and impartial, free of every biasing passion, every giddy vapour or melancholy 
fume. This is the first knowledge and previous judgment: To understand ourselves and know what spirit 
we are of.” See Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, p. 28. 
118 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 119 (Gesang XIV, 967–968). Earlier, Thomas attempts to attribute natural 
causes to the witness testimony, at one point even suggesting that the sun was being reflected into the 
armor of a Roman soldier to account for the illuminated figure that was said to be an angel (p. 98, Gesang 
XIV, V. 165–70). 
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judge” when evaluating the testimony of others. However, in the graveyard Thomas finds himself 
overwhelmed by melancholy, writhing like a “Wurm in Mitternächten,”119 [worm at midnight] and 
contemplating suicide: “Möcht’ ich liegen bey ihm [dem toten Körper Christi] und schlummern, 
müde von Wunden / Meiner Seele!”120 [I would like to lie next to him (the dead body of Christ) 
and fall asleep, I'm so exhausted from the wounds of my soul]. The apostle’s melancholic condition 
makes him unsuitable to judge and brings the procedure of self-examination to an abrupt end. 
Religious contemplation, Shaftesbury argues, often leads to melancholy and makes self-
examination unsuccessful:  
The melancholy way in which we have been taught religion makes us unapt to think 
of it in good humour […] We can never be fit to contemplate anything above us 
when we are in no condition to look into ourselves and calmly examine the temper 
of our own mind and passions.121 
Finding no peace on his sojourn through the graveyard, Thomas only becomes more 
intensely afflicted by his religious contemplation. The apostle’s guardian angel enters at the 
moment when his skepticism becomes most (self-)destructive: “Wessen ist diese Klage, die aus 
den Gräbern hervorschallt? / Fiel dich ein Mörder an? Und kann ich dir helfen, o Fremdling? / 
Rede! Wo bist du? Ich will dir deine Wunde verbinden.”122 [Whose laments do I hear sounding 
from the graves? Did a murderer strike you? O Stranger, can I help you? Speak! Where are you? I 
want to bind your wound]. Thankful but reluctant to accept the angel’s offer, Thomas is again 
convinced that his “wounded soul” could only be healed through the direct evidence of Christ’s 
                                               
119 Ibid., p. 117 (Gesang XIV, V. 880). 
120 Ibid. (Gesang XIV, V. 894–95). 
121 See Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, pp. 17–18. 
122 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 120 (Gesang XIV, V. 1008–10). 
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appearance. Before taking leave of Thomas, the angel recommends that he “Schau gen Himmel, 
und lerne mit Furcht und Zittern klagen! / Freuen sollen wir uns mit Furcht und Zittern, so sollen 
/ Wir auch klagen!”123 [Look towards heaven and learn to lament with fear and trembling! Just as 
we should rejoice with fear and trembling, so too should we lament!] The allusion to Philippians 
2:12 is apt, given that Paul composed these lines while in prison and uncertain of his fate. 
Philippians 2:1–14 recommends that one “be of the same mind as Christ” and act not out of self-
interest but from fear and trembling, which is to act as if Christ were present even though he might 
be absent. The implied presence of Christ should serve to regulate Thomas’s thoughts and actions 
in a pragmatic sense.124 Because Thomas is in no condition “to look up,” he finds himself 
imprisoned by melancholy, impartial, and driven by self-interest. The graveyard scene is when 
Klopstock’s amplification of Thomas becomes most polemical. He strongly advises against 
following Thomas’s skeptical path of despair by implying that it could end in suicide.  
A final observation to take away from Umbiel’s description of Thomas in Gesang III is 
perspectival. Thomas is shown to be isolated and brooding in the Garden of Gethsemane, the place 
where Jesus succumbed to doubt in two of the synoptic gospels.125 Also, Thomas’s solitary 
excursion into the graveyard takes place in the “fernsten Gräbern des Ölbergs” [furthest graves of 
the Mount of Olives], the location of Christ’s doubt in the Gospel of Luke.126 Klopstock, therefore, 
attempts to bring Thomas and Christ into relation as doubting figures. Yet to accomplish this 
Klopstock must abandon the Gospel of John—the only gospel in which Thomas and Jesus directly 
                                               
123 Ibid., p. 121 (Gesang XIV, V. 1040–42). 
124 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, pp. 294–99. 
125 See Matthew 26:36–46; Mark 14:32–52. 
126 See Luke 22:39–46. 
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communicate—and turn to the synoptic Gospels for his amplification of Jesus’s doubt. In John’s 
narrative, Jesus heroically accepts his fate, whereas the other Gospels portray him as reluctant to 
accept it.127 Klopstock’s decision to do this is a deliberate synthesis of scripture that praises one 
mode of doubt over another. That Klopstock attempts to establish Christ and Thomas as foils is 
especially interesting in the light of apocryphal literature, which portrays Thomas as Christ’s twin 
brother.128 The name “Didymus,” which Klopstock repeatedly uses to refer to Thomas, means twin. 
It is as if Klopstock built the possibility of Thomas being Christ’s twin into his narrative strategy, 
but wants his readers to identify Thomas as the weaker brother who fails to rise above his own 
limited perspective. In any case, the two modes of doubt function as foils; Thomas finds himself 
in exile, staring into a grave, while Christ emerges triumphantly from his moment of doubt. Gesang 
V of Der Messias depicts Christ at his most skeptical moment: 
Hast du [Gott] mit ausgebreitetem Arm den Kelch der Leiden / Über mich 
ausgegossen? Ich bin ganz einsam, von allen, / Die ich liebe, den Engeln; den 
Mehrgeliebten, den Menschen, / Meinen Brüdern […] Doch nicht mein Wille 
geschehe! / Vater, dein Wille geschehe! Mein hingeheftetes Auge / Schauet aus in 
die Nacht, und kann nicht weinen; mein Arm bebt, / Starrt nach Hülfe gen Himmel 
empor; ich sink’ auf die Erde: / Sie ist Grab! Es ruft, durch alle Tiefen der Seele, / 
Laut ein Gedanke dem andern: Ich sey von dem Vater verworfen!129 
 
[God, have you poured the cup of sorrow over me with outstretched arms? I am 
totally alone, from all of those whom I love: the angels, the most beloved, 
humankind, my brothers […] yet not my will be done, but your will, Father. My 
eye gazes out intensely into the night and cannot weep. My arm trembles as I look 
up towards the heavens for help. I sink to the earth; it is a grave! Calling out aloud 
                                               
127Compare John 18:11 and Matthew 26:39.  
128In The Acts of Thomas a king confuses Jesus with Thomas in § 11: “He saw the Lord Jesus talking with 
the bride. He had the appearance of Judas Thomas, the apostle who shortly before had blessed them and 
departed; and he said to him, ‘Did you not go out before them all? And how is it that you are here now?’ 
And the Lord said to him, ‘I am not Judas Thomas, I am his brother.’” The New Testament Apocrypha, p. 
452. 
129 Klopstock, Der Messias, p. 111 (Gesang V, V. 398–407). 
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through all the depths of my soul is one thought after another: I have been forsaken 
by the Father.]  
The images of complete isolation, peering out into darkness, and sinking into the earth all 
show striking parallels with Thomas’s doubts in Gesang XIV. However, the difference between the 
two modes of skepticism is that Christ’s doubts are always regulated by the presence of another’s 
will. In other words, Christ experiences a moment of kenosis in which he voids his individual will, 
trusts in the indirect evidence of God’s will, and finds his way out of the labyrinth of doubt. By 
contrast, Thomas rejects the moment of kenosis and maintains his demand for more evidence, 
which causes him to withdraw into melancholy and become schwärmerisch in his contemplation. 
In my analysis, Klopstock’s poetics turn the concept of kenosis on its head by seeking to fill up 
scripture with more powerful affects rather than trusting in the original stories to bring about 
modern confessions of faith. It is by questioning the efficacy of the foil between Christ and Thomas 
that the charge of heterodoxy can be leveled against Klopstock. Thomas could easily be celebrated 
as the patron saint of the enlightenment insofar as he refuses to yield to the will and testimony of 
others through faith alone; he exemplifies the spirit of autonomy; he thinks and acts according to 
self-imposed principles; and he has a rigorous method of investigation. Klopstock most likely did 
not intend for this reading of his Thomas, but in linking the apostle to Christ through a shared 
experience of doubt, he invites the audience to compare, and, as I have already suggested, he can 
only hope that the audience will be moved to the more virtuous mode of skepticism—whichever 
mode that may be. Thus, between the ambivalence inhering in Thomas’s doubt and the fact that 
Klopstock’s poetics privilege affect and movement over virtue, one can discover a red thread of 
heterodoxy running through his amplifications.  
In Der Messias, as in the Gospel of John, Thomas only manages to believe by seeing the 
miracle of Christ’s resurrection first hand. By adding flesh to the bones of scripture Klopstock 
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hopes that his readers will affectively experience Thomas’s radical skepticism and confirm the 
moral lesson that John that had already announced, namely, that it is better to believe than to see. 
The audience is invited to feel the “wounds” of Thomas’s soul in order to renounce the cause of 
those wounds. Yet, given how the poetics privileges movement (Bewegung) over edification (or at 
least remains in denial over how those two things might be at cross-purposes), it seems likely that 
a true skeptic would have cause to celebrate the mode of doubt captured in Klopstock’s adaptation 
of Thomas. In this way, Klopstock’s Thomas becomes a split exemplum; one that forces the reader 
to choose between two uncertain paradigms of doubt, which the etymology of the word “zweifeln” 
lucidly captures. The affects of Klopstock’s Thomas could persuade some skeptics to make room 
for faith, while others might just as easily double down and, like Thomas, demand more convincing 
proof. Regardless of which mode of doubt the author wanted his audience to affirm, Klopstock’s 
amplification of Doubting Thomas provides a useful heuristic for understanding the poetics of Der 
Messias.  
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CHAPTER TWO130 
From the Page to the Heart: Lessing’s Copernican Turn in Faith and the Genesis of a Romantic 
Spirit 
I. Towards a Lively Faith: Introduction into the Fragment Controversy 
As we have just seen in Lessing’s debate with Klopstock and the editors of the Nordische 
Aufseher, if poetry wishes to secure its status as a “freie Kunst,” it cannot serve any ends other 
than its own.131 It is perhaps worth repeating here that the autonomy of art depends on judgments 
that take into consideration the quantity and quality of sensible pleasure occasioned by works of 
art, rather than how well such works correspond to external doctrines or ideologies. Lessing, 
therefore, was right to interrogate Klopstock’s religious poetry in his Briefe die Neueste Literatur 
Betreffend to the extent that it exploited the office of poetry to facilitate a duty to believe 
[Glaubenspflicht] among his audience. Yet, the primary question of this chapter is not about art’s 
                                               
130 Throughout this chapter I used two English translations of Lessing’s work.  For Lessing’s Laokoon I 
used W.A. Steel’s translation found in the following volume: Bernstein, J.M. Classic and Romantic German 
Aesthetics. Ed. J.M. Berstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. For the majority of Lessing’s 
contributions of the Fragmentenstreit I used Hugh Nisbet’s translation in the following volume: Lessing, 
Gotthold Ephraim. Philosophical and Theological Writings. Trans. Hugh Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.  All other translations of Lessing are my own. 
131 Lessing, Laokoon, section IX: “so wünschte ich, daß man den Namen der Kunstwerke nur denjenigen 
beilegen möchte, in welchen die Schönheit seine erste und letzte Absicht gewesen. Alles andere, woran 
sich zu merkliche Spuren gottesdienstlicher Verabredungen zeigen, verdienet diesen Namen nicht, weil 
die Kunst hier nicht um ihrer selbst willen gearbeitet, sondern ein bloßes Hilfsmittel der Religion war, die 
bei den sinnlichen Vorstellungen, die sie ihr aufgab, mehr auf das Bedeutende als auf das Schöne sahe.” [I 
should like the name of ‘works of art’ to be reserved for those alone in which the artist could show 
himself actually as artist, in which beauty has been his first and last object. All the rest, in which too 
evident traces of religious ritual appear, are unworthy of the name because art here has not wrought on 
her own account, but has been an auxiliary of religion, looking in the material representations which she 
made of it more to the significant than to the beautiful.]  
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assumed autonomy, which, of course, is itself a form of ideology. Rather, this chapter will explore 
several aspects of Lessing’s theology: 1) how Lessing’s aesthetics relates to his theological writing; 
2) the theological context of the fragment controversy; 3) the significance of Lessing’s theology 
of spirit in relation to that context; 4) how history can be used to legitimize not the letter, but the 
spirit of religion. Therefore the question of adequatio is still in play, but will no longer be limited 
to concerns about raising the level of expression in scripture through poetry; rather it concerns 
multiplying the possible forms of religious experience by introducing a new mode of thinking 
[Denkungsart] through the biblical tradition. My simple thesis throughout the chapter will be that 
Lessing’s theological writings develop an aesthetic regime of faith that changed the way 
eighteenth-century religious subjects could relate to, understand, and experience the biblical 
tradition. The fragment controversy (1774–80), which is often overlooked by literary scholars, 
must be understood as a point of intersection between Lessing’s theology, aesthetics, literary 
criticism, and dramatic works. 
Justifying this thesis is, however, not such a simple task given the highly ambiguous nature 
of Lessing’s theological writings. As many scholars have indicated, these ambiguities make it 
difficult to pin down Lessing’s “actual position” vis-a-vis religion. For instance, in describing 
Lessing’s mature theological works, Hugh Nisbet argues that “ambiguity is a necessary part of his 
position.”132 Similarly, Toshimasa Yasukata’s recent book Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion and 
the German Enlightenment describes “the fragmentariness, unsystematicness, ambiguity, and 
contradictoriness [as] prominent features of [Lessing’s] theological and religious-philosophical 
                                               
132 Nisbet, Hugh, “Lessing and Philosophy,” in Fischer, Barbara and Fox Thomas, C., A Companion to the 
Works of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, New York: Camden House, 2005, p. 146. 
 
 54 
thought.”133 These ambiguities bring up the question of how exactly readers should relate Lessing’s 
theology to existing faith traditions and the ecclesiastical authorities of his time. Were they meant 
to undermine the protestant church, or did they function more as an elaborate apology on its behalf? 
Recent scholarship suggests that arguments can be made for both readings.134 Even Lessing’s own 
contemporaries found his religious “position” frustratingly enigmatic, eventually causing the 
fragment controversy (1774–80) to spill over into the pantheism controversy (1785–89) following 
Lessing’s untimely death in 1781. Rumors of Lessing’s “actual” religious position were circulated 
posthumously by Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819), who, in his Über die Lehre des Spinoza (1785), 
alleged that Lessing confessed his belief in Spinoza’s pantheistic view of religion while the two of 
them were reading Goethe’s Prometheus poem: 
Lessing: Ich finde es [das Gedicht] gut […] der Gesichtspunkt, aus welchem das 
Gedicht genommen ist, das ist mein eigener Gesichtspunkt […] Die orthodoxen 
Begriffe von der Gottheit sind nicht mehr für mich; ich kann sie nicht genießen […] 
Dahin geht auch dies Gedicht; und ich muß bekennen, es gefällt mir sehr. 
Jacobi: Da wären Sie ja mit Spinoza ziemlich einverstanden. 
Lessing: Wenn ich mich nach jemand nennen soll, so weiß ich keinen andern. 
                                               
133 Yasukata, Toshimasa, Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 8. 
134 See, for instance, Karl Barth’s chapter on Lessing where Barth (mistakenly) conflates Lessing’s 
theology with neology, a movement that instrumentalized rationalism to apologetic ends in its 
reevaluation of Church dogma: “If we wish to understand Lessing’s aims as a theologian we must proceed 
from the fact that every one of the positions of the theological neologians of that time […] were also 
contained and preserved in Lessing’s own position.” Barth, Karl, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century: Its Background and History, second ed., London: SCM, 2001, p. 225. Gordon Michalson, by 
contrast, argues that any theology willing to dispense with history constitutes a radical assault on the 
foundation of religion: Michalson, Gordon E., Lessing’s “Ugly Ditch”: A Study of Theology and History, 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985. Also, Henry Allison is more cautious, 
properly distinguishing Lessing from other theological movements of his time, and understands Lessing’s 
“position” more in terms of an attempt at sharpening the theology that Leibniz had already developed at 
the start of the eighteenth century: Allison, Henry, Lessing and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of 
Religion and its Relation to Eighteenth-Century Thought, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966 
(see especially Chapter 4, “Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion, and its Leibnizian Roots”). 
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Jacobi: Spinoza ist mir gut genug: aber doch schlechtes Heil das wir in seinem 
Namen finden! 
Lessing: Ja! Wenn Sie wollen! […] Und doch […] Wissen Sie etwas besseres135? 
 
[Lessing: I find the poem good […] The point of view from which the poem was 
taken is also my own […] The orthodox concepts of divinity are no longer for me; 
I cannot enjoy them. The subject of the poem is also about this, and I must confess 
that it pleases me very much. 
Jacobi: Then you would seem to be in agreement with Spinoza. 
Lessing: If I were to be named after anyone, then I know no one better. 
Jacobi: Spinoza is good enough for me, and yet what mixed blessing we find in his 
name! 
Lessing: Yes, if that’s the way you look at it […] but do you know anyone better?] 
Up until the mid 1780s, Spinoza was considered public enemy number one by the church 
and its academy of scholars. In addition to his pantheistic conception of God, which advances the 
possibility of subjectively accessing God through reflective means, Spinoza’s Theological-
Political Treatise (1670) waged a monumental attack against an ecclesiastical habitus of 
intolerance that transformed belief into prejudice by not permitting or taking seriously any external 
criticism of scripture.136 Spinoza’s controversial interpretation of the bible as a product of human 
history and culture (rather than a divinely inspired and infallible document made legible only to 
the privileged few) earned him the title of atheist in the eyes of the church. For Jacobi to publish 
his private conversation with Lessing created a new wave of controversy emanating from what 
appeared to be a confession of Lessing’s “true” Spinozistic position on religion. While even a 
superficial glance at Lessing’s theological writings should suffice to exonerate him from the charge 
                                               
135 See Jacobi, Friedrich, Über die Lehre des Spinoza, Hrsg. von Klaus Hammacher, Irmgard-Maria Piske, 
Marion Lauschke. Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg, 2000, p. 22. Translation mine. 
136 Two of Reimarus’ fragments, which Lessing published in 1773, address the issue of religious 
intolerance against rational theology: Von Duldung der Deisten and Von Verschreiung der Vernunft auf 
den Kanzeln. 
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of atheism, a comparative analysis of Lessing and Spinoza does in fact show some similarities. Yet 
there are also crucial differences. While it is true that, like Spinoza, Lessing viewed the bible as a 
human document and called for the free and open criticism of it, he distinguished himself from 
Spinoza by opposing the use of natural science to explain scripture,137 and rejected the idea that 
obedience could be the organizing principle of modern faith.138 For Lessing, modern faith depends 
on the project of Bildung and the incorporation of aesthetic principles into hermeneutics. By 
introducing aesthetic structures and a developmental model of faith into his theology, I argue, 
Lessing creates the conditions of possibility for a lively faith, one that topples the Glaubenspflicht 
[obligation to believe] model of faith advocated by neologians like Basedow, Cramer, and 
Klopstock.139 
It is also worth mentioning, even if only anecdotally, Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813–1855) 
enthusiastic celebration of Lessing’s religious ambiguity. In his Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, Kierkegaard offers the following “expression of gratitude” to Lessing: 
[Lessing] closed himself off in the isolation of subjectivity, did not allow himself 
to be tricked into becoming world historical or systematic with regard to the 
religious, but he understood, and knew how to maintain, that the religious pertained 
to Lessing and Lessing alone, just as it pertains to every human being in the same 
way, understood that he had infinitely to do with God, but nothing, nothing to do 
                                               
137 See Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: “I hold that the method of interpreting scripture, does 
not differ from the [correct] method of interpreting nature, but rather is wholly consonant with it. The 
[correct] method of interpreting nature consists above all in constructing a natural history, from which we 
derive the definitions of natural things, as from certain data. Likewise, to interpret Scripture, we need to 
assemble a genuine history of it and to deduce the thinking of the Bible’s authors by valid inferences from 
this history, as from certain data and principles.” 
138 Ibid.: “it was not the purpose of the Bible to teach any branch of knowledge. For from this we can 
readily infer that it requires nothing of men other than obedience, and condemns not ignorance but 
disobedience.” 
139 See my previous chapter on Lessing’s response to Basedow and Cramer in his Briefe, as well as his 
response to Klopstock’s essay Von der Besten Art über Gott zu Denken. 
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directly with any human being. See, this is the object of my expression, the object 
of my gratitude—now, if only it is certain that this is how it is with Lessing—if.140 
Kierkegaard radicalized Lessing’s model of faith by elaborating its perceived subjective-
existential underpinnings, and he assigned value to the futility of confirming Lessing’s “true” 
beliefs. The ominously dangling “if” at the end of the passage attests to Kierkegaard’s own 
uncertainty as to whether or not his “expression of gratitude” is warranted. Does Lessing resist 
subsuming religion under a world historical system like Hegel and his disciples? The vast majority 
of scholarship disagrees with Kierkegaard on this point. Lessing’s theological writings, above all 
his Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, are often read as a prelude to the totalizing system of 
Hegelian dialectics, to the extent that Lessing’s conception of “Erziehung” also shows human 
history to gradually dispense with revealed knowledge once it has recourse to rational knowledge. 
And yet I take Kierkegaard’s “if” very seriously. For it suggests that something more is at stake in 
Lessing’s theological writings than a mere prelude to Hegel. Without digressing too much further, 
I would only add that Kierkegaard’s “expression of gratitude” approaches the central question 
underlying Lessing’s theological investigations: “was verbindet mich denn dazu?”141 [what, then, 
binds me to it?]. What binds modern religious subjects to their faith is the question at the heart of 
Lessing’s influential Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft (1777). While Kierkegaard is perhaps 
correct to suggest that Lessing would not attribute the binding force of Christianity to a world 
historical system that promises to explain all religious phenomena from an external standpoint, is 
                                               
140 See Kierkegaard, Søren, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol 1, ed. 
and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992, p. 65. 
141 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Über den Beweis des Geistes und Der Kraft, in Werke und Briefe, Band 8, 
hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p., 352. 
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it not an evasion of “actual” history—the “trap of Idealism” that Kierkegaard so vigorously 
criticizes—to claim that Lessing’s enigmatic approach to Christianity emerged from “the isolation 
of subjectivity?”142 A closer look at the particular historical context in which Lessing wrote reveals 
that his writings did not emerge from the isolation of his own subjectivity, but were in fact written 
in response to questions that engaged a broader community of public opinions. 
This context is crucial for making Lessing’s theological innovations visible both within his 
own time, and with respect to his subsequent reception by the early romantic school and beyond. 
Lessing’s Anti-Goeze (1778), a text that polemically defends the legitimacy of rhetorical 
demonstration in theological arguments, represents a significant moment in the self-assertion of 
poetics over enlightenment theology near the end of the eighteenth century. 
Es kömmt wenig darauf an, wie wir schreiben: aber viel [mehr], wie wir denken. 
Und Sie wollen doch wohl nicht behaupten, daß unter verblümten, bilderreichen 
Worten notwendig ein schwanker, schiefer Sinn liegen muß? Daß niemand richtig 
und bestimmt denken kann, als wer sich des eigentlichsten, gemeinsten, plattesten 
Ausdruckes bedienet? Daß, den kalten, symbolischen Ideen auf irgend eine Art 
etwas von der Wärme und dem Leben natürlicher Zeichen zu geben suchen, der 
Wahrheit schlechterdings schade? […] Wie lächerlich, die Tiefe einer Wunde nicht 
dem scharfen, sondern dem blanken Schwerte zuschreiben!143 
 
                                               
142 Kierkegaard was likely under the spell of Schlegel, who praises Lessing’s unsystematic style: 
“[Lessing] habe das lebendige Gespräch noch mehr in der Gewalt gehabt als den schriftlichen Ausdruck 
[…] Das Interessanteste und das Gründlichste in seinen Schriften sind Winke und Andeutungen, das 
Reifste und Vollendetste Bruchstücken […] Das beste, was Lessing sagt, ist, was er, wie erraten und 
erfunden, in ein paar gediegenen Worten voll Kraft, Geist und Salz hinwirft; […] Einzeln und kompakt, 
ohne Zergliederung und Demonstration, stehen seine Hauptsätze da, wie mathematische Axiome; und 
seine bündigsten Räsonnements sind gewöhnlich nur eine Kette von witzigen Einfällen.” [Lessing was 
said to have even more control in living conversation than in written expression […] The most interesting 
and the most rigorous passages in his writings are hints and insinuations, the most mature and perfected 
are fragments […] The best things Lessing says are those things that he throws out, as if guessed at and 
invented, in a few sound words full of power, spirit and salt; […] His main clauses are individual and 
compact, without analysis and demonstration, like mathematical axioms; his most concise reasoning is 
usually just a chain of witty ideas]. Schlegel, Friedrich, “Über Lessing,” in Anthenäums-Fragmente und 
andere Schriften, hrsg. von Andreas Huyssen, Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 59–60. Translation mine. 
143 Lessing, Werke in drei Bände, Anti-Goeze II, p. 485. Translation mine. 
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[It depends less on how we write than on how we think. Surely you [Goeze] do not 
want to maintain that a weak and misguided sense necessarily lies behind allusive 
and figurative language? That no one can think properly and correctly except those 
who use the most factual, common and dull expressions? Or that the attempt to 
instill something of the warmth and life of natural signs in cold and symbolic ideas 
would damage the truth? […] How absurd to attribute the depth of a wound to the 
sword’s shine rather than to its sharpness!] 
 It’s not the style in which we write, but how we think, and the metaphors, parables, 
dialogues, allegories, and similes that Lessing mobilizes throughout his theological writings are 
oriented towards solving the common problem of how to attain religious conviction without 
forsaking reason. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Lessing’s theological writings should be 
treated as simple poetic documents that have no real contribution to offer theology. This would be 
an oversimplification that underestimates the value of the content within those writings and it 
would also overlook a much longer tradition of philosophers and theologians making use of 
figurative language to construct their arguments. One need only recall Plato’s cave analogy, 
Leibniz’s dream of an inverted pyramid that represents the best of all possible worlds, or 
Nietzsche’s repurposing of Greek myth to articulate a genealogy of morals. My point is, rather, 
that Lessing does not exclude culture from adopting a theological Denkungsart, and his religious 
writings elaborate, in a fugue-like manner, the insight that enlightenment theology has come to 
demand so much from the biblical letter [Buchstabe] that it alienates religious subjects from the 
spirit [Geist] of the bible. In other words, enlightenment theology confuses the logos of religion 
for its ethos, making a “Religion von Vernunft” [religion of reason.] There are several examples 
of how Lessing elaborates this insight throughout his writings. His Eine Parabel (1778) uses the 
metaphor of architecture to diagnose the problem of “bibliolatire,” or the unnecessary worship of 
the letter of religion. His dialogical invocation of the apocryphal Das Testament Johannes (1777) 
attempts to reverse the priority of the letter/spirit distinction that the Gospel of John consecrates 
 60 
through its well-known line: “in the beginning was the word.” Finally, his Ernst und Falk (1778) 
dramatizes his thesis that letter is not the spirit by showing how religious institutions and customs 
are merely externalizations of a constantly evolving spirit. 
Of course, the suggestion that literature, rhetoric, and aesthetics could offer viable solutions 
to difficult questions of faith inflames old tensions between theology and classical traditions. That 
antagonism stretches as far back as Tertullian (160–220), who posed the infamously xenophobic 
question: “What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?”144 Tertullian’s question finds its most 
sustained answer in St. Augustine’s (354–430) De Doctrina Christiana (397), a text that attempts 
to reconcile Christian hermeneutics with classical rhetoric and demonstrates to the Christian world 
how it stands to benefit from developing rules for interpreting scripture. In some ways, the stand-
off between Goeze and Lessing restages this antagonism in an entirely new context. Not all 
theologians at the time adopted Goeze’s hardline opposition to secular hermeneutics. Many 
reconsidered the efficacy of their own communicative practices and hermeneutic methodologies 
by contemplating the possibility of embracing classical traditions and the newly emerging field of 
aesthetics to regain influence over a public gradually turning to literature for spiritual and moral 
guidance.145 One of the more interesting and relevant examples of this can be found in the 
theological writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who already in 1769 applied an 
organic conception of truth to his homiletics, one that would “live on in the hearts and minds” of 
his congregation rather than be unreflectively relegated to memory and prejudice: “mein Wort 
                                               
144 Quoted from Kennedy, A. Georg, Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian & Secular Tradition from Ancient 
to Modern Times, second revised and enlarged ed., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
145 See, for instance, Heinrich Philipp Schuler’s Geschichte der Veränderungen des Geschmacks im 
Predigen (1794). 
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müsse im Gedächtnis und was noch mehr ist, im Herzen meiner Zuhörer leben […] Predigten 
müssen gehalten sein sie müssen lebendig gefaßt, sie müssen im Herzen und nicht auf dem Papier 
bleiben, sie müssen ewigen Eindruck nachlassen”146 [my word must be impressed upon the 
memory, and what is still more it must live in the hearts of my audience […] Sermons must be 
given and they must be composed in a lively manner, they must be inscribed on the heart and not 
simply remain on the page, they must leave behind an eternal impression]. More conservative 
theologians fell in line with Goeze by seeking to enforce stricter censorship laws to curb the 
proliferation of what they perceived to be hostile secular values.147 By the end of the fragment 
controversy, Goeze and his constituency successfully appealed to the duke of Braunschweig to 
have Lessing’s publishing rights revoked, citing that his criticisms of religion threatened the well-
being of the public. While the duke’s censorship might have brought the fragment controversy to 
its official end, it continued in the form of Lessing’s Nathan play, which Friedrich Schlegel (1772–
1829) aptly described as “die Fortsetzung vom Anti-Götze, Numero Zwölf”148 [the twelfth 
installment of the Anti-Goeze polemic]. 
Ironically, Schlegel would go on to judge Lessing’s theological writings (especially their 
fragmentary style) as a true expression of genius, while failing to acknowledge how closely his 
polemical writings adhered to the prescribed rules of classical rhetoric.149 Nevertheless, the 
Romantics viewed Lessing’s passionate approach to theology as a synthesis of art and religion, 
                                               
146 See Herder’s “Abschiedsrede von Riga,” in Herder, Johann, Werke in zehn Bänden: Theologische 
Schriften, Band 9, hrsg. von Christoph Bultmann und Thomas Zippert, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche 
Klassiker Verlag, 1994, p. 62. Translation mine. 
147 Johann Melchior Goeze successfully appealed directly to the Duke of Braunschweig in 1778 to censor 
Lessing’s theological writings. 
148 See Schlegel, “Über Lessing,” p. 67. 
149 Ibid., p. 60. See also Moore, Evelyn K., The Passions of Rhetoric: Lessing’s Theory of Argument and 
the German Enlightenment, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993, pp. xi-xix.  
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one that would eventually culminate in the idea of “Kunstreligion,” which becomes developed 
more fully in the literary works of Wackenroder and the religious treatises of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768–1834). Yet it was not Lessing’s style alone that garnered the attention of the 
Romantics, but his radical observations on the nature and limitations of historical evidence, which, 
as we will see in the next chapter, had a profound influence on Novalis. More than any other 
romantic, Novalis sought to build on and improve Lessing’s insights into the relationship between 
poetry and history.150 Above all, Novalis wanted to elaborate the way in which Lessing deployed 
the creative imagination to transfigure the contingencies of history into meaningful narratives that 
could facilitate subjective religious conversion. 
The status of history within theological discourse was indeed central to the fragment 
controversy, and Lessing accused enlightenment theologians of abusing biblical history by 
constructing artificial “proofs” designed to assure religious subjects of the credibility of their faith, 
that their bond to Christianity rested on sound truths (rather than mere feeling). This meant that 
revealed knowledge, or knowledge acquired through reports of divinely inspired prophecies and 
miracles, was to be grounded by reason. Lessing became highly critical of this effort, arguing that, 
[d]ie Kanzeln, anstatt von der Gefangennehmung der Vernunft unter den Gehorsam 
des Glaubens zu ertönen, ertönen nun von nichts, als von dem innigen Bande 
zwischen Vernunft und Glauben. Glaube ist durch Wunder und Zeichen bekräftigte 
Vernunft, und Vernunft raisonnierender Glaube geworden. Die ganze geoffenbarte 
Religion ist nichts, als eine erneuerte Sanction der Religion der Vernunft.151 
 
[The pulpits no longer resound with the need to subordinate reason to faith; they 
now resound only with talk of the intimate bond between reason and faith. Faith 
has become reason reinforced by miracles and portents, and reason has become 
                                               
150 See Saul, Nicholas, History and Poetry in Novalis and in the Tradition of the German Enlightenment, 
London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1984. 
151 Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker 
Verlag, 1989, p. 316. 
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faith reinforced by rational thought. The whole of revealed religion is no more than 
a renewed sanctioning of the religion of reason.] 
Lessing was fighting against a generation of theologians who eclectically made use of the 
insights in Leibniz’s Theodicy (1709). Above all, theologians got swept up in the drive to set reason 
and faith on an equal footing,152 which, as Lessing suggests, found popular expression on the 
pulpit. However, Leibniz’s vindication of God from the charge of having allowed evil to exist in 
the world inadvertently suggests that reason is needed to explain the “will” of the Creator.153 This 
desire to “justify the ways of god to men”154 in the Theodicy is, therefore, strikingly similar to what 
we have already seen in Klopstock’s amplification of scripture in Der Messias. Of course, the 
crucial difference is that Leibniz called on metaphysics rather than poetry to serve as the 
handmaiden of religion, but nevertheless there is a shared methodology at work. Loosely following 
the path that Leibniz set out, enlightenment theologians developed several strategies that reflect 
the apparent harmony of revelation and reason. These strategies included using biblical 
paraphrastics to reconcile scripture with popular morality, using advanced knowledge of ancient 
languages to challenge the authority of certain translations or editions of the bible, and 
interrogating the history of the Church and its dogma in order to distinguish “true” from “false” 
articles of faith.155 
                                               
152 See my Chapter 1, Section 2, or Leibniz’s Theodicy, § 39: “But since reason is a gift of God, even as 
faith is, contention between them would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of 
reason against any article of faith are insoluble, then it must be said that this alleged article will be false 
and not revealed: this will be a chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capable 
of comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat.”  
153 For an analysis of this in the context of Leibniz see Neiman, Susan, Evil in Modern Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 
154 Of course, Milton’s Paradise Lost is also apart of this constellation of science, literature, and religion. 
155 See Aner, Karl, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964. 
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Perhaps the most popular strategy among theologians of the 1760s was the historical-
critical exegesis of the biblical letter, which attempted to humanize and rationalize certain articles 
of faith without reference to church dogma. For instance, Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem 
(1709–1789), whose son Karl contributed to the fragment controversy and tragically became the 
biographical model for the protagonist in Goethe’s Werther,156 challenged Augustine’s dismal 
account of original sin in his Betrachtungen über die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der Religion (1768). 
For Augustine (and Luther) human nature will always be ontologically corrupt and unable to 
actualize virtuous life without the aid of divine grace. Against this Jerusalem protests: “Wo steht 
es, daß die Menschen ihres angeborenen Verderbens wegen verdammt werden sollen?”157 [Where 
does it say that mankind is to be condemned because of its innate corruption?]. In this case, the 
goal was to use scripture rather than the dogma produced from the symbolic books158 of the Early 
Church to give human agency (i.e. free will) a more dignified status with respect to the doctrine of 
original sin. Jerusalem made the case that to be born without virtue in no way means that human 
                                               
156 Karl Jerusalem (1747–1772) wrote several essays that responded to Reimarus’ fragment Von Duldung 
der Deisten, an essay that Lessing published which calls for greater tolerance for rational inquiry into 
theology. Lessing acknowledges Karl Jerusalem’s unfortunate suicide that was the real-life analogue to 
Goethe’s main character in his epistolary novel Werther. Of Karl Jerusalem, Lessing wrote: “Der 
Verfasser dieser Aufsätze war der einzige Sohn des würdigen Mannes, den alle, welchen die Religion 
eine Angelegenheit ist, so verehren und lieben. Seine Laufbahn war kurz; sein Lauf schnell. Doch lange 
leben ist nicht viel leben. Und wenn viel denken allein, viel leben ist: so war seiner Jahre nur für uns zu 
wenig” [The author of these essays was the only son of a worthy man whom everyone involved with the 
office of religion reveres and loves. His career was short; his run fast. But to live long is not to have lived 
much. And if much thinking alone is to live much: then it is only for us that his years were too few]. In 
Lessing, Werke, Band 8, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, p. 137. Translation mine. 
157 Jerusalem, Johann Friedrich Wilhelm, Schriften, Band IV, hrsg. von Andreas Urs Sommer, 
Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2007, p. 433. Translation mine. 
158 Symbolic books [symbolische Bücher] refer to works written by theologians of the early and later 
Church, or works that are not part of the biblical canon, yet their influence is so far reaching that it rivals 
the authority of the biblical authors themselves. Examples of these works would include the writings of 
Augustine and, for the Protestant Church, Luther. Neologians debated how much authority these books 
should have in relation to actual scripture. 
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nature lacks an innate capacity for virtue. That capacity, according to Jerusalem, manifests itself 
across history, which serves as a kind of eye-witness testifying to humanity’s constant struggle to 
regain its lost state of benevolence.159 In this way, Jerusalem’s pelegianic response to Augustine 
makes use of historical observations to revise and modernize Church dogma. 
Echoes of Jerusalem’s argument also found expression in secular literature. Friedrich 
Nicolai’s satirical, shandyesque novel Das Leben und Meinungen des Sebaldus Nothankers (1773–
76), gave voice to a host of theological arguments that were in circulation during the fragment 
controversy. For instance, he puts Jerusalem’s reading of original sin into the mouth of the novel’s 
protagonist, who argues against the Augustinian conception of original sin with a fellow traveller. 
Sebaldus protests: “Wir besitzen Kräfte zum Guten. Wer dies leugnen wollte, würde Gottes 
Schöpfung schänden, der uns so viel Vollkommenheiten gegeben hat. Ohne den Einfluß einer 
übernatürlich wirkenden Gnade können wir Tugend und edle Taten ausüben.”160 [We posses the 
capacity for virtue. Whoever wanted to deny this would offend God’s creation, which has given us 
so many perfections. We can exercise virtue and noble deeds without the influence of supernatural 
grace.] In their respective roles as theologian and novelist, Jerusalem and Nicolai demonstrate a 
shared interest in articulating a conception of original sin that does not refer to the necessity of 
divine intervention (i.e. grace), but instead refers to the necessity of Bildung as the primary means 
of sharpening mankind’s perceived capacity for virtue. 
Of course, this is an insight that Lessing fully endorses, yet his method of harmonizing 
religion with popular morality involves an appeal to the spirit (i.e. religion’s underlying ethos), 
                                               
159 For an analysis of the theological context out of which Jerusalem’s argument emerged see Aner, Karl: 
“Der Übergang von Wolffianismus zur Neologie,” in Die Theologie der Lessingzeit, Hildesheim: G. 
Olms, 1964, pp. 144–201. 
160 Nicholai, Friedrich, Das Leben und die Meinungen des Herrn Magister Sebaldus Nothanker, 
Hamburg: Tredition Classics, 2012, viertes Buch, erster Abschnitt. Translation mine. 
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which dispenses with the aspiration to build a fully coherent system of religion from the logos of 
the biblical letter. In other words, whereas Jerusalem appeals to the minutiae of scripture to present 
an epistemic argument that can replace the institutionalized doctrine of original sin, Lessing rises 
above local skirmishes by developing what will eventually be defined as a moral proof by thinkers 
like Kant and Fichte.161 This proof considers the efficacy of religion’s ethos within historical 
development as more vital to the “truth” of religion than any logical demonstration. That is to say, 
it considers how well the ethos of religion satisfies the practical needs of individuals and 
communities at a given historical moment: “Was kümmert es mich, ob die Sage falsch oder wahr 
ist: die Früchte sind trefflich […] Diese Früchte sähe ich vor mir reifen und gereift, und ich sollte 
mich damit nicht sättigen dürfen?”162 [What does it matter to me whether the old legend is true or 
false? The fruits [i.e. miracles and fulfilled prophecies] are excellent […] And were I to see these 
fruits ripening and ripened before me, am I not supposed to eat my fill of them?] This language of 
fruit and digestion, or consumption rather than reflection, prioritizes confessional systems of faith 
that turn on pragmatism. Here, in Lessing’s Beweis, which functions as a manifesto against both 
the scientific effort to prove or disprove the truth of revealed knowledge (Reimarus) and the 
dogmatic denial that revealed knowledge poses any kind of epistemic obstacle for modern religious 
subjects (Schumann), the contours of a moral proof begin to emerge in Lessing’s argument, which 
concludes on a wish: “Ich schließe, und wünsche: möchte doch alle, welche das Evangelium 
Johannis trennt, das Testament Johannis wieder vereinigen! Es ist freilich apokryphisch, dieses 
Testament: aber darum nicht weniger göttlich”163 [I shall end with this wish: may all those whom 
                                               
161 Kant and Fichte will develop moral proof arguments in their respective practical philosophies. 
162 Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker 
Verlag, 1989, p. 354. 
163 Ibid., p. 445. 
 67 
the Gospel of St. John divides be reunited by St John’s Testament! It is admittedly apocryphal, this 
testament—but not for that reason any the less divine]. Lessing traces the cause of sectarian 
divisions within Christianity to the Gospel of John (1:1–14: “In the beginning was the Word”) and 
hopes that the Testament of John can undo that damage and serve as a unifying force in the future. 
Lessing’s Das Testament Johannis is a dialogical text that repeats over and over again the most 
essential teaching of Christianity: “Kinderchen, liebt euch!” [Little children, love one another]. St. 
John, who was famous for his eloquence, reportedly kept reducing the length of his sermons 
towards the end of his life until finally he boiled it down to just several words suggesting that the 
core teachings of scripture revolve around the Christian concept of agape, or charitable love. The 
situation in the eighteenth century could not be more different. Here one finds theologians, 
philosophers, and literary figures all hastening to amplify the word of God to make it correspond 
more closely to popular morality. In describing the Testament of St. John as a foil to the Gospel of 
John, Lessing positions himself against his contemporaries. 
During the fragment controversy the main article of faith being disputed was the doctrine 
of eternal salvation, which relied on the historical “fact” of Christ’s resurrection as narrated in the 
Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. As far as Lessing was concerned, this was the place 
in scripture where theologians were most dishonest insofar as they wanted more than sufficient 
reason to believe in Christ’s resurrection; they wanted to prove it with certainty. This became 
glaringly obvious in the fragments of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), who 
systematically set out to prove that the only thing “certain” about Christ’s resurrection was that it 
never happened, at least not in the way that religious institutions led their subjects to believe. 
Reimarus was a former student of Christian Wolff, an underground deist, and a talented philologist. 
He also wrote some of the most devastating biblical commentaries on record. For example, in his 
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fragments he questioned whether or not the Old Testament should even qualify as religion 
considering its “immoral” content;164 used data about the mortality rates of children to 
problematize the missionary work of the Church and its policy of condemning to hell all 
unbaptized souls (even if they are “innocent” children);165 described the doctrine of original sin as 
a shield protecting the Church against rational criticism;166 used statistical analysis to discredit the 
miracles described in Exodus (e.g. Moses’ parting of the Red Sea);167 and made use of legal 
conventions to undermine the veracity of witness testimony in the New Testament.168 Lessing’s 
publication of Reimarus’ fragments was strategic. If rational theologians continue to cross-
examine the Gospel narratives with the intent to prove the veracity of Christ’s resurrection (by 
showing that the particular details and testimony in the four Gospels do not contradict each other), 
then they should also be prepared to embrace Reimarus’ skepticism as their own169 because his 
views represents the end game of rational theology. On the one hand, Lessing agreed with 
Reimarus’ underlying premise that the evidence grounding the doctrine of salvation—the 
testimony and historical reports of fulfilled prophecies and miracles—is shot through with 
                                               
164 See Reimarus’ Viertes Fragment: Daß die Bücher A.T. nicht geschrieben worden, eine Religion zu 
Offenbaren.  In: Lessing. Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1989, pp. 246-276. 
165 Ibid., Reimarus’ Zweites Fragment: Unmöglichkeit einer Offenbarung, die alle Menschen auf eine 
gegründete Art glauben könnten. pp. 189-236. 
166 Ibid., Reimarus’ Erstes Fragment: Von Verschreiung der Vernunft auf den Kanzeln. pp. 175-188. 
167 Ibid., Reimarus’ Drittes Fragment: Durchgang der Israeliten durchs rote Meer. pp. 236-246. 
168 Ibid., Reimarus’ Fünftes Fragment: Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte. pp. 277-311. 
169 Ibid., Reimarus’ Fünftes Fragment: Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte, pp. 277-311. Here Reimarus 
compares the testimony of the four Evangelists and finds multiple grounds to believe that Christ’s 
resurrection was a ruse. For instance, in the Gospel of Matthew he finds evidence to suggest that Joseph 
of Arimathea (who owned the land where Christ was buried) struck a deal with the apostles and gave the 
Roman guards the wrong location in which to guard Christ’s body so that the apostles only had to move 
the stone in the middle of the night and could then report that Christ had risen from the dead even though 
his body was at a different location. 
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pernicious contradictions. Lessing was very explicit about this in his response to Johann Heinrich 
Ress, writing: “Ich gab den Vordersatz zu; und leugnete die Folge”170 [I accepted the premise, but 
I rejected the conclusion]. On the other hand, Lessing was not prepared to abandon himself to the 
bleak conclusion that a confession of faith is tantamount to endorsing a lie. Instead, he strategically 
described Reimarus as the “ideal opponent of religion” and published the anonymous fragments 
so that an “ideal defender of religion” might emerge; someone who could see beyond the 
“hairsplitting interpretations” of the letter and acknowledge that “die Seligkeit nicht an die 
mühsame Erforschung dieser [die Bücher der Offenbarung], sondern an die herzliche Annahme 
jener gebunden sei”171 [salvation is not tied to the laborious study of the books of revelation, but 
rather to the heartfelt acceptance of revelation]. 
In his Gegensätze des Herausgebers Lessing included nearly half of the Erziehung 
fragments, and the following one identifies the crux of the problem for enlightenment theologians 
like Reimarus: 
Aber jedes Elementarbuch ist nur für ein gewisses Alter. Das ihm entwachsene 
Kind länger, als die Meinung gewesen, dabei zu verweilen, ist schädlich. Denn um 
dieses auf eine nur einigermaßen nützliche Art tun zu können, muß man mehr 
hineinlegen, als darin liegt; mehr hineintragen, als es fassen kann. Man muß die 
Anspielungen und Fingerzeige zu viel suchen und machen, die Allegorien zu genau 
ausschütteln, die Beispiele zu umständlich deuten, die Worte zu stark pressen. Das 
gibt dem Kinde einen kleinlichen, schiefen, spitzfindigen Verstand; das macht es 
geheimnisreich, abergläubisch, voll Verachtung gegen alles Faßliche und 
Leichte.172 
 
[But every primer is only for a certain age. To continue using it for longer than 
intended with a child who has outgrown it is harmful. For in order to do this in a 
useful way, one must read more into it than is present and introduce more than it 
                                               
170 See Lessing’s Eine Duplik. 
171 Lessing, Gedanken über die Herrnhuter, in Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 2003, pp. 271–80. Translation mine. 
172 Lessing, Werke und Briefe: Zur Geschichte und Literatur, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt 
am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 346. 
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can hold. One must look for and invent too many allusions and pointers, extract too 
much from the allegories, interpret the examples too circumstantially, and press the 
words too hard. This gives the child a petty, warped, and hairsplitting 
understanding; it makes the child secretive, superstitious, and full of contempt for 
everything comprehensible and straightforward.] 
Here Lessing speaks of primers [Elementarbücher] and pointers [Fingerzeige], which 
represent the machinery of religious education. The primers refer to the Old and New Testaments, 
each of which contain pointers or obscure, indeterminate elements that incentivize readers to 
further development an understanding of those pointers in order to advance to the next primer. In 
other words, one primer prepares the way” to the next, and Reimarus’ insatiable demand for 
testimony purified of all contradiction obstructs his ability to advance to the next primer. According 
to Lessing, the doctrine of salvation was already latent (i.e. it held the status of a pointer) within 
Mosaic law, which, if obeyed, promised to secure a life of happiness (or more accurately a life 
without punishment), and it took many centuries before the concept of salvation evolved to include 
the promise of happiness in another life yet to come. For Lessing, the eighteenth century had grown 
up enough to realize that this promise should be thought of in experiential terms rather than in 
terms of transcendence.173 He argues, “Ich will es den Gottesgelehrten gern zugeben, daß aber 
doch das Seligmachende in den verschiedenen Religionen immer das Nämliche müsse gewesen 
sein: wenn sie mir nur hinwiederum zugeben, daß darum nicht immer die Menschen den nämlichen 
Begriff damit müssen verbunden haben”174 [I will gladly concede to the theologians that the 
salvation element in the different religions must always have been the same—provided they will 
concede to me in turn that people need not therefore always have had the same conception of it]. 
                                               
173 Lessing, Erziehung, § 85–90. To think of salvation in experiential terms also introduces a political 
dimension into Lessing’s theology. 
174 Lessing, Gegensätze des Herausgebers, p. 345. 
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By building a transformative mechanism into his conception of religious education it becomes, 
much to the chagrin of orthodox theologians, essential for revealed knowledge to be subjected to 
free and open criticism. Without this, revelation is in danger of becoming a fossilized object of 
faith. For Lessing, by contrast, the point is to think of revelation as perpetual so that theologians 
like Reimarus might begin to imagine how the doctrine of salvation could still hold value for 
religious subjects in the eighteenth century. 
Another major site of conflict during the fragment controversy involved the capacity of 
historical evidence to serve as the foundation of confessional systems. Many enlightenment 
theologians took recourse in history to prove that eternal salvation was a very real and legitimate 
promise, and a promise that reason could show to be universally and eternally applicable. On this 
particular issue Lessing never showed signs of equivocation: “zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten 
können der Beweis von notwendigen Vernunftswahrheiten nie warden”175 [contingent truths of 
history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason]. Here, in his Beweis, Lessing 
vigorously defends the claim that contingent truths of history are mediated through testimony and 
reports, which, means that the force of those truths will always be weaker than knowledge obtained 
through direct empirical observation. To this effect he writes: 
daß Nachrichten von erfüllten Weissagungen nicht erfüllte Weisagungen; daß 
Nachrichten von Wundern nicht Wunder sind. Diese, die vor meinen Augen 
erfüllten Weissagungen, die vor meinen Augen geschehenen Wunder, wirken 
unmittelbar. Jene aber, die Nachrichten von erfüllten Weissagungen und Wunder, 
sollen durch ein Medium wirken, dass ihnen alle Kraft benimmt.176 
 
[It is because reports of fulfilled prophecies are not fulfilled prophecies; because 
reports of miracles are not miracles. The latter—prophecies fulfilled before my 
eyes and miracles that happen before my eyes—have an immediate effect. But the 
                                               
175 Lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft. 
176 Ibid. 
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former—reports of fulfilled prophecies and of miracles—have to act through a 
medium which deprives them of all their force.] 
This passage recalls the problem of doubting Thomas, who symbolically emerges on the 
stage of the fragment controversy as the central obstacle for modern faith. Implied here is Lessing’s 
critique of enlightenment theology that treats the letter of the bible as if it were an object of natural 
science. For Lessing, as for Vico, Gadamer, and others, the “proofs” of history will always be 
qualitatively different from those of the natural sciences, whose methodologies demand the 
immediacy of empirical observation to arrive at “universal” or “transhistorical” knowledge.177 By 
contrast, human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] like history are founded upon an ideal of 
consensus, which has the capacity to evolve over time as new bodies of research and insight are 
introduced into a given scholarly environment. Historical truth, in other words, cannot aspire 
beyond the particular and the contingent, a fact that effectively denies any Church’s claim to 
universal truth. At best, one might argue in Kantian terms that the promise of eternal salvation is 
nothing more than an idea of reason and the “historical” reports of Christ’s resurrection are 
individual attempts to translate this idea of reason into an aesthetic idea (i.e. each gospel is an 
attempt to give concrete, sensible form to the idea of eternal salvation). 
Lessing, however, is not interested in developing a philosophically rigorous vocabulary to 
make his argument about the status of history within theological inquiry. Instead, he returns to the 
                                               
177 See Vico, Giambattista. The First New Science. Edited by Leon. Pompa, Cambridge University Press, 
2002; Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: Mohr, 1960; and White, Hayden, The 
Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990. See also Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963, which uses the history of science to challenge the assumption that 
natural science is capable of securing universal/transhistorical truths. 
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Early Church Fathers and develops a hypothesis about the four Evangelists that makes use of the 
“regula fidei,” or rule of faith, as articulated in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.178 In the Epistle, Paul 
declares that “we have different gifts, according to the grace given us. If a man’s gift is 
prophesying, let him use it in proportion to his faith.”179 In other words, if John’s “gift” was his 
talent for eloquence and Paul’s was his ability to construct arguments that could appeal to potential 
Christian converts, then each should put their particular talents to work in their individual accounts 
of Christ’s life and teachings. Lessing represents the Evangelists as human historians with discrete 
rhetorical skills—rather than divinely inspired historians—to both discredit orthodox notions of 
scripture’s inerrancy180 and to disarm rational theology’s concerns about the presence of 
contradictions in scripture. According to Lessing, religion existed prior to the bible. In fact, he 
argues “Die Religion ist nicht wahr, weil die Evangelisten und Apostel sie lehrten: sondern sie 
lehrten sie, weil sie wahr ist”181 [religion is not true because the evangelists and apostles taught it; 
on the contrary, they taught it because it is true]. The Evangelists were only inspired to write 
anything down after they developed their convictions about the significance of Christ’s life. 
Lessing further describes the rule of faith in his Notwendige Antwort. This text was directed at 
Goeze, who rejected Lessing’s hypothetical argument that religion could survive even if scripture 
had been lost or never existed at all: 
Diese Regula fidei war, ehe noch ein einziges Buch des Neuen Testaments 
existierte. Diese Regula fidei ist sogar älter als die Kirche. Denn die Absicht, zu 
                                               
178 Unfortunately Lessing never completed his argument, but we only have fragments of it in his Neue 
Hypothese über die Evangelisten als bloss menschliche Geschichtscreiber betrachtet [New Hypothesis on 
the Evangelists as Merely Human Historians.] 
179 See Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 12:6. 
180 Goeze, for instance, believed in the infallibility of every letter in the Bible on the grounds that the 
Evangelists were divinely inspired. For an analysis of this theory see Allision’s Lessing and the 
Enlightenment, especially chapter 3, section IV. 
181 Lessing’s Gegensätze des Herausgebers. 
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welcher; die Anordnung, unter welcher eine Gemeinde zusammen gebracht wird, 
ist ja wohl früher als die Gemeinde […] Diese Regula fidei also ist der Fels, auf 
welchen die Kirche Christi erbauet worden, und nicht die Schrift. 
 
[This regula fidei was in existence before a single book of the New Testament 
existed. This regula fidei is even older than the Church. For the intention for which, 
and the rules under which, a congregation is brought together must certainly be 
prior to the congregation itself […] Thus this regula fidei, and not the Scriptures, is 
the rock on which the Church of Christ was built.] 
The rule of faith, therefore, adheres not to the letter of religion, but to its spirit, which, 
again, refers to the ethos that emerged from Christ’s actions and his teachings. For Lessing, as for 
the Early Church, the letter of religion only performs the function of missionary work and it should 
be judged based on its efficacy rather than the logical consistency of a closed system. 
In his final analysis, Lessing knew that the historical narratives of the Evangelists were not 
capable of shouldering the weight of “eternal” truths, and so he called for a new kind of faith that 
could rest on “Zeit angemessenere Beweise”182 [proof more appropriate to his time]. This new 
faith was to be grounded on the spirit of religion: 
Denn da dieses Zeugnis [des heiligen Geistes] sich doch nur bei denjenigen 
Büchern und Stellen der Schrift mehr oder weniger äußern kann, welche auf unsere 
geistliche Besserung mehr oder weniger abzwecken: was ist billiger, als nur 
solcherlei Bücher und Stellen der Bibel den Geist der Bibel zu nennen? Ich denke 
sogar, es streife ein wenig an Gotteslästerung, wenn man behaupten wollte, daß die 
Kraft des H. Geistes sich eben sowhol an dem Geschlechtsregister der 
Nachkommen des Essau beim Moses, als an der Bergpredigt Jesu beim Matthäus, 
wirksam erzeigen könne.183 
 
[Testimony [of the spirit] can only express itself more or less in those books and 
passages of Scripture which aim more or less at our spiritual improvement: what is 
more reasonable than to call only those books and passages “the spirit” of the Bible? 
I even think it would be verging on blasphemy to assert that the power of the Holy 
                                               
182 Lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft. In: Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno 
Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 440). 
183 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, p. 453. 
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Spirit manifests itself as much in the genealogical tables of Esau’s descendants in 
Genesis as in the Sermon on the Mount in St Matthew’s Gospel.] 
For Lessing, the spirit of religion aligns with the teleological goals of Bildung, which 
effectively emancipates modern faith from simply being a question of obeying the statutory 
elements of scripture. But before turning to Lessing’s polemical arguments against enlightenment 
theology’s Buchstabe fetish and before analyzing the aesthetic structures in his theology in the 
following sections, careful attention must be given to his conception of spirit [Geist]. It is, after 
all, the spirit that offers protection from the devastating criticism of Reimarus’ Fragments. To avoid 
any confusion with respect to an idea that has produced much, I will put my cards on the table first 
and then defer my analysis to subsequent sections of this chapter. I take the idea of Geist to be 
imaginative: not transcendental, not suspended in a “pure,” ethereal realm impervious to the effects 
of time and space: it is something that must be taught, instilled, nurtured, and argued about in each 
and every generation or else it risks becoming a meaningless petrification—a memorized 
catechism or an absolute truth. To be sure, there is something “constant” to Lessing’s conception 
of the spirit. This would be the “regula fidei,”184 or the ethos185 represented in the stories about 
Christ that were designed to improve the practical life of a given religious community through a 
                                               
184 In his Nötige Antwort auf eine sehr unnötige Frage—a text that clarifies how the spirit of religion 
precedes its letter—Lessing claims that it was not scripture, but the regula fidei upon which the church 
was originally built: “Diese regula fidei ist der Fels, auf welchen die Kirche Christi erbauet worden, und 
nicht die Schrift.” Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band 
III, p. 549.  
185 Lessing will refer to the regula fidei as the “essential content, rules, and intentions” (ibid. p. 549, §1, 
§4). My reading is indebted to John Smith’s Dialogues between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return 
of God in Modern German Thought, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011. Smith refers to Lessing’s 
spirit as an ethos and uses it as a stepping-stone to Kant’s moral proof of God’s existence that, in one 
stroke, makes the theoretical proof obsolete. Smith does not explore the specific details of the fragment 
controversy, though his reading of the “as if” in Kant’s categorical imperative as aesthetic compliments 
my analysis of Lessing (see below). 
 
 76 
variety of means. The prophecies, miracles, histories, poetry, and arguments scattered throughout 
the bible are merely expressions of that ethos, to be judged neither by how well they adhere to 
subsequent doctrines and dogma nor by categories of “true” and “false,”186 but on how well they 
penetrate into moral fabric of society and individuals. Efficacy, then, becomes just as much the 
point of departure for judging and interpreting the written traditions as it is for creating the 
narratives in the first place. With this in mind, I believe that Lessing’s theology of spirit creates 
the conditions of possibility for a lively faith to develop within modern religious discourse. 
 
II. The Theological Import of Lessing’s Laokoon 
Ich bin nun überzeugt, daß der höchste Akt der Vernunft, der, in 
dem sie alle Ideen umfaßt, ein ästhetischer Akt ist und daß Wahrheit und 
Güte nur in der Schönheit verschwistert sind. Der Philosoph muß 
ebensoviel ästhetische Kraft besitzen als der Dichter. Die Menschen ohne 
ästhetischen Sinn sind unsere Buchstabenphilosophen. Die Philosophie 
des Geistes ist eine ästhetische Philosophie.187 
 
[I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, by 
encompassing all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness 
are only siblings in beauty. The philosopher must possess as much 
aesthetic power as the poet. These people without an aesthetic sense are 
our philosophers of the letter. The philosophy of spirit is an aesthetic 
philosophy.] 
 
                                               
186 Sequence is always important for Lessing: “Diese Regula fidei ist sogar älter als die Kirche. Denn die 
Absicht, zu welcher; die Anordnung, unter welcher eine Gemeinde zusammengebracht wird, ist ja wohl 
früher als die Gemeinde” [This regula fidei is even older than the church. For the intention to which; the 
arrangement under which a church is brought together is probably earlier than the church.] Ibid. 
187 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Frühe Schriften. 1. Aufl., Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 235. The English 
translation of this passage is attributed to Hölderlin in Bernstein, J.M. Classic and Romantic German 
Aesthetics. Ed. J.M. Berstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 186. 
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––Hegel, Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, 1796/7 
The question of why Lessing’s theology should be described as “aesthetic” requires some 
attention. There are several reasons why speaking of aesthetic theology is particularly apt when 
thinking through Lessing’s religious writings. For this section, however, I will limit myself to 
demonstrating how the aesthetic “Denkungsart” [mode of thinking] of Lessing’s Laokoon (1766) 
is structurally analogous to a mode of thinking he introduces into modern theology. 
At first glance, the only common denominator between Lessing’s Laokoon and his religious 
writings appears to be the polemic. His Laokoon waged an attack against Winckelmann’s highly 
influential treatise Gedancken über die Nachahmung der Griechischen Werke in der Mahlerey und 
Bildhauerkunst (1755), which argued, paradoxically, that the only way for modern art to become 
“inimitable” is for artists to imitate the Greeks. The paradox is resolved once it becomes clear that 
by “imitation” Winckelmann refers not to any individual works of Greek art, but rather to their 
methodologies.188 In any case, for Winckelmann Greek culture symbolized the fountainhead of 
good taste, and it was there that modernity should develop an aesthetic theory: “Der gute 
Geschmack, welcher sich mehr und mehr durch die Welt ausbreitet, hat sich angefangen zuerst 
unter dem Griechischen Himmel zu bilden”189 [good taste, which is spreading more and more 
across the world, first established itself under a Greek sky]. According to Winckelmann, all Greek 
masterpieces express “noble simplicity” and “serene sublimity”:  
                                               
188 See Beiser, Frederick, Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 163f. Translation mine. 
189 Winckelmann, Johann J., Gedancken über die Nachahmung der Griechischen Wercke in der Mahlerey 
und Bildhauer-Kunst; Sendschreiben; Erläuterung, ed. Max Kunze, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2013, p. 9. 
Translation mine. 
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Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der Griechischen Meisterstücke ist 
endlich eine edle Einfalt, und eine stille Größe, so wohl in der Stellung als im 
Ausdruck. So wie die Tiefe des Meers allezeit ruhig bleibt, die Oberfläche mag 
noch so wüten, eben so zeiget der Ausdruck in den Figuren der Griechen bei allen 
Leidenschaften eine grosse und gesetzte Seele.190 
 
[The ideal characteristics of Greek masterpieces are: noble simplicity and serene 
sublimity, just as much in disposition as in expression. Just as the depth of the sea 
remains at all times calm while its surface rages, so too do the expressions of Greek 
sculpture show a great and settled soul in the midst of great passions.] 
As far as Winckelmann was concerned noble simplicity and serene sublimity, which index 
the stoic tradition, were ideals manifestly written onto the face (and body) of the Laocoön statue. 
Decisive for Lessing’s polemic was Winckelmann’s observation that the Greek statue contained 
no trace of the outward horror described by Virgil in his Aeneid. The statue, Winckelmann writes, 
“hebet kein schreckliches Geschrey, wie Virgil von seinem Laokoon singet.”191 [raises no horrible 
scream like the Laocoön of whom Virgil sings]. Whereas Virgil’s poetry vividly describes a scene 
in which Laocoön screams in agony as he witnesses the violent death of his children, the Greek 
sculptor, according to Winckelmann, chose to represent the father’s capacity to endure in the face 
of overwhelming agony: “sein Elend gehet uns bis an die Seele; aber wir wünschen, wie dieser 
grosse Mann, das Elend ertragen zu können”192 [his misery drills down to our soul, but we hope to 
be able to bear the misery, like this great man]. In other words, the statue reinforces Winckelmann’s 
claim that noble simplicity and serene sublimity form the ideological foundation of Greek taste. 
Yet, for Lessing the sculptor’s decision to mitigate the agony described by Virgil had 
nothing to do with the ethical ideals of noble simplicity or serene sublimity. Rather, it was the 
result of aesthetic deliberations over the medium of sculpture. The sculptor knew that he needed 
                                               
190 Ibid., p. 27–28. 
191 Ibid., p. 28. Translation mine. 
192 Ibid. Translation mine. 
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to mitigate the pathos of the poem if he wanted his sculpture to facilitate aesthetic pleasure and 
arouse the audience’s sympathy, that is, to fulfill the function of art. According to Lessing, 
Winckelmann provided “the wrong reasons” to justify his observation: “Nur in dem Grunde, 
welchen Herr Winckelmann dieser Weisheit gibt, in der Allgemeinheit der Regel, die er aus diesem 
Grunde herleitet, wage ich es, anderer Meinung zu sein”193 [Only in the reasons, which 
Winckelmann provided for his argument, that is, in the general rule which he draws from these 
reasons, do I venture being of a different opinion than he]. Had the sculptor not mitigated the 
pathos described by Virgil, his artwork would have become a source of displeasure [ekelhaft] for 
its audience: “er [der Bildhauer] mußte Schreien in Seufzen mildern; nicht weil das Schreien eine 
unedle Seele verrät, sondern weil er das Gesicht auf eine ekelhafte Weise verstellet”194 [the sculptor 
had to mitigate the scream into sighs; not because screaming betrays an ignoble soul, but rather 
because it disfigures the face in an unpleasing manner]. 
A detailed analysis of their arguments exceeds the purpose of the present investigation. 
However, if one situates Lessing’s response within a larger constellation of eighteenth-century 
aesthetics, his approach appears relatively singular in its call for greater attention to what 
distinguishes the arts from each other. In no way does Lessing aspire to a general aesthetic theory 
like Baumgarten had done in the 1750s or Sulzer would do in the 1770s:195 “Wenn mein 
Raisonnment nicht so bündig ist als das Baumgartensche, so werden doch meine Beispiele mehr 
nach der Quelle schmecken”196 [If my argument is not as systematic as Baumgarten’s, at least my 
                                               
193 Lessing, Laokoon, in Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, 
p. 14. 
194 Ibid., p. 24. Translation modified. 
195 Here I refer to Baumgarten’s Ästhetik. Mirbach, Dagmar, and Alexander G. Baumgarten. Ästhetik. 1., 
edition, Meiner, F, 2009. and Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, Leipzig: Dyk, 1792. 
196 Lessing, Laokoon, “Vorrede.” 
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examples will taste more of the original sources]. Of course, an explicit methodology is never 
spelled out, yet the passage indicates an empirical inductive method to be at work in Lessing’s 
aesthetics. Most significant here is his insight that the criteria for making aesthetic judgments 
should take into account formal and material distinctions among the arts. The Horatian dictum “Ut 
pictura poesis” [as is painting so is poetry], which influenced generations of critics and artists all 
the way up to Winckelmann, no longer serves as an adequate criterion by which to judge poetry 
and painting. For Lessing, aesthetic judgments should not conflate artistic mediums; rather, they 
should build their criteria around these differences, a claim that directly challenges the Horatian 
paradigm. This much is clear even before he begins his polemic against Winckelmann. An epigram 
by Plutarch announces the organizing principle of Lessing’s treatise, which functions as an 
alternative to the Horatian tradition: “Ύλη και τροποις μιμησεως διαφερουσι”197 [durch den Stoff 
und die Arten der Nachahmung unterscheiden sie sich / subjects differ in their materials and types 
of imitation]. While the majority of his peers worked to articulate general aesthetic theories, 
Lessing shows the inherent value in localizing aesthetic judgments to the specific medium in which 
a given artwork is situated.198  
At this point, I will begin to demonstrate how Lessing brings similar insights to bear on the 
methodological practices of eighteenth-century theology, which showed a propensity to judge 
revealed knowledge (signs, miracles, prophecies) as if it could be verified through rational 
                                               
197 Ibid. 
198 For Lessing, each artistic medium makes use of different strategies to facilitate aesthetic pleasure and 
our judgments upon various works of art should also take into consideration these formal differences. In 
section XVI of his Laokoon, Lessing defines the crucial difference between painting and poetry. 
Simultaneity and successivity are the concepts on which the difference between painting and poetry turn. 
Wheras painting uses signs all at once, poetry uses signs that unfold in a sequence. For an excellent study 
on this topic through the perspective of semiotics, see Wellbery, David, Lessing’s Laocoon: Semiotics 
and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
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procedures. That is to say, to judge revealed truths according to criteria that properly belongs to 
natural science. In the next section, I will venture a more extensive analysis of the particular 
theological systems that Lessing targeted during the fragment controversy, but for now it is 
necessary to at least briefly sketch a general picture of how theology begins to make use of natural 
science, which ushers in new standards for judging theological arguments and concepts according 
to how well they harmonize with natural science (i.e. empirical and logical proofs). On the surface, 
these proofs 1) promise to make it possible for religious subjects believe in the existence of God 
or doctrines of faith on the strength of argument199 (rather than feeling, prejudice, or opinion), and 
2) assume that scientific knowledge of the natural world can contribute to a better understanding 
of God. After all (so it was thought), if God were the architect of the world it would seem plausible 
that his fingerprint lay somewhere upon his creation.200 Yet upon closer examination, it becomes 
apparent that these attempts to prove the existence of God and facilitate a greater understanding of 
Him proceed on the assumption that the divine logos can be justified through human reason and 
not simply through faith alone. Of course, these proofs undermine Luther’s efforts to diminish 
philosophy’s influence on theology and maintain strict borders between them—a task he forcefully 
makes known in his Disputations against Scholastic Theology, which argues: “In vain does one 
fashion a logic of faith […] No syllogistic form is valid when applied to divine terms […] If a 
syllogistic form of reasoning holds in divine matters, then [for instance] the doctrine of the Trinity 
                                               
199 The three most famous arguments for the existence of God during the period from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries were the ontological (Descartes), the cosmological (Leibniz), and the 
physicotheological (Clarke) arguments. 
200 Here I am referring to the design/physicotheological argument, popularized by Samuel Clarke’s A 
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1705), but already latent in Melanchthon’s 16th 
oration, On Natural Philosophy. 
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is demonstrable and not an object of faith […] Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as 
darkness is to light.”201 
 One of the more influential proofs is found in Descartes’ fifth meditation, which offers an 
especially illuminating example of how theology might take recourse in natural science to achieve 
its ends (i.e. conviction). In it he writes: 
But now, if because I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails 
that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really 
does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the 
existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one 
that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my 
understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and 
distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property 
belongs to its nature.202 
Here Descartes entertains the possibility that mathematical certainty could serve as the 
“possible basis” for proving the existence of God. In other words, just as we determine 
mathematical certainties by intuiting clear and distinct ideas from arithmetic or geometry (e.g. all 
angles of a triangle must add up to 180 degrees or certain numbers are always odd, while others 
are even), so too can we infer the necessity of God’s existence by intuiting the (clear and distinct) 
idea of a perfect being, who was responsible for bringing all existence into being. Simply stated, 
Descartes’ mediation suggests that human thought is able to infer the ontological existence of God, 
which still enjoyed wide appeal throughout the eighteenth century. 
                                               
201 Luther, Martin, Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, third edition, ed. Timothy F. Lull and 
William R. Russell, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012, p. 16. 
202 Descartes, René, Discourse on Method & Meditations on First Philosophy, fourth edition, trans. 
Donald Cress, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998, Meditation V, “Of the Essence of Material Things, 
and, Again, of God: That He Exists.” 
 83 
A more radical iteration that attempts to reconcile natural science with theology is 
developed in Spinoza’s Ethics, which argues that God is the immanent cause of nature and his 
attributes spread out infinitely across all of eternity. “By God,” Spinoza states, “I understand a 
being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each 
one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”203 Unlike Descartes, who affirms a traditional 
concept of God as a transcendent being who is responsible for all of creation, Spinoza understands 
God as the immanent cause of nature, which forges an identity between nature and God, wherein 
the infinite diversity of the natural world comes to be seen as an expression of God’s essence. 
By the time we get to the mid-eighteenth century the alliance between natural science and 
theology appears to have grown stronger. The theological writings of Wolff, Leibniz, and 
Baumgarten each advance the legacies of their predecessors in this respect. However, a single 
example from Baumgarten’s Metaphysics must suffice to illustrate this point. In his Metaphysics 
it becomes clear that not only does theology need natural science to supply proof of God’s 
existence (Descartes), but that without God the law of (non)contradiction, which is, according to 
Baumgarten, “absolutely primary” for all sciences, would not be possible.204 “If God were not 
actual,” Baumgarten writes, 
then the principle of contradiction, which is the first principle of both the form and 
the matter in all our proofs, would be false. Therefore, even though many sciences 
could be completely proven without any theological premise, nevertheless, unless 
                                               
203 See Spinoza, Benedict, A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and other Works, ed. & trans. Edwin Curley, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 86. 
204 See Baumgarten, Alexander, Metaphysics, trans. & ed. Courtney D. Fugate & John Hymers, New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013, § 7: “[that] which is negative, something that cannot be represented, something 
impossible, something inconsistent, (an absurdity), something involving or implying a contradiction, 
something contradictory […] This proposition is called the principle of contradiction, and it is absolutely 
primary.”  
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God were actual, there would be neither these sciences themselves nor their objects; 
indeed, on the contrary, they would not be possible.205 
For better or worse, science shows itself to be completely wedded to the task of proving 
the existence of God, and the idea of perfection (which was thought to be tied to an understanding 
of God) provides science with its most essential instrument for demonstrating truth. Baumgarten 
implies that if there were no God (i.e. if atheism were the law of the land), science might not be 
possible for it would lose the ability to distinguish between true and false propositions. However, 
one should not be fooled by Baumgarten’s modesty, for he also maintains that “many sciences 
could be completely proven without any theological premise.”206  
Lessing, by contrast, ascribes value to revealed knowledge precisely because it is beyond 
the reach of natural science. To my mind, his intervention produces a situation in which religious 
subjects must actively work to secure their convictions rather than relying on Christian dogma or 
rational proofs to legitimize a given faith tradition. Both dogma and rational proofs serve as 
prosthetics of faith and undermine the freedom of religious subjects to willfully bind themselves 
to the underlying ethos of religion. In a sense, Lessing seems to renew Luther’s insistence that a 
sharp distinction between the offices of theology and philosophy be maintained; however, 
Lessing’s justification for doing so is more persuasive than Luther’s often irrational dismissal of 
philosophical inquiry.207 Moreover, Lessing’s rationale parallels his insights with respect to the 
                                               
205 Ibid., § 285. 
206 Ibid., § 824. 
207 For instance, see Luther’s Disputation Against Scholastic Philosophy: “Virtually the entire ethics of 
Aristotle is the worst enemy of Grace. This is said in opposition to the Scholastics” (p. 16).  Luther, 
Martin.  Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings. Third Edition. Ed. Timothy F. Lull & William R. 
Russell. Fortress Press: Mineapolis, 2012. 
 85 
difference between painting and poetry: to bind oneself to an article of faith requires a different set 
of considerations than those needed to assent to a proposition made by natural science. 
The theological import of Lessing’s Laokoon rests in large part on his conception of the 
“pregnante Moment” [pregnant moment]. The pregnant moment is an aesthetic imperative that 
calls on artists to represent their subjects in such a way that the audience can use their reflective 
powers to bring the artwork to a state of completion. Lessing describes the rule in the following 
terms: “dasjenige aber nur allein ist fruchtbar, was der Einbildungskraft freies Spiel läßt. Je mehr 
wir sehen, desto mehr müssen wir hinzudenken können. Je mehr wir dazu denken, desto mehr 
müssen wir sehen glauben”208 [Now that alone is significant and fruitful which gives free play to 
the imagination. The more we see, the more must we be able to add by thinking. The more we add 
thereto by thinking, so much the more can we believe ourselves to see]. The passage develops a 
dialectics of seeing that, for instance, deviates from the optics expressed in Klopstock’s fabrication 
of doubting Thomas, whose desire to see everything violates the proposed rule and earns him 
condemnation. Here, Lessing seeks to harness the desire to see by showing how degrees of 
concealment are necessary to incentivize thought to reveal something further about a given 
object.209 At this point, there is an unmistakable idealism at work in Lessing’s aesthetics: 
“Ohnstreitig; denn was wir in einem Kunstwerke schön finden, das findet nicht unser Auge, 
sondern unsere Einbildungskraft, durch das Auge, schön”210 [Unquestionably; for what we find 
beautiful in a work of art is not found beautiful by the eye, but by our imagination through the 
                                               
208 Lessing, Laokoon, section III, p. 26–27. 
209 Nikolas von Kues’ De doctra ignorantia [On Learned Ignorance] (1440) could be characterized as a 
prefiguration of Lessing’s argument. See especially chapter 3, “Absolute Truth is Beyond our Grasp.”  
210 Lessing, Laokoon, section VI, p. 53. 
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eye]. This assumes that the viewer does not simply grasp the beauty of an artwork by applying 
concepts and categories to what it sees, but that the viewer has access to the interiority of the 
artwork by means of the imagination, which then grasps the beautiful.211 However, this assumption 
breaks down if the viewer sees too much from the outside, Lessing writes, that this “heißt der 
Phantasie die Flügel binden, und sie nötigen”212 [would bind the wings of imagination and coerce 
it]. Such a view articulates a participatory regime of aesthetics that is also at the heart of Lessing’s 
theology of spirit, which I argue involves a similar dynamic between the outward “letter” and the 
inner “spirit” of religion. I will discuss Lessing’s theology of spirit in the final section of this 
chapter, but the idea that more work needs to be done in order to complete our understanding of 
religion effectively opens up the biblical canon to external critique and allows theological concepts 
to evolve rather than be held captive by dogma. Lessing’s theory that a “New Eternal Gospel” lies 
concealed in the “Elementarbüchern des Neuen Bundes” [primers of the New Covenant] represents 
the culmination of this idea.213 
 Now that my argument is on the table, I want to provide further justification for making 
these claims. I first suspected that Lessing’s aesthetics were operative in his theology after 
reflecting on a comment made by his theological adversary, Johann Melchior Goeze (1717–1786), 
who accused Lessing of obscuring religious truths through a style that makes use of metaphors, 
                                               
211 See Joachim Jacob’s “Analysis of Beauty: Zur Aufklärung des Schönen zwischen theologischer und 
materialer Ästhetik,” in Literatur und Theologie im 18. Jahrhundert: Konfrontationen, Kontroversen und 
Konkurrenzen, Hallesche Beiträge zur Europäischen Aufklärung, 41, hrsg. von Friedrich, Hans-Edwin; 
Haefs, Wilhelm; Soboth, Christian, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. 
212 Lessing, Laokoon, section III, p. 27. 
213 See Lessing’s Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, § 85f. The New Eternal Gospel designates a future 
time when the promise of eternal salvation in a transcendent world no longer incentivizes humanity to act 
virtuously; rather, every act of virtue in this world is accompanied by a concrete experience of salvation. 
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allegories, and similes—through what Goeze ultimately calls “Theaterlogik” [a logic of the 
theater]: 
Die Art wie Herr Lessing streitet ist sonderbar. Seine Bemühungen gehen nicht 
dahin, den Verstand seiner Leser durch Gründe zu überzeugen, sondern sich ihrer 
Phantasie durch allerhand unerwartete Bilder und Anspielungen zu bemächtigen. 
Er bestimmt daher nichts durch richtige Erklärungen, er führet nie einen 
gründlichen und einleuchtenden Beweis, sondern er spielt beständig mit 
Gleichnissen, Instanzen und Antithesen. Er nimmt die Worte in Verschiedenen 
Bedeutungen und gerade jedesmal in der jenigen, von welcher er sich die meisten 
Hoffnung macht, daß sie am ersten blöde Augen blenden werde. Er erlaubt sich 
Sophismen, Equivocen und Fallacien […]214 
 
[Lessing’s manner of argumentation is very peculiar. He is not concerned with 
attempting to convince his readers through the use of reason, but instead attempts 
to take possession of his readers’ imagination through all kinds of unexpected 
images and allusions. He thus determines nothing by means of real explanations, 
never leads his readers through well-reasoned and plausible proofs, but instead 
constantly plays with similes, instances, and antitheses. He employs words with 
many semantic registers and always such that he has the greatest hope of blinding 
the eyes of his dumbest readers. He permits himself sophisms, equivocations, and 
fallacies.] 
While the comment was likely intended to expose Lessing as a charlatan peddling a secular 
theology apparently too dangerous for public consumption, Goeze nevertheless struck a nerve. In 
fact, Lessing is at his most polemical when attempting to defuse this particular charge leveled 
against his style. Several entries in his Axiomata (an especially hostile treatise directed against 
Goeze in 1778 after he accused Lessing of being an enemy of Christianity) are explicitly devoted 
to defusing this issue. In one entry, Lessing defends himself by claiming, “Ich bin Liebhaber der 
Theologie und nicht Theolog. Ich habe auf kein gewisses System schwören müssen. Mich 
                                               
214 Goeze, Melchior Johann, Goezes Streitschriften gegen Lessing, hrsg. von Erich Schmidt, in Deutsche 
Litteraturdenkmale des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts, Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein: Nendeln,1968, p. 5. 
Translation mine.  
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verbindet nichts, eine andere Sprache, als die meinige, zu reden.”215 [I am an amateur of theology, 
not a theologian. I have not had to take an oath on any particular system. I am not obliged to speak 
any language other than my own]. Even if Lessing’s modesty seems disingenuous, it nevertheless 
becomes apparent that Goeze landed a punch in this exchange, yet for reasons that he never fully 
understood or troubled himself to investigate further. 
However, to be guilty of using a literary style to advance theological arguments is not yet 
to properly speak of aesthetics. After all, figurative language has been an instrument of 
philosophical and theological discourse ever since Plato and Augustine. Goeze, by contrast, 
maintains a rigid sense of how theological inquiry should be stylized, and, to him, Lessing 
symbolizes a negative example: 
Die Theaterlogik, und die Logik, welche in theologischen Streitigkeiten 
insonderheit in denen, welche die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion entschieden 
sollen, gebraucht werden muss, sind himmelweit unterschieden. Die erste kann auf 
die Zuschauer große Wirkung thun, und diejenige, welche Goethe in seiner 
schändlichen Stella gebraucht hat, um die Hurerei und Vielweiberei zu 
rechtfertigen, hat öfters den Zuschauer ein lautes Jauchzen und ein heftiges 
Klatschen abgelocket. Allein alle Rechtschaffene verabscheuen solche auf dem 
theologischen Kampfplatze, so wie sie in juristischen Streitigkeiten die Schikane 
verabscheuen. In der Theaterlogik ist Herr Lessing ein großer Meister.216 
 
[Theater logic and the kind of logic which must be used in theological disputations, 
particularly those which aim to decide the truth of the Christian religion, are worlds 
apart. The former can have a great effect upon the audience, and that which Goethe 
used in his scandalous play Stella, in order to justify whoring and polygamy, often 
coaxed great cheers and vigorous applause from the audience. Only decent people 
are averse to such [logic] in the theological arena just as they despise chicanery in 
legal proceedings. Lessing is a great master in the logic of the theater.] 
                                               
215 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, p. 447. 
Translation mine. 
216 Goeze, Melchior Johann, Goezes Streitschriften gegen Lessing, hrsg. von Erich Schmidt, in Deutsche 
Litteraturdenkmale des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts, Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein: Nendeln, 1968, p. 7–8. 
Translation mine. 
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Being the son of a Lutheran minister, Lessing was well versed in the art of preaching and 
much of his religious writings perform the function of a sermon directed (ironically) at modern 
theologians who, like Goeze, continue to falsely assume that their system of faith must appeal to 
universal truth. In Goeze’s eyes, the artistic universe of Lessing and Goethe is in no position to 
reveal the truths of Christianity; rather, it provides a disservice to society by undermining its moral 
integrity. Goeze’s preference for a style that is unencumbered by rhetorical eloquence is, of course, 
symptomatic of a wider ideology that permeated the scientific community since the sixteenth 
century. In their excellent study The Ends of Rhetoric, John Bender and David Wellbery identify 
attitudes like those expressed by Goeze as “emblematic of the Enlightenment as a whole. They 
bespeak a general movement toward representational neutrality and […] a model of critical 
communication that stresses the neutrality and transparency of discourse and that, in consequence, 
throws off the rhetorical tradition.”217 Lessing, for his part, swims against the current of this 
“general movement” insofar as he views rhetoric and eloquence not merely as ornaments of truth, 
but as constitutive of truth.218 Evidence of this can be found in Lessing’s Anti-Goeze (1778), in 
which he defends his style more forcefully: 
Ich suche allerdings, durch die Phantasie mit, auf den Verstand meiner Leser zu 
wirken. Ich halte es nicht allein für nützlich, sondern auch für notwendig, Gründe 
in Bilder zu kleiden; und alle die Nebenbegriffe, welche die einen oder die andern 
erwecken, durch Anspielungen zu bezeichnen.219 
 
[Above all, I try to act on the understanding of my readers with the help of 
imagination. I consider it to be not only useful, but also necessary to dress concepts 
                                               
217 Bender, John B., and David E. Wellbery, eds., The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 13. 
218 See chapter 4 in Blumenberg, Hans, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998. 
219 Lessing, Anti-Goeze, in Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band 
III, p. 523. Translation mine. 
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[Gründe] in images; and to describe by means of allusions all the secondary 
concepts inspired by the concepts or the images.] 
Again, the imagination can be used as a means for stimulating further contemplation and 
allowing one access to a richer conceptual matrix that advances reflection, knowledge, and, in this 
context, faith. There is no mere “playing with words,” Lessing objects, “wo ich mit Worten am 
meisten spiele, ich dennoch nicht mit leeren Worten spiele; Daß überall ein guter triftiger Sinn zum 
Grunde liegt220” [where I play with words most, I play not with empty words; at bottom there is 
everywhere a good and valid sense to be found]. Lessing concludes that Goeze’s entire approach 
to their polemic is immature insofar as he refuses to engage with the content of Lessing’s ideas, 
but instead keeps his criticism on the superficial level of style. 
Style aside, it was at this juncture that I decided to go back to Lessing’s Laokoon, published 
nearly a decade before the fragment controversy, to look for evidence that might link his 
theological writings more explicitly to an aesthetic paradigm, and found a structural analogy 
between the “pregnant moment” and the kind of theological approach Lessing attempts to 
articulate throughout the fragment controversy. As I mentioned, in his Laokoon, it is crucial that a 
viewer’s imagination enjoys sufficient freedom to participate in the completion of the artwork. As 
Lessing puts it, “Wenn Laokoon also seufzet, so kann ihn die Einbildungskraft schreien hören; 
wenn er aber schreiet, so kann sie von dieser Vorstellung weder eine Stufe höher, noch eine Stufe 
tiefer steigen, ohne ihn in einem leidlichern, folglich uninteressantern Zustande zu erblicken.”221 
[When Laocoon sighs, the imagination may hear him shriek; but when he shrieks, the imagination 
can neither advance beyond this extreme point, nor descend below it without viewing him under 
                                               
220 Ibid., p. 526. Translation mine. 
221 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, p. 27.  
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circumstances of less urgent distress, and consequently of diminished interest]. In Lessing’s 
theological writings, a similar situation emerges in a religious subject whose interest stands to be 
elevated through the uncertain status of revealed knowledge,222 a condition that activates rather 
than diminishes the movement of faith. 
Lessing’s motto throughout the fragment controversy can be summed up in the following 
comment: “Womit sich die geoffenbarte Religion am meisten weiß, macht mir sie gerade am 
verdächtigsten”223 [Where revealed religion is most certain of knowledge, this is precisely where 
it makes me most suspicious]. His suspicion has to do with two things. First, it relates to the 
somewhat obvious fact that world religions are grounded on contingent truths of history rather 
than necessary truths of reason. Even if the historical element of scripture provides the senses with 
something “factual” to hold on to, this “empirical” record (i.e. eye-witness testimony) still limits 
the truth of those narratives to the particularities of its history. Second, and perhaps more important 
for the purpose of this chapter, Lessing’s suspicion relates to the assumption that certain truths 
impede our capacity to participate in the production of meaning. This becomes most audible in 
Lessing’s response to Johann Ress (1732–1803), an orthodox theologian also living in 
Wolfenbüttel at the time, who argued that Christ’s resurrection must be true because he could find 
no evidence across the four gospel narratives to suggest otherwise.224 Ress, like many orthodox 
theologians, was trained to view contradictions in scripture as merely apparent contradictions 
                                               
222 I characterize revealed knowledge as uncertain because it rests on historical testimony. Obviously not 
all of the bible (i.e. not all religious truths are communicated through the medium of history), but when 
dealing with the New Testament, which is what is at stake in the fragment controversy, these truths do 
rest on history, a fact which denies religious truth any claim to universality. 
223 Quoted from Taubes, Jacob, Abendländische Eschatologie, hrsg. von Rene König, Bern: Franke 
Verlag, 1947, p. 131. 
224 See Ress’ essay: Die Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu Christi gegen einige im vierten Beitrage zur 
Geschichte und Literatur (1777). 
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[anscheinend Widersprüche], which could be resolved through historical-critical-exegesis, often 
making use of the law of non-contradiction to harmonize the sensus spiritus and sensus literalis of 
scripture. Ress, therefore, did not find the inflammatory content of the fragments to pose any 
serious threat to Christianity. His belief in the inerrancy of scripture angered Lessing, who was 
determined not to allow willful blindness or religious prejudice to get the upper hand in a public 
debate he knew would provide theology with the tools it needed to disarm certain forms of religious 
skepticism. Against Ress, Lessing states: 
Nicht die Wahrheit, in deren Besitz irgend ein Mensch ist, oder zu sein vermeinet, 
sondern die aufrichtige Mühe, die er angewandt hat, hinter die Wahrheit zu 
kommen, macht den Wert des Menschen. Denn nicht durch den Besitz, sondern 
durch die Nachforschung der Wahrheit erweitern sich seine Kräfte, worin allein 
seine immer wachsende Vollkommenheit bestehet. Der Besitz macht ruhig, träge, 
stolz.225 
 
[Not the truth which someone possesses or believes he possesses, but the honest 
effort he has made to get at the truth, constitutes a human being’s worth. For it is 
not through the possession of truth, but through its pursuit, that his powers are 
enlarged, and it is in this alone that his ever-growing perfection lies. Possession 
makes us inactive, lazy, and proud.] 
By turning a blind eye to the content of the fragments, Ress clearly failed in his effort to 
“honestly get at the truth,” but instead withdrew himself into familiar prejudices. Moreover, this 
passage shows the spirit of the pregnant moment to be serviceable to Lessing’s theology. Again, 
we find here a labor-based conception of knowledge that is driven by a progressive humanism, and 
this structure applies equally to Lessing’s aesthetics and theology. Any theology that attempts to 
secure its doctrines of faith through dogma or rational proof leaves behind a dead letter that vitiates 
any aspiration for advancement. In other words, a dead letter leaves no room for the program of 
                                               
225  Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker 
Verlag, p. 510. 
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Bildung that stands at the heart of both Lessing’s aesthetics and his theology. Already at the early 
stages of the fragment controversy, Lessing articulates a theological Denkungsart that promises to 
enliven religious experience rather than limit it; one that implies religion need not be explained 
scientifically or dogmatically but that it can assume a lead role in the project of Bildung and stand 
alongside science and politics. Moreover, one of the inevitable outcomes of this structural analogy, 
which the Romantics take full advantage of in their creative works, is that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between religious experience and aesthetic experience, even though the 
ends of art (i.e. pleasure) and the ends of religion (i.e. conviction) remain discrete. This reading 
challenges recent theories about the secularization of religion (Schmitt, Taubes, Löwith) through 
aesthetics by suggesting that aesthetic experience does not replace religious experience, but rather 
that the two join forces and expand the possibilities in which religious subjects can relate to the 
biblical tradition. 
In order to justify his theology, Lessing needs to turn the Lutheran hierarchy between the 
letter and spirit on its head, which situates him within the humanist tradition advocated by 
Erasmus.226 Yet, before exploring the intricacies of Lessing’s theology of spirit, it will be necessary 
to get a better sense of the particular theological systems that became objects of criticism during 
the fragment controversy. 
                                               
226 See Erasmus, Desiderius, Discourse on Free Will: Erasmus–Luther, ed. Ernst F. Winter et al., London: 
Continuum, 1996. 
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III. Lessing’s Unholy Trinity: Deism, Neology, and Orthodoxy in the Context of the 
Fragmentenstreit 
The fragment controversy began shortly after Lessing published Von Duldung der Deisten: 
Fragmenten des Ungenannten (1774–77), which were followed up by his own critical commentary 
under the heading Gegensätze des Herausgebers. The fragments—numbering seven in total227—
were excerpts taken from the manuscripts of Samuel Hermann Reimarus (1694–1768), a family 
friend of Lessing who harbored private sympathies for English deism. The content of the fragments 
was so inflammatory that in 1770 Lessing travelled to Berlin to consult his friends Friedrich 
Nicolai (1733–1811), Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), and Reimarus’ daughter Elise 
Reimarus228 (1735–1805), about whether or not he should publish them. All three predicted that 
going to press would only lead to trouble and advised Lessing not to do so. Not heeding the counsel 
of his closest friends, Lessing eventually went through with the publication, promising Elise and 
her family that he would keep the author’s name anonymous so that they would not be exposed to 
any public ridicule or possibly even state retribution.229  
                                               
227 The seven fragments were published in the following sequence: first, the 1774 publication of “Von der 
Duldung der Deisten.” Five more fragments followed later in 1777: “Von Verschreiung der Vernunft auf 
den Kanzeln,” “Unmöglichkeit einer Offenbarung, die alle Menschen auf eine gegründete Art glauben 
könnten,” “Durchgang der Israeliten durchs rote Meer,” “Daß die Bücher der Alten Testament nicht 
geschrieben worden, eine Religion zu offenbaren,” and “Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte.” Lastly, in 
1778 another fragment titled: “Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger.” A complete version of the 
nearly 1,500-page manuscript would not be published until 1972, under the title Apologie oder 
Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag). 
228 For Eilise Reimarus’ role in the fragment controversy, see Spalding, Almut Marianne Grützner, Elise 
Reimarus (1735–1805): The Muse of Hamburg: A Woman of the German Enlightenment, Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2005. 
229 For scholarship on the punitive measures that the Prussian state took against apostate publications and 
“free” translations of the bible, see Sheehan, Jonathan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, 
Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, especially chapter 5. 
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Before turning to the content of the fragments and Lessing’s criticism of it, I want to 
provide a brief chronology of the events and summarize relevant background information 
pertaining to the three theological systems that Lessing found himself at odds with throughout the 
controversy. 
The first response to the fragments came from Johann Daniel Schumann (1714–1787), a 
teacher of Lutheran theology in Hannover. Schumann attempted to challenge the claims of the 
anonymous author in his essay Über die Evidenz der Beweise für die Wahrheit der Christlichen 
Religion (1777). However, Schumann failed to address the specific objections raised by the 
fragments, but instead fell back on familiar prejudices that viewed the historical accounts of the 
Evangelists as evidence of fulfilled prophecies and miracles. Lessing responded to Schumann with 
his famous short essay Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft (1777), which challenges the 
adequacy of historical evidence (i.e. reports of miracles) to serve as a legitimate foundation for 
Christian faith. Lessing supplements this essay with a brief dialogue between “He” and “I,” titled 
Das Testament Johannis (1777). In this imagined dialogue Lessing dramatizes a confrontation 
between a dogmatist [“Er”], who insists that true Christian love [die wahre christliche Liebe] be 
based on doctrines [die christliche Glaubenslehre], and an interlocutor [“Ich”], who argues, 
conversely, that true Christian love can be realized outside Church doctrine.230 Schumann ventures 
another response with his Antwort auf das aus Braunschweig an ihn gerichtete Schreiben über den 
Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft (1777), but Lessing’s attention had already shifted to Johann 
Heinrich Ress (1732–1803). 
                                               
230 The dialogue also contrasts the Gospel of John and its highly influential first line—“In the beginning 
was the word”—with the apocryphal Testament of St. John, which is reducible to the precept “little 
children, love one another.” See section I of this chapter. 
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Ress, also an orthodox Lutheran theologian, responded to the fragments with his essay: Die 
Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu Christi gegen einige im vierten Beitrage zur Geschichte und 
Literatur (1777). In the essay, Ress refused to acknowledge that discrepancies in the four Gospel 
narratives pose any serious threat to Christianity, arguing instead that they only signify apparent 
discrepancies [anscheinend Widersprüche]. Failing to take the objections of the fragments 
seriously moved Lessing to polemics. In response to Ress, Lessing published Eine Duplik (1778), 
an essay challenging the commonly held belief within orthodox thinking that considers scripture 
infallible on account of its authors being divinely inspired. 
The participation of Johann Melchior Goeze (1717–1786), Lessing’s former neighbor and 
head of St. Catherine’s Church in Hamburg, further intensified these debates. This increased 
hostility was primarily owing to Goeze’s accusation that Lessing advocated the unnamed author’s 
religious criticism. “Durch seine mittelbaren Angriffe auf unser Religion,” Goeze argues, “und auf 
die heilige Schrift, verstehe ich den von ihm veranstalteten Druck der Fragmente, und die von ihm 
übernommene Advocatur des Verfassers derselben”231 [From his indirect attacks on our religion 
and on holy scripture, I view his printing and organizing of these fragments to be equivalent to his 
advocating their author]. Simply printing the fragments was enough to provoke the enmity of 
Goeze, who had earned himself a reputation for being a militant orthodox Lutheran, known 
amusingly in some circles as “Melchior Cromwell,” the “Grand Inquisitor of Hamburg,” and the 
“night watchman of the Zion of Hamburg.”232 Goeze published two essays during the course of 
                                               
231 See Goeze, Melchior Johann. “Etwas Vorläufiges…” in Goezes Streitschriften gegen Lessing, hrsg. 
von Erich Schmidt, in Deutsche Litteraturdenkmale des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts, Kraus Reprint, 
Liechtenstein: Nendeln, 1968, p. 4–5f. Translation mine. 
232 See Nisbet, Hugh, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: His Life, Works, and Thought, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, and Moore, Evelyn K., The Passions of Rhetoric: Lessing’s Theory of Argument 
and the German Enlightenment, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993. 
 97 
the controversy. The first bore the unwieldy title Etwas Vorläufiges gegen des Herrn Hofraths 
Lessings mittelbare und unmittelbare feindselige Angriffe auf unser allerheiligste Religion, und 
auf den einigen Lehrgrund derselben, die heilige Schrift (1778), and the second was modestly titled 
Lessings Schwächen (1778). Lessing, in turn, responded with several publications all dating from 
1778: Eine Parabel, Axiomata, Anti-Goeze, and Der Nötigen Antwort auf eine sehr unnötige Frage 
des Herrn Hauptpastor Goeze in Hamburg. Realizing that Lessing was gaining the upper hand in 
their public debates, Goeze made an appeal to the Duke of Braunschweig to have Lessing’s 
publishing immunity revoked on grounds that his writings undermined the authority of the Church, 
forcing Lessing to continue the conversation indirectly through his play Nathan der Weise (1779). 
While many additional public figures enter the debates that were ignited by the fragments, I stop 
here to move into the second and more substantial aim of this section, which is to bring out those 
aspects of deism, neology and orthodox Lutheranism that become objects of criticism for Lessing. 
Since it was deism that initially provoked Lessing, I will begin with an exposition of it and consider 
one of Reimarus’ fragments as an example. 
  
a. Deism 
Deism emerged concurrently with the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century and 
was, at the time, considered more radical than other forms of rational theology.233 This was partly 
owing to the fact that deism did not attempt to limit the task of theological inquiry to affirming 
traditional Christian doctrines and beliefs, but instead made use of rational methods to establish a 
more true “religion of nature” that could unapologetically reject both incoherent Church dogma 
                                               
233 Gay, Peter, Deism: An Anthology, Michigan: Van Nostrand Press, 1968. 
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and dubious historical facts.234 Indeed, many deists made historical inquiry—often into Church 
history—the primary weapon against orthodox sects of Christianity by calling into question the 
credibility of testimonies and the reliability of source materials. Deism, thus, considers any 
theological argument that justifies Christianity on the basis of miracles or fulfilled prophecies as 
fraudulent superstition, mere enthusiasm, and, above all, an affront to the sufficiency of reason.235 
Samuel Johnson (1709–1784), famous for his criticism of English literature, described deism as 
the affirmation of God’s existence “without the reception of any revealed religion.”236 Instead of 
accepting the authority of revealed truth on faith, deists prefer to observe the workings of well-
ordered nature to gain knowledge of God’s existence. This knowledge is based on the inference 
that the intricacies of nature— our experience of its beauty, order, and purposiveness—indicates 
an intelligence analogous to that of human intelligence, only on a scale that would require divine 
authorship. David Hume, who realized that such analogies were extremely speculative, challenged 
the design argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) by proposing that our 
experiences of nature’s imperfections can just as convincingly tell the story of an apprentice God 
who “botched and bungled many worlds” before the present one was forged. Hume constructed 
alternative analogies that exposed the absurdity of the design argument. “If we survey a ship,” 
Hume wrote, “what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter, who framed 
so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find 
him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession 
                                               
234 See Lucci, Diego, Scripture and Deism: The Biblical Criticism of the Eighteenth-Century British 
Deists, Bern: Peter Lang, 2008. 
235 Allison, Henry, Lessing and the Enlightenment, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. 
236 See Johnson, Deism, in A Dictionary of the English Language, vol. I. 
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of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been 
gradually improving?”237 Of course, Hume’s Dialogues was not the only critique of deism in 
circulation. Two years after its posthumous publication Kant would also refute the design argument 
in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781). Kant denied that any single experience of nature, 
regardless of all its apparent perfections, could ever serve as an adequate proof of God’s 
existence.238 Leaving the criticism aside, however, deism poised itself towards a form of 
skepticism that no longer trusted revealed knowledge, but instead confided in the authority of 
reason to both prove the existence of God and to determine which articles of faith are worthy of 
assent. 
Reimarus’ fragments epitomize this skepticism by constantly putting pressure on Christian 
doctrines that fail to meet basic demands of reason. In the interest of concision, I will limit my 
analysis to the fragment titled “Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte” (1777). This fragment provides 
a general sense of deism’s skeptical approach to Christian doctrine, and it is the fragment that we 
should bear in mind when analyzing Lessing’s interventions against using to historical evidence to 
                                               
237 Hume, David, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings, ed. Dorothy Coleman, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Part IV, 5, p. 43. 
238 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A621/B649: “Die transzendentale Idee von einem notwendigen 
allgenugsamen Urwesen ist so überschwenglich groß, so hoch über alles Empirische, das jederzeit bedingt 
ist, erhaben, daß man teils niemals Stoff genug in der Erfahrung auftreiben kann, um einen solchen 
Begriff zu füllen, teils immer unter dem Bedingten herumtappt, und stets vergeblich nach dem 
Unbedingten, wovon uns kein Gesetz irgendeiner empirischen Synthesis ein Beispiel oder dazu die 
mindeste Leitung gibt, suchen werden” [The transcendental idea of a necessary all-sufficient original 
being is so overwhelmingly great, so sublimely high above everything empirical, which is at all times 
conditioned, that partly one can never even procure enough material in experience to fill such a concept, 
and partly if one searches for the unconditioned among conditioned things, then one will seek forever and 
always in vain, since no law of any empirical synthesis will ever give an example of such a thing, or even 
the least guidance in looking for it]. English translation from Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure 
Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 578. 
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ground faith. In the fragment, Reimarus casts doubt on the facticity of Christ’s resurrection because 
witness testimonies appear to be in an obvious state of disagreement. If, according to Reimarus, 
the four gospel narratives represent conflicting reports of the same event, then Christians have 
sufficient grounds to doubt the doctrine of eternal salvation, which is inextricably tied to those 
reports: 
Zeugen, die bei ihrer Aussage in den wichtigsten Umständen so sehr variieren, 
würden in keinen weltlichen Händeln, wenn es auch nur bloß auf ein wenig Geld 
einer Person ankäme, als gültig und rechtsbeständig erkannt werden, so daß der 
Richter sich auf ihre Erzählung sicher gründen, und den Spruch darauf bauen 
könnte: Wie kann man den begehren, daß, auf die Aussage von solchen vier 
variierenden Zeugen, die ganze Welt, das ganze menschliche Geschlecht zu allen 
Zeiten, und aller Orten, ihre Religion, Glauben und Hoffnung zur Seligkeit gründen 
soll?239 
 
[Witnesses whose testimonies disagree so much on the most important details 
would not be accepted by a judge in any worldly affair, even if it were only a 
question of deciding who has the right to a small amount of money. How then can 
one demand that the testimonies of four such conflicting witnesses should serve as 
the basis upon which the whole world, the entire human race in all times and places, 
grounds its religious faith and hope of salvation?] 
The analogy is telling, for it suggests that a proper judge—in both worldly affairs 
[weltlichen Händeln] and in matters of religious faith [Glauben und Hoffnung zur Seligkeit]—
makes decisions according to categories of “agreement” and “disagreement” [i.e. that which is not 
“variierende”]. The principle of non-contradiction, thus, guides Reimarus’ historical-critical 
inquiry into Christ’s resurrection. He makes no effort to distinguish between witness testimony 
and historical reports of that testimony, assumes the “wichtigsten Umstände” [the most important 
                                               
239 Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker 
Verlag, p. 294. English translation from Allison, Henry, Lessing and the Enlightenment, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1966. p. 44. 
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circumstances] to be objective and fixed, and fails to acknowledge that particular opinions, beliefs, 
and prejudices inevitably mediate witness testimony and historical narration.240 By modeling his 
inquiry of Christ’s resurrection after methods befitting natural science, Reimarus finds little 
justification for belief in the doctrine of eternal salvation. Unsurprisingly, this attempt to establish 
“certain” proof [i.e. testimony free of contradiction] among the available historical evidence leads 
Reimarus into even darker skepticism. He speculates, for instance, that the salvific narrative of 
Christ’s death emerged only in the years following his crucifixion, and that Christ’s teachings about 
salvation refer only to his hope of actualizing concrete political goals for the Jewish people. 
Reimarus’ investigation brings him to the radical conclusion that the apostles most likely stole 
Christ’s body from his grave and fabricated lies about the universal significance of his death to 
stabilize their own power within the early days of the Church.241 From this one fragment it becomes 
obvious that Reimarus seeks to replace revealed knowledge with certain knowledge, and that he 
grants the Buchstabe [testimony and historical reports] a lead role in achieving that end. 
 
                                               
240 In this sense, Lessing follows Spinoza (Theologico-Political Treatise, chapter 6) and makes this a point 
of contention in section V of his Gegensätze: “Sind widersprüche unter den Zeugen vorhanden 
gewesen?—Anscheinende: warum nicht? Denn die Erfahrung gibt es, und kann schlechterdings nicht 
anders sein, als daß von mehrern Zeugen nicht jeder die nämliche Sache, und dem nämlichen Orte, zu der 
nämlichen Zeit, anders sehen, anders hören, folglich anders erzählen sollte” [Were true contradictions 
present among the witnesses—that is, contradictions which no fair comparison or more detailed 
explanation can remove?—How are we to know? We do not even know whether the witnesses were ever 
properly examined. At least there is no longer any record of such an examination, and anyone who says 
that there were such contradictions has in this respect as much justification as someone who denies it]. 
241 To this effect, Reimarus writes: “It was only after the death of Jesus that the apostles hit upon the idea 
of a spiritual, suffering savior of the whole human race. Hence, after Jesus’ death the apostles discarded 
their previous conception of his teachings and deeds, and therefore first ceased to conceive of him as a 
powerful, earthly savior of the people of Israel.” In “Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger,” quoted 
from Allison, Henry, Lessing and the Enlightenment, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1966. 
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b. Neology 
In sharp contrast to deism, neology (circa 1740–80) never turned its back on a traditional 
conception of revelation (i.e. a divinely communicated knowledge whose assent requires faith as 
opposed to reason).242 Instead, it followed in the footsteps of Leibniz and Wolff, who celebrated a 
perceived harmony between revelation and reason.243 Eager to apply this insight more broadly 
within the field of theology, neologians worked diligently, often in an apologetic mode,244 to 
reconcile Christianity with a skeptical modernity. In order to actualize this, neology—like deism—
had to provide a more rational justification for faith, which meant that it too challenged the 
authority of church dogma and subjected Christian doctrine to targeted critiques.245 Yet unlike 
deism, revelation played an essential part in this process. For instance, August Friedrich Wilhelm 
Sack (1703–1786), a neologian who gained literary praise for his Vertheidiger Glaube der Christen 
(1750), considered revelation to be the “Fernrohr der Vernunft” [telescope of reason], helping to 
guide reason as it strives to bring “Das Wesentliche des Glaubens in ein desto helleres Licht”246 
                                               
242 The conflict between deism and neology can in many ways be read as a continuation of the conflict 
between Bayle’s skepticism (especially the “Second Clarification” of his Historical and Critical 
Dictionary) and Leibniz’ optimism (Theodicy). See also Odo Marquard’s Skepsis in der Moderne 
philosophische Studien, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007 for a more recent reflection on this topic. 
243 See Leibniz Theodicy, Book I, § 39: “But since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention 
between them would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of reason against any article 
of faith are insoluble, then it must be said that this alleged article will be false and not revealed.” See also 
Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, § 1014: “Da der göttliche 
Verstand die Quelle aller Wahrheiten ist, derselbe aber wegen seiner Vollkommenheit nichts 
wiedersprechendes hervorbringen kan; so kan auch dasjenige, was Gott soll geoffenbahret haben, 
Wahrheiten der Vernunfft nicht zu wieder sein” [Since the divine mind is the source of all truth, and since 
nothing can contradict His perfection, then reason cannot contradict what God has revealed]. 
244 A survey of the publication titles among the neologians provides overwhelming evidence that this was 
the case. See also Aner, Karl, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964, p. 27f., and 
Kaiser, Gerhard, Klopstock: Religion und Dichtung, Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963, p. 42. 
245 On neology’s most-wanted list were the doctrines of original sin, predestination, eternal punishment, 
atonement, supernatural beings (particularly the devil), miracles, and the status of symbolic books. 
246 Quoted from Aner, Theologie der Lessingzeit, p. 63. Translation mine. 
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[the essence of belief into an ever brighter light]. Similarly, Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem247 
takes revelation for the “zuverlässigste Vernunftlehre”248 [most reliable doctrine of reason] and 
commits himself to articulating a “new” theology—“Neologie”—that promises to reconcile the 
differences between revealed religion and natural religion. Jerusalem follows natural religion in 
attempting to increase the apparent legitimacy of revealed truths—i.e. to check that no divinely 
revealed truths were contradictory, no general laws of nature were broken, and that the content of 
revelation was not averse to human reason and morality. By achieving a greater degree of 
coherency on this basic level, Jerusalem (and other neologians) hoped that religious subjects would 
be more compelled to confess their faith on rational grounds. In this way, neology no longer treated 
religion as a closed system, but like Lessing and other enlightenment theologians, tested them 
according to how well they promoted piety and virtue. However, Jerusalem still needed to accord 
revelation an equal share in this process. To that end, he used Locke’s biblical paraphrasing as a 
model,249 and created popular narratives that described the gradual development of reason from 
prelapsarian times to the time of Christ.250 According to Jerusalem, there was an “Uroffenbarung” 
[original revelation], concurrent with the fall, that showed reason to be a better guide for humanity 
than mere “Sinnlichkeit,” and that the entire history of Christianity tells the story of how revelation 
assists humanity in actualizing greater rational capacities—which were thought to translate into 
                                               
247 My reading of Jerusalem is indebted to Karl Aner’s monumental work Die Theologie der Lessingzeit, 
Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964 (originally published 1929), which impressively continues to serve as the 
authoritative work on neology. 
248 Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, I, p. 412. Translation mine. 
249 Jerusalem was exposed to Locke’s Paraphrases on the Epistles of St. Paul (1707) during his studies in 
England from 1738–40. The paraphrastic tradition became a popular alternative to translation insofar as it 
retold familiar stories in a popular idiom, often in accordance with prevailing sensibilities and customs. 
250 See Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, I. 
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greater ethical capacities. For instance, Jerusalem describes the revelation of Mosaic Law as a 
“Morgenröte” [twilight] in comparison to the “größere Licht” [greater light] emanating from 
Christ’s teachings. These kinds of statements—which can easily be construed as anti-Semitic—
belong to what Jonathan Sheehan referred to in his book as a “mania for pedagogy” that swept 
across Europe starting around the 1760s.251 Lessing too participates in this mania and understands 
the differences between Mosaic Law and the teachings of Christ—or the Old Testament and the 
New Testament—to be a difference of human development. That is to say, an individual (a child, 
properly speaking) initially requires more stringent rules before learning to cope with greater 
autonomy. 
While Jerusalem’s pedagogical account of revelation might appear similar to that of 
Lessing’s Erziehung, he does not grant reason the capacity to develop independent of revelation 
(see Lessing’s Erziehung, section 4). This difference is significant. For Jerusalem, revelation 
becomes a means to excuse non-rational or morally dubious content within Christian doctrine. 
That is to say, such content only appears in a depraved state because more advanced knowledge of 
our rational capacities had not yet been revealed. A second (and more common) strategy was to 
attribute ambiguous content or doctrinal contradictions to apocryphal additions made by unknown 
authors or translators during the Early Church. Pursuing this course of action involved studying 
the history of the Church itself and exploring its literary estates to ascertain the authenticity of the 
texts in question. Consequently, the tactics of neology have a tendency to subsume the content of 
scripture under popular morality. When confronted by “offensive” testimony within biblical 
narratives, for instance, neology must perform an operation designed to restore dignity to scripture. 
                                               
251 See Sheehan, Jonathan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005, especially chapter 5. 
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Heinrich Heine summarizes this aspect of neology quite accurately as follows: “[es] wurde der 
Versuch gemacht allen historischen Inhalt aus dem Christentum herauszunehmen und nur den 
moralischen Teil zu bewahren”252 [it attempted to extract all the historical content of Christianity 
and leave only the moral part]. Extracting just the “moral part” of Christianity amounts to a 
purification of the biblical word. This process involves a latent skepticism of scripture that 
approximates the kind of skepticism we already encountered in Klopstock’s “Heilige Poesie.”253 
Here too we find a situation of subtle mistrust, whereby neologians doubt the adequacy of the 
biblical word (testimony and narratives) to express the “moral part” of scripture and feel compelled 
to speak on its behalf. 
 
c. Orthodox Lutheranism 
At the time of the Fragmentenstreit, orthodox Lutheranism was in its last, if not final phases 
and had already experienced its own version of enlightenment. Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten 
(1706–1757), the almost entirely forgotten older brother of Alexander Baumgarten (a name 
inextricably bound to aesthetics), was among those responsible for bringing enlightenment to 
orthodox Lutheranism by weaving Wolff’s rigorous mathematical method into the practice of 
theology.254 Even though Siegmund might not have secured himself a place in posterity quite to 
the extent that his younger brother did, one finds his legacy very much alive in a student of his 
                                               
252 Heine, Heinrich, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, Hamburg: Tredition 
Classics, 2016. Modified translation mine. In this particular passage, Heine describes the historical critical 
methodology of Johann Semler, another leading figure within neology. 
253 See my chapter 1. 
254 For a sense of Baumgarten’s wider effects within Protestant theology, see Sorkin, David, The 
Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008. 
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who became the most vociferous advocate of Lutheran orthodoxy during the fragment controversy, 
namely, Goeze.255 Goeze’s theological training with Baumgarten undoubtedly influenced his 
attack on Lessing’s style of argumentation—his so-called “Theaterlogik”—as well as the “inner 
truth” of Christianity, which Goeze understood to be aligned with a pietistic conception of inspired 
faith that gains its legitimacy through personal experience. Admittedly, Baumgarten’s contribution 
to theology is actually quite extensive and cannot easily be contained solely under the banner of 
orthodoxy. In fact, several students of his—most notably Johann Salomo Semler (1725–1791)—
would become advocates of neology, applying what they learned from Baumgarten to their own 
critiques of scripture and early church histories. Nevertheless, I associate him with orthodoxy to 
show a lineage of thought that ultimately culminates in Goeze. Most important to my exposition 
of Baumgarten is emphasizing those aspects of his theology that are visible in Goeze’s polemics 
with Lessing. These aspects include common assumptions about the epistemic value of historical 
evidence and an inclination towards a rigorous style of theological argumentation. 
 Baumgarten began teaching at the University of Halle in 1730 and viewed the philosophy 
of Wolff as having enormous potential for theology. He was especially convinced that Wolffian 
philosophy could offer pietism the means to access a stronger, more sustained “union with God” 
than its sharply criticized confessional system of “Wiedergeburt” [rebirth], wherein religious 
subjects claimed to have direct access to divine grace through subjective experience. The task, for 
Baumgarten, was to purge the underlying enthusiasm built into this confessional model by insisting 
that the state of grace resulting from a union with God could only be achieved through constant 
                                               
255 During S. Baumgarten’s own life, however, he was quite well known. Voltaire even referred to him as 
“the jewel in crown of German scholarship.” See Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment. p. 9. 
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labor rather than through a “magische Kraft auf das Herz”256 [magical power exerted on the heart]. 
It was Wolff’s philosophy that supplied the tools for carrying out this labor. Through it, 
Baumgarten managed to draw up a peace treaty between pietism and orthodox Lutheranism 
through their common pursuit of “vital knowledge,” or knowledge that conditions the will and 
motivates action.257 It should be noted that—for subsequent generations of orthodox theologians—
this practical orientation around “vital knowledge” often conflicts with the more speculative forms 
of theology like that of deism and (to a lesser extent) neology. 
Baumgarten was primarily attracted to the degree of “certainty” [Gewissheit] that Wolff’s 
method promised. In his Evangelische Glaubenslehre (1759) he developed a methodical approach 
to scripture that examined all Christian dogma against the rule that “written revelation cannot 
contradict what human reason recognizes as true.”258 Baumgarten asserted that humanity had a 
responsibility to use its capacity for knowledge, which was acquired after the fall, to mediate 
between rational knowledge and religious belief. According to Baumgarten, God chose rational 
creatures to write the bible so that their impressions would always relate back to reason.259 Above 
all, Baumgarten aspired to make the certainty of Wolff’s methodology available for theology so 
that it would rest on an equal footing with science [Wissenschaft]. According to Baumgarten, 
theology becomes a science “when the divinity and incontrovertibility of scripture is demonstrable, 
and all truths are derived from it in a demonstrable and orderly manner, so that the necessity of the 
                                               
256 Quoted from Kemper, Hans-Georg, Deutsche Lyrik der frühen Neuzeit, Band 6/1, Empfindsamkeit, 
Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1997, p. 158. Translation mine. 
257 For a discussion of “vital knowledge” as being at odds with a rationalist tradition, see Gadamer, Hans-
Georg, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: Mohr, 1960. 
258 Quoted from Kemper, Hans-Georg, Deutsche Lyrik der frühen Neuzeit, Band 6/1, Empfindsamkeit, 
Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1997, p. 158. 
259 Ibid., p. 158. 
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conclusions can be referred back to their causes.”260 However, this methodology sets up a false 
equivalence between revelation and reason, one in which any truths derived from scripture must 
cohere into an “unbroken chain of reasoning” [Kette der Wahrheit].261 Wolff’s concept of 
coherence—which he takes for the criterion of reason—permeates Baumgarten’s theology.262 
However, he deviates from Wolff’s teachings in one crucial respect: he believes that a rigorous 
historical method can also achieve “outward” certainty. Wolff viewed history merely as the study 
of facts, which cannot attain the same kind of “inner” certainty as that of philosophy or 
mathematics. For history to achieve “outward” certainty the narrated events would have to be 
coherent and probable; the sources would have to be credible and authenticated; and eyewitness 
testimony would have to prove reliable. Baumgarten’s effort to raise the status of historical 
knowledge to a level of certainty was motivated by the assumption that an ignorance of history—
in this more systematic sense—was at the root of religious skepticism like that of deism. This 
demonstrates just how malleable history (testimony and narratives) was around the mid-eighteenth 
century—Baumgarten making use of it to strengthen faith, Reimarus to undermine it. According 
to Baumgarten, an ignorance of history opened the door to modern paraphrastics and efforts to 
bring specific Christian doctrines in line with popular sensibilities. The task of a rigorous historical 
method was, rather, to show the soundness of Christian doctrine, “to safeguard everyone against 
                                               
260 Quoted from David Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology for the Enlightenment: The Case of Siegmund 
Jacob Baumgarten,” Central European History, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2003, p. 503–30. 
261 The metaphor is Wolff’s; see Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes: 
und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, Chapter 2, § 40. 
262 Wolff, Christian, Vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt, anderer Theil, bestehend in ausführlichen Anmerckungen, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 
1983, chapter 3, § 370: “Je mehr man den Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten einsiehet, je mehr hat man 
vernunfft” [The more one sees the cohesion between the truths, the more reason one possesses]. 
Translation mine. 
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the equally incorrect ways of disorderly and exaggerated dissatisfaction as well as complacency 
with the present state of the church; to set limits to complaints about the decline of Christianity; to 
check the impulse for renewal; and to guard against headstrong partisanship and devotion.”263 The 
effect of his work was, therefore, quite profound; it incentivized a generation of theologians to 
bring systematic rigor to the study of history, specifically as a means of guarding Christianity 
against the threat of external criticism. With this in mind, Lessing’s argument that contingent truths 
of history can never attain the kind of certainty promised here must have been particularly 
devastating for theologians (like Goeze) who adhered to Baumgarten’s teachings. 
Situating Lessing within this theological landscape is particularly difficult owing to the fact 
that elements of all three confessional systems can be found in his religious thought. He valued 
Reimarus’ deism, praising him as the “ideal opponent of religion” who proved that the biblical 
narratives cannot secure a rational foundation for Christianity. Like many neologians, Lessing also 
wanted to make moral improvement rather than obedience central to religion. In his later years 
(1771–80), he even became increasingly attracted to orthodoxy’s positive system of faith—
specifically that it neither rejected nor mediated revealed knowledge, but wholly accepted it.264 
There is no question, however, that Lessing remained deeply unsatisfied with his theological 
options at the time. In a letter written to his brother Karl at the start of the fragment controversy, 
we find a vivid description of his discontent: 
Nicht das unreine Wasser, welches längst nicht mehr zu brauchen, will ich 
beibehalten wissen: ich will es nur nicht eher weggegossen wissen, als bis man 
                                               
263 Quoted from Sorkin, David, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from 
London to Vienna, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 149. 
264 Dilthey, Wilhelm, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung: Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin, 
durchgesehene aufl., Leipzig: Reclam, 1991. p. 88f. 
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weiß, woher reineres zu nehmen; ich will nur nicht, daß man es ohne Bedenken 
weggieße, und sollte man auch das Kind hernach im Mistjache baden. Und was ist 
sie anders, unsere neuemodische Theologie, gegen die Orthodoxie, als Mistjache 
gegen unreines Wasser?265 
 
[I do not want the impure water, long unusable, to be preserved; it is only that I do 
not want it to be poured away before we know where we can get purer water; I only 
do not want it foolishly poured out, leaving the child to be bathed in sewage. And 
what else is our new-fashioned theology, as compared with orthodoxy, but sewage 
as compared with impure water?] 
Lessing never abandons a critical stance toward the “impure” and “long unusable” waters 
of orthodoxy, yet still prefers it to the detestable “sewage” [Mistjache] of both neology and deism 
[neuemodische Theologie]. By closing itself off to criticism, orthodoxy makes piety and 
enlightenment incompatible, while deism and neology obscure the distinction between reason and 
faith, resulting in a “religion of reason” [Sanction der Religion der Vernunft].266 Lessing—himself 
being “a child” [das Kind] of the enlightenment—appears trapped in a tragically intolerable 
situation in which he must decide between the lesser of two evils. These circumstances motivated 
Lessing to publish the fragments and search for another way of securing religious faith. 
There is just one more issue that needs to be addressed before moving on to Lessing’s 
critique of the letter of religion. From what we have just seen, modern theology represents the 
greater threat to Christianity,267 and Lessing hoped that in publishing the fragments he would entice 
                                               
265 See Lessing, Briefe, 2 February 1774. Translation mine. 
266 See Lessing, Gegensätze des Herausgebers, in Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, 
Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 316. 
267 In that same letter to his brother (2 February 1774), Lessing continues to describe the extent to which 
he “approves” of orthodoxy over neology: “Mit der Orthodoxie war man, Gott sei Dank, ziemlich zu 
Rande; man hatte zwischen ihr und der Philosophie eine Scheidewand gezogen, hinter welcher eine jede 
ihren Weg fortgehen konnte, ohne die andere zu hindern. Aber was tut man nun? Man reißt diese 
Scheidewand nieder und macht uns unter dem Vorwande, uns zu vernünftigen Christen zu machen, zu 
höchst unvernünftigen Philosophen. Ich bitte dich, lieber Bruder, erkunde dich doch nur nach diesem 
Punkte genauer, und siehe etwas weniger auf das, was unsere neuen Theologen verwerfen, als auf das, 
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advocates of neology and deism to enter into a public debate with him. For the most part, however, 
the neologians remained silent during the controversy. Only Johann Semler (1725–1791) replied 
in his 1779 essay Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten, but by that time Lessing’s 
publication immunity had already been revoked and he died before having a chance to properly 
respond to Semler’s essay.268 Consequently, the bulk of the fragment controversy involves 
Lessing’s polemics with Goeze and appears to be a critique limited to Lutheran orthodoxy. Prima 
facie this would seem to pose a problem for our study that attempts to read the fragment 
controversy as a crucible for analyzing Klopstock’s Messias. However, a deeper look into the 
implications behind Lessing’s critique of the “Buchstabe” shows his arguments to be applicable to 
the methodology governing Klopstock’s notion of “heilige Poesie.” 
 
d. Excursus: Pietism 
All three writers who are the subject of this study exhibit tendencies in keeping with pietist 
traditions, although of the three only Novalis was born into a pietist household. Regardless of their 
religious upbringing, some attention must be paid to pietism insofar as it was a source of influence 
for each writer. I should mention first that pietism was never an object of criticism for Lessing, 
                                               
was sie dafür in die Stelle setzen wollen. Darin sind wir einig, daß unser alters Religionssystem falsch ist: 
aber das möchte ich nicht mit dir sagen, daß es ein Stückwerk von Stümpern und halbphilosophen sei […] 
Flickwerk von Stümpern und halbphilosophen ist das Religionssytsem, welches man jetzt auf die Stelle 
des alten setzen will; und mit weit mehr Einfluß auf Vernunft und Philosophie, als sich das alte anmaßt” 
[Thankfully, orthodoxy was pretty much at the margins; one had drawn a partition between it and 
philosophy, behind which each could go its respective way without hindering the other. But what now? 
Now they are tearing down this partition and, under the pretext of making us rational Christians, are 
making us highly unreasonable philosophers. Dear brother, I ask you, explore this point more closely and 
look less at what our neologians reject and more at what they propose to put in its place. We agree that 
our old religious system is false, but I would not agree with you that it is a patchwork of bunglers and 
halfwit-philosophers, for that is what the system of religion is, with which people now want to replace the 
old; and with far more influence on reason and philosophy than the old one assumes]. Translation mine. 
268 Lessing’s Nachlass indicates that he intended to respond to Semler in his Sogennante Briefe an 
Verschiedene Gottesgelehrten (1779–80). 
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even though (in his early writings) he disagreed with Klopstock over the role that feeling should 
play in theological reflection. In fact, as we will see from Lessing’s Gedanken über die Herrnhuter 
(1750), he actively came to the defense of pietists who were being accused of Schwärmerei 
[fanaticism] by advocates belonging to one or another of the above theological systems. Thus, 
when I refer to “enlightenment theology” I do not mean to include pietism. 
Some of the leading figures of pietism include (among others) Johann Arndt (1555–1621), 
Philip Jacob Spener (1635–1705), August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), Nikolaus Ludwig 
Zinzendorf (1700–1760), and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782). Rather than going 
through each pietist, I will focus mostly on the main arguments of Spener’s Pia Desideria (1675) 
to provide a general sense of how pietism—which was itself an extremely diverse movement of 
religious renewal—developed at a time when the reformation was starting to fragment into 
different ideological sects. Spener wrote his Pia Desideria, or “pious wishes,” in response to 
concerns about the spiritual well-being of the Lutheran church after the Thirty Years’ War. He 
writes, for instance, in his opening salutations that the “precious spiritual body of Christ is now 
afflicted with distress and sickness.”269 The “sickness” had to do with a much broader political 
history of the Lutheran Church, which gradually came under the control of a vast and decentralized 
network of nobles competing with each other for more control over lands and resources. To 
maintain their control over territories, nobles formed alliances with high-ranking clerics who held 
similar ideological and political beliefs, making religious intolerance among competing regions 
inevitable.270 By the seventeenth century it was common for princes to appoint clerics and 
                                               
269 Spener, Philipp Jacob, Pia Desideria, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1964, 
p. 31. 
270 There is a much more complex history between the regional nobilities and the clergy than I am able to 
present here. For a historical materialist account of these dynamics, see Engels, Friedrich, The Peasant 
War in Germany, 3rd edition, New York: International Publishers, 2006 (especially chapter 1). 
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ministers without the consent of the congregation. This produced hierarchies that were alienating 
for the average parishioner, who felt their ministers were more eager to win the favor of the nobles 
(often for material gain) than they were at promoting the spiritual well-being of the congregation. 
As a result, class distinctions within the Lutheran Church became increasingly more visible. Elite 
members of the church enjoyed, for instance, more luxurious seating arrangements and could 
request to have private baptisms, weddings, funerals, and communion services.271 Much of 
Spener’s Pia Desideria proposes ways to mitigate these unfavorable circumstances. Thus pietism 
must be considered a movement from within the Lutheran Church rather than outside of it. 
Perhaps the most controversial proposal that Spener implemented was the collegia pietatis, 
which was a gathering of lay parishioners who wanted to be more involved in the culture of the 
Church by praying together or openly discussing passages from the bible and weekly sermon. 
Spener intended to extend some of the duties of ministers to lay parishioners so that they could 
also be qualified to spread the word of God to others—a gesture that essentially widened the 
application of Luther’s Große Katechismus (1529), a text that functioned as a kind of training 
manual for preachers by elaborating on the significance of the ten commandments, the Apostles’ 
Creed, the Lord’s Prayer, baptism, and communion.272 This brought Spener to his idea of a 
“universal priesthood” in which he believed redistributing the duties of the ministry onto all 
members of the congregation would help improve the overall state of the church. He pointed out 
that “one of the principal reasons why the ministry cannot accomplish all that it ought, is that it is 
                                               
271 See Theodore Tappert’s introduction to Spener’s Pia Desideria. 
272 In the preface to his Große Katechismus, Luther urges “all Christians [to read the catechism] but 
especially all pastors and preachers, that they should daily exercise themselves in the catechism, which is 
a short summary and epitome of the entire Holy Scriptures, and that they may always teach the same.” 
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too weak without the help of the universal priesthood. One man is incapable of doing all that is 
necessary for the edification of the many who are generally entrusted to his pastoral care.”273 
Initially the meetings took place at private residences and were regarded as “conventicles” that 
supplemented public worship, but once the meetings became too controversial, they were only 
permitted inside the church. Spener—who viewed the Early Church as the paragon of religious 
organization274—hoped that by giving parishioners an informal platform to discuss religious 
subjects they would feel more connected with their religious community. In this way, he hoped to 
counteract the established hierarchy by giving “the lower ranks opportunity to speak their minds 
without prejudice and with more freedom than is granted the upper ranks, who with their more 
mature reflection are allowed the honor of amending the proposals which others make.”275 By 
allowing the lower ranks to be heard the upper ranks might become more attuned to how they can 
better serve the members of their congregation. Spener believed (much like Lessing) that church 
leaders were too preoccupied with Christian doctrine, so a lot of the group discussions revolved 
around practical questions of how to lead a good Christian life. 
However, what started as a movement designed to unify members of the church quickly 
became a source for even further alienation. As the collegia pietatis became more widespread 
among various churches, the conventicles started to gain a reputation for being divisive. Members 
who participated in the meetings grew highly critical of ministers and other parishioners they felt 
                                               
273 Spener, Philipp Jacob, Pia Desideria, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1964, 
p. 94–95. 
274 About the Early Church, Spener wrote: “it would perhaps not be inexpedient to reintroduce the ancient 
and apostolic kind of church meetings […] which Paul describes in I Corinthians 14:26–40. One person 
would not rise to preach (although this practice would be continued at other times), but others who have 
been blessed with gifts and knowledge would also speak and present their pious opinions on the proposed 
subject to the judgment of the rest, doing all this in such a way as to avoid disorder and strife.” Ibid., 
p. 89. 
275 Ibid., pp. 32–33. 
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were not leading good Christian lives, which cultivated self-righteous, nearly puritanical attitudes 
that drew the collegia pietatis into open hostility with other members of the Lutheran Church. 
Because pietists believed that they knew more about what constitutes “true” Christianity than the 
more orthodox members of the Lutheran Church, they gradually became treated as outsiders. 
The most relevant contribution that Spener made with respect to this study was his demand 
that Christians become familiar with “all of scripture,” or tota scriptura as it appears in the Latin 
edition of his Pia Desideria. The problem for Spener was that Luther’s doctrine of sola scriptura 
limited the teaching of scripture largely to the contents of the Kleine Katechismus (1529), which 
all Christians (especially children) were obliged to memorize. In Luther’s preface to the Kleine 
Katechismus he expressed concern for “common people” who “have no knowledge whatsoever of 
Christian teaching,” and then complained that “although the people are supposed to be Christian, 
baptized, and have received the holy sacrament, they do not know the Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, or 
the Ten Commandments, and they live as if they were pigs and irrational beasts.”276 However, 
Spener believed that the “common people” of his day were sufficiently prepared to read more than 
just the prescribed amount of scripture, so he essentially called for an expansion of the canon. 
“Thought should be given,” Spener wrote, “to a more extensive use of the Word of God among 
us.”277 For Spener and other pietists, learning the catechism was just a first step on the way to 
reading the entire bible on one’s own, a prospect that would have terrified Luther, who seldom 
displayed confidence in the intelligence of “common people.” Nevertheless, Spener remained 
                                               
276 Luther, Martin, Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, third edition, ed. Timothy F. Lull & 
William R. Russell, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012, pp. 322–23. 
277 Spener, Philipp Jacob, Pia Desideria, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1964, 
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adamant that knowing all of scripture was necessary to improving the state of the church and the 
lives of its members: 
all Scripture, without exception, should be known by the congregation if we are all 
to receive the necessary benefit. If we put together all the passages of the Bible 
which in the course of many years are read to a congregation in one place, they will 
comprise only a very small part of Scriptures which have been given to us. The 
remainder is not heard by the congregation at all, or is heard only insofar as one or 
another verse is quoted or alluded to in sermons, without, however, offering any 
understanding of the entire context, which is nevertheless of the greatest 
importance.278 
On the one hand, reducing scripture to its most essential parts (Kleine Katechismus) and 
providing preachers with blueprints for how to interpret those parts (Große Katechismus) stabilized 
the administration of the Lutheran Church. On the other hand, it created an environment in which 
the “Word of God” languished. Pietists grew bored of having to recite the same parts of scripture 
and having to listen to the same sermons. Spener’s solution was to make parishioners responsible 
for knowing the “entire context” of scripture, which ideally would provide them with even more 
spiritual resources with which to secure their salvation. However, dissent against Spener’s call for 
tota scriptura could quickly be heard within the orthodox ranks. For instance, Johannes Kromayer 
(1576–1643), the general superintendent of the Lutheran church in Weimar, argued against the call 
for tota scriptura, writing: “Dies ist eine irrige Meinung, daß ein jeder Christ so gar eine große 
Wissenschaft der göttlichen Lehre haben und die ganze Bibel bei Verlust seiner Seligkeit lesen 
müsse und gründlich verstehen.”279 [It is a misconception to think that every Christian must have 
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a scientific knowledge of divine instruction and must thoroughly read and understand the entire 
bible so as not to forfeit salvation]. As one critic aptly described, the orthodox response to Spener’s 
Pia Desideria made Lutherans sound more like Catholics280 insofar as they were trying to curtail 
the newly won freedom to read the bible without clerical mediation. 
By the eighteenth century many of the changes that pietists like Spener advocated for were 
realized, bringing the movement into a kind of golden age.281 The movement’s desire for more 
authentic and dynamic religious experiences; its call for more responsive clerics and engaged 
parishioners; and its emphasis on social and ethical concerns were more or less absorbed into the 
mission of the Church. However, since pietists were often so critical of the present state of affairs 
within the church and always eager to introduce more sweeping changes, they often found 
themselves on the receiving end of some very harsh criticism. A significant amount of that criticism 
came from the secular world. This was because many pietists rejected how orthodox Lutheranism 
defined the “adiaphora,” or practices that were not expressly forbidden by the bible and thus left 
up to the moral discretion of the individual. Theater, gambling, drinking, dancing were all deemed 
inappropriate by pietists. As a result, the secular world portrayed pietists less in terms of having 
an erudite command of “all of scripture” and more in terms of being fanatical in their display of 
religious sentiments, dishonest in their claim to having subjective experiences with Christ, and 
downright quioxtic when it came to their docrtrine of “Wiedergeburt” [rebirth] which designates 
the moment of one’s true spiritual awakening or, in the case of Oetinger, enlightenment.282 It was 
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281 For a general account of eighteenth-century Pietism, see Stoeffler, F. Ernest, German Pietism during 
the Eighteenth Century, Leiden: Brill, 1973. 
282 Oetinger equated rebirth with enlightenment in his essay “On Enlightenment,” arguing “the new birth 
and enlightenment are the same: The new birth comes through water and the Spirit, that is, by the 
 
 118 
therefore common for critics to conflate pietism with mysticism and Schwärmerei [fanaticism]. 
For example, Gottsched attacked literature (like Klopstock’s Der Messias) that advocated pietism. 
Gottsched viewed pietism as a source of Schwärmerei, writing “in Wahrheit, man muß sich 
gegentheils wundern, wie unsere Gottesgelehrten so still sitzen, und es nicht wahrnehmen, wie viel 
solche neue geistliche Lügenden, in diesen zur Freygeisterey und Religionsspöterey so geneigten 
Zeiten, dem wahren Christenthume schaden werden. Sie verfolgen mit einem löblichen Eifer die 
zinzendorfischen Schwärmereyen”283 [In truth, one must be astonished at how our theologians 
remain so quiet and do not realise how much the new spiritual blasphemers, in these times that are 
so inclined to free thinking and religious mockery, will harm true Christianity. They advance the 
Zinzendorfian brand of fanaticism with a laudable zeal]. Louise Gottsched (1713–1762) was in 
complete agreement with her husband, though she refused to remain quite about the pietist 
“blasphemers.” In her 1736 comedy Pietiserey im Fischbeinrock she deploys stereotypes 
(inscribed onto each character’s name) and the figure of the Schwärmer to mount an attack against 
pietism. The play depicts the middle class “Glaubeleicht” family as being easily manipulated by a 
pietist charlatan named “Scheinfromm.” Herr Scheinfromm claims to personally communicate 
with Christ and attempts to exploit this “relationship” to bleed the family of its financial assets, 
even suggesting that Christ wishes their daughter to marry his nephew so that Scheinfromm can 
make off with the dowry. Much of Pietiserey im Fischbeinrock is designed to expose what L. 
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Gottsched believed to be the hypocrisy of pietism, and it represents just one satirical drama in a 
much larger body of anti-pietist literature.284 
Beyond the secular world, at least one theologian heard Gottsched’s battle cry against 
pietists: Siegmund Baumgarten. In his book Klopstock: Religion und Dichtung (1963), Gerhard 
Kaiser locates S. Baumgarten at the tip of the spear in a polemical campaign against pietist 
literature. Kaiser writes, “mit [Baumgartens] Erklärung gegen Zinzendorf von 1742 [gab er] das 
Signal für den Hauptangriff einer umfangreichen Streitschriftenliterature gegen die 
Brüdergemeine”285 [with Baumgarten’s statement against Zinzendorf in 1742, the signal was given 
for the main attack on the Moravian Brotherhood by means of extensive polemical literature ]. 
Zinzendorf was the target of many enlightenment theologians simply because he rejected any effort 
to rationalize faith. In his Thoughts for the Learned and Yet Good-Willed Students of Truth (1732) 
Zinzendorf claimed that “religion can be grasped without the conclusions of reason; otherwise no 
one could have religion except the person with intelligence.”286 According to Zinzendorf, 
experience testifies to a very different reality, one in which “religion must be grasped […] through 
experience alone without any concepts.”287 
The neologians, many of whom were trained by Baumgarten, continued the fight against 
pietism from the mid- to late-eighteenth century, focusing much of their criticism on domesticating 
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the excessive religious feelings associated with pietists like Zinzendorf. That is to say, neologians 
were less interested in dismissing religious feelings as such, and more interested in raising them 
to the level of rational consciousness. For example, Johann Joachim Spalding (1714–1804) 
dedicated his book Gedanken Über den Werth der Gefühle in dem Christenthum (1761) to this 
cause. Both a great admirer of Shaftesbury288 (1671–1713) and a leading figure behind the 
practically oriented “Popularphilosophie,”289 Spalding wanted to be able to distinguish true 
religious feelings sent by God from natural “changes of the soul,” writing: 
die Gefühle, welche bisweilen im Anfange und Fortgange des Christenthums, als 
so notwendig, erfordert werden, müssen freylich einen unschätzbaren Werth haben, 
so bald man sich berechtiget hält, sie, als eigentliche Wirkungen Gottes, anzusehen; 
und so bald man glaubt, daß man eben durch die unmittelbare Empfindung und 
durch das Gefühl selbst die übernatürlichen Eindrücke des göttlichen Geistes 
erkennen und von den natürlichen Veränderungen der Seele unterscheiden 
können.290 
 
[the feelings which are sometimes required as so necessary to the beginning and 
progress of Christianity, must of course have an inestimable value as soon as one 
considers oneself entitled to regard them as the actual effects of God; and as soon 
as it is believed that it is precisely through immediate sensation and feeling itself 
that one can discern the supernatural impressions of the divine spirit and distinguish 
them from the natural changes of the soul.]  
Here Spalding proves to be more interested in training himself to make intuitive judgments 
about his own affective economy than he is with polemically rejecting feeling as such. The aim of 
his investigation, then, is about being able to enjoy feelings that are properly religious and not to 
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confuse them with feelings occasioned by natural inclinations. This constitutes the foundation of 
Spalding’s theological project, which he had spelled out earlier in his Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen (1748), a book that would become a huge success in the eighteenth century, capturing 
the attention of Mendelssohn, Kant, Goethe, Schiller, and Fichte who in 1799 would published his 
own book under that same title.291 In Spalding’s Bestimmung he describes the moral dimension of 
his project, which involves being able to control one’s passions so as to act in accordance with 
Christian virtues. He begins the treatise by acknowledging that he possesses the capacity to choose 
and should therefore not act blindly or follow the “swarm,” but determine beforehand how to 
properly conduct himself.292 
Mein Wehrt und meine Glückseligkeit soll nur darin bestehen, daß die 
oberherrschaftlichen Aussprüche der Wahrheit, unbetäubt durch den Tumult der 
Leidenschaften und der eigennützigen Begierden, allen meine Handlungen leiten; 
daß die reine Empfindung dessen, was sich schickt, meine eigentliche höchste 
Verbindlichkeit ausmache, und daß ich also überhaupt in einem jeden Augenblicke 
meines Lebens das sey möge, wozu meine Natur und die allgemeine Natur Dinge 
mich bestimmen.293  
 
[My worth and my happiness shall consist only in this: that the highest sayings of 
truth, unsullied by the tumult of the passions and by selfish desires, shall alone 
guide my actions; that a pure sense of that which is proper may truly constitute my 
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highest obligation, and that I may be at every moment of my life that which is 
determined by my own nature and by the general nature of things.] 
The moral sense tradition weighs heavy in this passage as the figure of the lawgiver is 
internalized into the speaker, who sees his “highest obligation” as cultivating a moral capacity to 
determine for himself a “pure sense of what is proper.” Yet the more orthodox critics of pietism 
did not share Spalding’s relatively liberal views and were fearful that the church might become 
increasingly irrelevant if believers started to appeal to their own subjective capacities and feelings 
rather than using the church as mediating institution. 
It was orthodox intolerance that motivated Lessing to defend pietism in his treatise 
Gedanken über die Herrnhuter (1750). The ethical orientation of Lessing’s theology was very 
much influenced by the pietist tradition, especially by pietists like Zinzendorf who rejected 
enlightenment theology’s obsession with Christian doctrine by reasserting the primacy of a 
practical religion. Lessing echoes this conception of faith when he states: “Der Mensch ward zum 
Tun und nicht zum Vernünfteln erschaffen. Aber eben deswegen, weil er nicht dazu erschaffen 
ward, hängt er diesem mehr als jenem nach. Seine Bosheit unternimmt allezeit das, was er nicht 
soll, und seine Verwegenheit allezeit das, was er nicht kann”294 [Man was created for action and 
not for speculation. However, for the very reason that he was not created for it, he dwells more on 
the latter than on the former. His wickedness always leads him to what he should not, and his 
audacity to what he cannot do]. To prove his point, Lessing turns to the history of philosophy for 
evidence and then finds that the history of religion suffers a similar fate. 
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According to Lessing, Socrates represents the pinnacle of ancient philosophy. Socrates 
ushered in the “Glückselige Zeiten, als der Tugendhafteste der Gelehrteste war! Als alle Weisheit 
in kurzen Lebensregeln bestand!”295 [What happy times when the most learned were the most 
virtuous! When all wisdom consisted of short rules for living]. However, after him it quickly fell 
into a state of decline: “Nur wenige von seinen [Socrates] Jüngern gingen den von ihm gezeigten 
Weg. Plato fing an zu träumen, und Aristoteles zu schließen”296 [Only a few of Socrates’ disciples 
followed the path he showed them. Plato began to dream, and Aristotle to syllogize]. The same 
fate was in store for modern philosophy, which, according to Lessing, also fell into a state of ruin 
shortly after Descartes managed to restore a sense of dignity to truth following a long period of 
scholastic decadence. “Die Wahrheit,” Lessing wrote, “schien unter seinen Händen eine neue 
Gestalt zu bekommen” [The truth appeared to be given a new form under Descartes’ hand]. 
However, Descartes’ disciples found his “Weltweisheit noch allzuviel praktisches” [worldly 
wisdom all too practical], and decided to subject his philosophy to a new “Meßkunst”297 [art of 
calculating]. Under this new paradigm, philosophers were only able to “fill their heads, while their 
hearts remained empty” (“So füllen sie den Kopf, und das Herz bleibt leer”298). 
It is at this point in his argument that Lessing shifts to a discussion of religion, in which he 
discovers a similar pattern of development. He begins by describing religion as quite simple at its 
inception. “Wie einfach, leicht und lebendig war die Religion des Adams?” [How simple, easy, 
and lively was the religion of Adam?]. Similar to the fate of philosophy, Adam’s descendants all 
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wanted to add their own opinons and “willkürlichen Sätzen” [arbitrary propositions] to religion, 
which initiated a period of religious decadence. Consequently, “Alle waren der Wahrheit untreu 
geworden, nur einige weniger, als die andern” [all had become unfaithful to the truth, only some 
less than others]. Eventually, “nur wenige einen richtigen Begriff von Gott behielten”299 [only a 
few retained a true concept of God]. Like Descartes, Christ enters the scene and is able “to bring 
religion out from its state of darkness” by teaching that “Gott ist ein Geist, den sollt ihr im Geist 
anbeten”300 [God is a spirit that one should worship in spirit]. Shortly after Christ and following 
the further advances made by the Early Church Fathers, Lessing identifies another period of 
decline. Suddenly a new group of theologians emerged and wanted “ihre Religion 
auszuschmücken, ihre Lehrsätze in eine gewisse Ordnung zu bringen, und die göttliche Wahrheit 
mit menschlichen Beweisen zu unterstützen”301 [to amplify their religion, to bring their doctrines 
into a certain order, and to reinforce divine truth with human proofs]. Lessing believes that 
enlightenment theology is oriented around this paradigm, in which “die Vernunft führte euch auf 
einen andern Irrweg” [reason has led people onto another erroneous path]. From this brief sketch 
of religious history Lessing arrives at the conclusion that “ein wahrer Christ weit seltner, als in den 
dunklen Zeiten geworden. Der Erkenntnis nach sind wir Engel, und dem Leben nach Teufel. ”302 
[A true Christian has become more rare than in the Dark Ages. In knowledge we are like angels, 
but in our manner of living like the Devil]. In other words, enlightenment theology has lost sight 
of religion’s original mission of providing practical wisdom to its followers. 
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Following this rather short and sweeping history of religion, Lessing identifies pietism as 
counter-movement that has the potential to steer religion back onto the right path. In describing 
Zinzendorf’s practically oriented teachings, Lessing was able to overlook the critique of religious 
enthusiasm that orthodox polemics waged, claiming instead that pietists like Zinzendorf wanting 
to renew the ethical mission of the church were the “true theologians.” In fact, many of Lessing’s 
theological arguments apply this line of thinking. As I will show in the next section, Lessing’s 
criticism of the letter of religion must have drawn lessons from pietists like Zinzendorf and Spener. 
Spener’s criticism against frivolously erudite theologians, interested only in winning polemical 
arguments rather than providing parishioners with ethical guidance, sounds strikingly similar to 
Lessing’s critique of enlightenment theology. For example, the following lines from Spener could 
easily be mistaken for Lessing’s: “They think that everything has turned out very well if only they 
know how to give answers to the errors of the papists, the Reformed, the Anabaptists, etc. [But] 
they pay no attention to the fruits of those articles of faith which we presumably still hold in 
common with them or of those rules of morality which are acknowledged by us all.”303 Like Spener 
and Zinzendorf, Lessing seeks to redirect theology back to the ethos of scripture, which serves as 
the common root of the various religious sects. 
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IV. Against the Letter: Lessing’s Copernican Turn in Religious Consciousness 
In his monumental study Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland 
(1834), Heine famously asserted that “seit Luther hat Deutschland keinen größeren und besseren 
Mann hervorgebracht, als Gotthold Ephraim Lessing”304 [since Luther, Germany has produced no 
greater nor better man than Gotthold Ephraim Lessing]. What earned Lessing a seat next to Luther 
in Heine’s pantheon of German heroes was his revolt against the privileged status of the letter in 
the dominant confessional systems of his day. According to Heine, Lessing triggered a “spiritual 
revolution” that would realize the legacy of Luther’s religious liberation to an even greater degree. 
However, upon closer scrutiny Heine’s analogy seems more seductive than precise, for several 
reasons. As is widely known, Luther turned the letter into a weapon. This is perhaps most 
pronounced in his Ninety-Five Theses (1517), in which Luther accused church leaders of 
corrupting the sacrament of penance by authorizing a “human doctrine” [indulgences] that forged 
a transactional relationship between contrition and absolution. Exposing this corruption was 
central to Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses: “They preach only human doctrines who say that as soon 
as the money clinks into the money chest, the soul flies out of purgatory.”305 Believers could 
purchase indulgences to mitigate the amount of temporal punishment they owed for their 
transgressions, and much of these funds, as Luther implied, helped to finance the construction of 
the costly St. Peter’s Basilica—a monumental insult to the abject poverty that afflicted many 
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Christians.306 The ethical implications of selling indulgences was a source of anxiety for Luther, 
who felt that it was “very harmful if [believers] lost their fear of God because of [indulgences].” 
For Luther, purchasing an indulgence is merely an outward sign of atonement; true atonement can 
only take place through genuine “works of love,”307 which help a person to become better. Not 
only was this practice harmful to the moral integrity of Christians, it also debased the office of 
preaching. “Injury is done [to] the Word of God,” Luther wrote, “when, in the same sermon, an 
equal or larger amount of time is devoted to indulgences than to the Word.”308 For Luther the Word 
of God was the real treasure of Christianity, and prior to the selling of indulgences it was the gospel 
that served as the “nets with which one formerly fished for men of wealth. The treasures of 
indulgences,” by contrast, “are the nets with which one now fishes for the wealth of men.” In many 
ways Luther’s fanaticism for the Word of God (as opposed to “human doctrines”) is linked with 
his effort to reclaim the dignity of the Church and its followers by exposing the hypocrisy and 
corruption of Rome. Most important in our context, under Luther’s watch the doctrine of sola 
scriptura became a pillar of the Protestant faith, making the bible increasingly more authoritative 
and impervious to external criticism. Finally, with the help of the letter, Luther insulated reformers 
from unauthorized, humanist readings of scripture, which theologians advanced in order to clear 
up obscurities that were a source of bitter controversy among biblical scholars. 
In the context of Luther’s theology, humanist readings of scripture employed the fourfold 
sense of scripture, which included the literal, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical senses (or 
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modes of reading) that became an object of criticism for Luther and his followers.309 Luther found 
it absurd and impractical to subsume the content of scripture under four generic categories that 
enabled readers to easily extract whatever they wanted from it, arguing instead that ‘scripture is its 
own interpreter.’310  Consequently, Lutheranism privledged the literal mode of interpreting 
scripture at the expense of the other modes.311  Humanists, by contrast, employed the various 
modes of interpretation to supplement scriptures literal meaning (sensus literalis), which, at the 
same time, was a means of preserving its moral integrity–gaurding it against any ethically 
compromising contradictions, paradoxes, and content.  By maintaining the moral integrity of 
scripture through these various modes, humanists hoped to make knowledge of scripture more 
“vivid” to listeners.312 Nevertheless, Luther vociferously rejected allegorical readings of scripture. 
In part, his refusal to endorse this mode of readings had to do with a fear that self-appointed 
religious fanatics [Schwärmer] would feel more at liberty to claim they were called on by God to 
preach, when in fact these “callings” were often a ruse in which the figurative meaning of scripture 
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was intentionally distorted to manipulate the public.313 Against these kinds of readings, Luther 
wrote: 
Scripture calls all those who teach their own laws false prophets, false priests, 
deceivers, seducers, wolves, ravenous animals, of whom He says in Jeremiah 23:32, 
“They have led my people astray when I did not send them or charge them to teach 
such things.” I fight so that everyone may understand the true difference between 
divine Scripture and human teachings […] so that a Christian heart does not buy 
the one for the other—straw for gold, hay for silver, and wood for jewels.314 
 
Luther was himself partly to blame for the rise in false prophets. His translation of the bible led to 
the increased spiritual autonomy of reformers who could begin to confide in the word of God on 
their own rather than needing to listen to the (corrupt) words of the clergy. In this way, Luther put 
a powerful instrument in the hands of reformers, but it was an instrument that would become an 
engine for social and political transformation that even he could not control.315 Nevertheless, 
Luther worked tirelessly to centralize the authority of the reformation as a means of protecting the 
reformed Church against false prophets and false translations of the bible. For instance, he insisted 
that the office of preaching be won through appointment only, rather than through individual 
claims of having direct communication with God or special insight into the figurative meaning of 
scripture. 
The aim of such measures was to make it more difficult for “fanatical” agitators like 
Thomas Müntzer (1489–1525) to use the word of God to achieve concrete political objectives such 
                                               
313 See Klein, Lawrence and La Vopa, Anthony, Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650–1850, 
San Marino, Ca.: Huntington Library, 1998, especially La Vopa’s essay “The philosopher and the 
Schwärmer: on the Career of a German Epithet from Luther to Kant.” 
314 See Luther, “Concerning the Letter and the Spirit,” in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings. 
315 For more on the social and political effects of Luther’s translation of the bible see Sheehan, Jonathan, 
The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, 
especially chapter 1: “The Vernacular bible: Reformation and Baroque.” 
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as those expressed in the twelve articles of the peasants.316 In fact, Müntzer was denied support by 
Luther even after directly appealing to him on behalf of the peasantry. “Dear brother,” Müntzer 
wrote, “cease your waiting and hesitation. It is time, for summer is at the door. Keep not friendship 
with the ungodly who hinder the Word from working its full force. Flatter not your princes, or you 
will perish with them.”317 The problem was that Luther reserved all his passion for the fight against 
corruption within the Church: “Since we punish thieves with the sword, murderers with the halter, 
and heretics with fire, why do we not turn on all those evil teachers of perdition, those popes, 
cardinals and bishops, and the entire swarm of the Roman Sodom with arms in hand, and wash 
our hands in their blood.”318 In order for the “full force” of the word to be experienced in the 
secular world, Müntzer believed that revolution (not reform) was the proper course of action. 
Luther, however, had allied himself with the nobles and did not wish to extend the revolutionary 
potential of the reformation to dismantling feudal structures that were a constant source of poverty 
and suffering for the peasants. Eventually Luther would explicitly condemn the peasant uprising 
and describe Müntzer as “the arch devil who […] commits nothing but theft, murder, and 
bloodshed.”319 
Münzter and Luther had fundamental disagreements over the status of the letter/spirit 
distinction. Whereas Luther believed the letter of religion was central both to emancipating 
reformers from the Church and to bringing about confessions of faith, Müntzer viewed its 
significance as far more limited both in terms of what the letter could offer reformed faith and how 
                                               
316 The preface to the twelve articles explicitly cites that one of its objectives is to “remove the reproach 
from the word of God […] and give a Christian justification for the disobedience or even the revolt of the 
entire peasantry.” Quoted from Engels, Friedrich. The Peasant War in Germany, third edition, New York: 
International Publishers, 2006, p. 87. 
317 Ibid., p. 25. 
318 Ibid., p. 17. 
319 See Luther’s pamphlet Against the Thieving and Murderous Gangs of Peasants (1525). 
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it might actually lead to new problems. Given that Müntzer’s theology was structured by a form 
of medieval mysticism that stressed the importance of having personal experiences with God when 
confessing one’s faith, he immediately found himself at cross-purposes with Luther. According to 
Müntzer, the scrupulous study of the letter of religion only gives believers insight into the historical 
experiences of those who have already heard the word of God. This is not enough for Münzter, 
who argued that these experiences were still vital for faith in the sixteenth century: “that is why all 
the prophets [say]: ‘this is the word of the Lord.’ They do not say: this is what the Lord said, as if 
it had happened in the past; rather, they speak with regard to the here and now.”320 Müntzer’s point 
is that experiences like these bring believers into contact with the spirit of religion, which 
conditions the will and legitimizes confessions of faith: “The human heart,” Müntzer wrote, “is 
the parchment upon which the finger of God inscribes his unchanging will and eternal wisdom.”321 
Furthermore, Müntzer feared that investing too much value in the letter of religion would have 
adverse effects on reformed faith. He wrote that theologians “will now dupe [Christians] with a 
new kind of logic, with the deception of the word of God [which] extols the holy scriptures, 
covering all those books in ink and endlessly gabbing ‘believe, believe’—while denying the advent 
of faith.”322 In fact, in his Prague Manifesto Müntzer insinuated that Luther’s attempt to hold a 
monopoly on the letter of religion makes “a mockery of the Spirit of Christ” and reproduces 
problems similar to that of selling indulgences. He wrote, “[Luther and his reformers] did not hear 
the ordinances of God, as implanted in all his creatures […] they only heard from them the naked 
                                               
320 Quoted from Taubes, Jacob, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009, p. 111 (emphasis added). 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid., p. 110–11. 
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word [bloße Schrift] which as murderers and thieves they stole from the Bible, never having heard 
it themselves from the mouth of God.”323 In the eyes of Müntzer, Luther was himself duped and 
the best way for Christians to avoid a similar fate was to suffer for themselves: “Before man can 
be sure of salvation, there must come so many turbulent waters, with their awful roar, that he loses 
the will to live, because the storm waves of this wild sea consume many who think they have 
already won the battle.”324 In the end, Müntzer believed that the word of God did not have the 
power to bring about faith, but could only bear witness to faith. True faith, by contrast, can only 
be forged through personal experience with the spirit of religion, and Müntzer’s larger contribution 
to theology was, as one scholar put it, to “secularize the spirit of religion by externalizing the inner 
light of mysticism onto the world.”325 Externalizing the spirit of religion created chiliastic 
expectations within the horizon of existing social and political realities. His message to a group of 
miners was clear enough: “with the advent of faith we all, earthly people made of flesh, must 
become gods […] so that our earthy life soars into heaven.” It was precisely this element within 
Müntzer’s theology that caused Luther to condemn the peasant movement as being overtly 
fanatical, yet, as we will see, Müntzer’s chiliasm finds continuity in Lessing’s religious writings. 
Before moving on to Lessing, I want to show that Luther’s theology of the letter was not 
only at odds with advocates of the peasant movement, but that it also created controversy among 
establishment theologians like Erasmus von Rotterdam (1466–1536). For Erasmus it was self-
evident that the literal meaning of scripture sometimes posed difficulties for the Church. This was 
                                               
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid., p. 115. 
325 Taubes, Jacob, “Thomas Müntzer: The Theology of Revolution,” in Occidental Eschatology, trans. 
David Ratmoko, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, 106f. 
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especially clear with respect to the role of free will in matters of salvation. On this issue Erasmus 
asked whether or not “our [free] will contributes anything to our eternal salvation [or] whether 
everything we do, good or evil, is done out of mere necessity [i.e. according to divine grace].”326 
Unlike Luther, Erasmus believed that a consensus on the literal meaning of scripture was not given, 
and that in certain cases, like the question of free will, further “human” elaboration was needed. 
This led to the famous polemic between Luther and Erasmus. In his discourse on The Free Will, 
Erasmus wrote, “if [Luther] objects: ‘what can large numbers contribute to an understanding of 
the spirit?’ I answer: what can a small number? […] If [he] says: ‘what can a philosophical 
understanding contribute?’ I answer: what can ignorance?”327 Rather than assuming that God 
arbitrarily distributes grace according to a necessity that human reason has no access to, Erasmus 
used scripture to propose a synthesis between necessity and freedom. According to Erasmus, the 
human will does have a say in its own salvation insofar as it must choose whether or not to receive 
grace and turn towards faith. In response, Luther protested: 
I frankly confess, that I should not want free will to be given me, even if it could 
be, nor anything else be left in my own hands to enable me to strive after my 
salvation. [For] I should be forced to labor with no guarantee of success and to beat 
the air only […] my conscience would never reach comfortable certainty as to how 
much it must do to satisfy God […] But now that God has put my salvation out of 
the control of my own will and put it under His control […] according to His grace 
and mercy, I rest fully assured.328 
 
Because Luther assumes that human reason enjoys no comfortable certainty with respect 
to how our actions might satisfy God, he abandons the possibility that free will has any power to 
alter the course of what is predetermined. Be that as it may, it already starts to become clear how 
                                               
326 See Erasmus, Desiderius, Discourse on Free Will: Erasmus–Luther, ed. Ernst F. Winter et al., London: 
Continuum, 1996, p. 14–15. 
327 Ibid., p. 24. 
328 Ibid., p. 138–39. 
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Lessing’s theology not only deviates from Luther’s, but appears more in tune with his adversary. 
In Lessing’s theology, further human elaboration into scripture is non-negotiable; since revealed 
knowledge never carries the force of certain truth it can and should be subjected to criticism. 
Moreover, without being able to criticize the bible, the aesthetic underpinnings of Lessing’s 
theology would be completely irrelevant and there would be no prospect for a participatory regime 
of faith that allows religious subjects to use the bible as an instrument for self-improvement. To 
bring this back to Heine, it seems to be a rather spurious analogy to place Lessing side by side with 
Luther, and one that eclipses many of the significant differences between their respective 
theologies. 
Luther advanced a far more radical argument against humanist interpretations of the sensus 
spiritus of scripture in his polemic against Jerome Emser (1478–1527). Emser thought it was too 
simplistic to argue that every complex problem in the church could be resolved by directly 
appealing to the bible. By contrast, Luther seemed to categorically oppose any form of human 
amplification beyond the literal meaning (sensus literalis) of scripture: 
The Holy Spirit is the simplest writer and adviser in heaven and earth. That is why 
his words could have no more than the one simplest meaning which we call the 
written one, or the literal meaning of the tongue. But written words and spoken 
language cease to have meaning when the things which have a simple meaning 
through interpretation by a simple word are given further meanings and thus 
become different things [through a different interpretation] so that one thing takes 
on the meaning of another […] one should not therefore say that Scripture or God’s 
word has more than one meaning.329 
 
Not only was Emser a target here, so too was Augustine, who in his On Christian Doctrine 
established a canonical approach to biblical exegesis that defies this rationale and proves to be 
                                               
329 See Luther, “Concerning the Letter and the Spirit,” in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, 
p. 56. 
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much more flexible than Luther’s preferred hermeneutic agenda.330 For Luther, the “sheer 
murderous noise of raging amplification [only] strengthens [his] cause, [which] is well grounded 
in scripture,” whereas Emser’s appeal to the spirit of religion was, according to Luther, built “upon 
human dreams.”331 Even though enlightenment theology grew out of the soil of the reformation, it 
bore very different fruits. As we have seen in Klopstock’s religious poetry, amplification is at the 
heart of his project, which aspires to invest the letter of religion with more potent affects. 
Furthermore, the efforts made by neologians to purify scripture of apparent contradictions through 
paraphrastics also require “human” interventions that defy the doctrine of sola scriptura. But 
Lessing’s theology of spirit is perhaps the most radical deviation from Luther’s theological 
imperative against humanist readings of scripture. Not only did Lessing embrace Erasmus’ 
argument that theologians should debate scripture to build institutional consensus, he also 
relocated the authority of religion in its spirit rather than in its letter. For Lessing, the letter is no 
longer static; rather, it represents a host of provisional, human attempts to capture the ethos of 
religion. Modernity must have the right to amplify, modify, negate, or uphold the letter of religion 
so that the spirit can be illuminated according to the demands of a particular historical moment.332 
                                               
330 See Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, especially book one, 4–7, and book two, 1: “For a sign is a 
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332 Herder advances a similar kind of historicism in his sermon “Göttlichkeit und Gebrauch der Bibel” 
(1768), in which he suggests that God had to reveal his will in a way that would allow specific cultures 
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My analysis of Luther’s polemics against Müntzer, Erasmus, and Emser serves as the basis 
for discussing how Lessing confronts the Lutheran tradition, rather than carrying it further as Heine 
suggested. I propose that he defies the Lutheran doctrine of sola scriptura as soon as he announces 
that “Der buchstabe ist nicht der Geist; und die Bibel ist nicht die Religion. Folglich sind Einwürfe 
gegen den Buchstaben, und gegen die Bibel, nicht eben auch Einwürfe gegen den Geist und gegen 
Religion”333 [The letter is not the spirit, and the bible is not religion. Objections to the letter and 
the bible need not also be objections to the spirit and to religion]. The significance of this claim 
cannot be overstated. The implication is that faith no longer revolves around the letter of religion, 
but rather its spirit. Expressed more boldly, Lessing initiates a Copernican turn in (Protestant) 
religious consciousness; a turn that promises to multiply (rather than limit) the possibilities for 
religious experience by allowing the letter to be reshaped by criticism. To break the halo 
surrounding the letter of religion was a clear provocation that did not go unnoticed by the Protestant 
community, as some of the most bitter polemics of the fragment controversy directly challenged 
this claim. Yet the effects of Lessing’s argument went well beyond the theological community 
                                               
and ages to understand Him: “Wenn Gott sich also für Menschen offenbarte: wie anders, als in der 
Sprache und Denkart des Volkes, des Erdstrichs, des Jahrhunderts, des Zeitalters, zu dem seine Stimme 
geschah. Nun ists eine ausgemachte Sache, daß die Denkart, und die Art des Ausdruckes allen Völkern 
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eine ganze andre Welt um sich: einen Schatz von ganz andern Begriffen in seiner Seele gesammelt, und 
durch die Erziehung seines Erdstrichs eine ganz andere Richtung Wendung Ton Gestalt des Geistes 
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else than in the language and style of thinking of the people, the part of the world, the century, the age, to 
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Oriental […] has an entirely different world around him: a treasure of entirely different concepts has 
collected in his soul and through the upbringing in his part of the world he has acquired a very different 
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Werke in zehn Bänden: Theologische Schriften, Band 9, hrsg. von Christoph Bultmann und Thomas 
Zippert, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1994. Translation mine. 
333 See Lessing, Fragmentenstreit I, p. 312. 
 
 137 
insofar as it invited the secular community to also participate in reshaping the letter of religion. 
Artists and writers who observed the polemics of the controversy felt more authorized to work 
with material considered to be sacred, and Lessing’s arguments were instrumental in facilitating 
the emergence of Kunstreligion, which Romantic writers like Novalis and Schleiermacher 
developed in their religious writings. If Klopstock had access to Lessing’s insight before writing 
his Heilige Poesie, then there would have been no need to express a duty to “follow in the footsteps 
of scripture”;334 instead he could have been more honest and argued that his poetics were an 
approximation of the spirit of religion and that his adaptations were intended to speak to the 
spiritual needs of the present. 
I will discuss Lessing’s theology of spirit in the following section, but for now it is 
important to see how his call for the free and open criticism of the letter helped breathe new life 
into modern faith, which had been choking on the bad air of dogmatic theology ever since the 
Reformation invested absolute authority in the letter of religion. This is not to say, however, that 
there was a ban on, or even a dearth of biblical criticism at the time. Nothing could be further from 
the reality of eighteenth-century Germany, which chronicles a thriving industry of biblical 
scholarship, criticism, and translation.335 Yet, who had the authority to object, and the kinds of 
objections that were approved by a relatively small circle of gatekeepers, remained a problem well 
                                               
334 See my chapter one, section 3, “Fabricating Thomas.” 
335 A good source on this is Jonathan Sheehan’s recent book The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, 
Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Of course, after the French Revolution 
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into the nineteenth century. From the standpoint of Lessing’s Bildung project, religious intolerance 
only served to insulate religious subjects from actual problems that, if not addressed, could 
threaten their faith.336 For Lessing, objections to the bible should be taken seriously even if they 
were uttered from the mouths of deists, atheists, and freethinkers. This distinguishes him from 
Klopstock, who in his Heilige Poesie essay expressed intolerant views by suggesting that 
freethinkers did not have the capacity to fully understand Christianity—or his own religious poetry 
for that matter: “Der Freigeist, und der Christ, der seine Religion nur halb versteht, sehn da nur 
einen großen Schauplatz von Trümmern, wo der tiefsinnige Christ einen majestätischen Tempel 
sieht”337 [The free spirit, and the Christian who only half understands his religion, sees in scripture 
only a great scene of rubble, where the profound Christian sees a majestic temple]. Lessing, by 
contrast, worked to ensure that any form of biblical criticism was given the opportunity to actualize 
its most obvious end: cultivating more advanced knowledge of religion. 
Lessing’s Nathan (especially its ring parable) is consistently cited as evidence of his 
broader political commitment to address the harmful effects of religious intolerance, which he 
personally experienced after being censored in 1778.338 To get a more direct sense of his fight 
against religious intolerance–and the people who suffered from it–one can explore his often 
overlooked collection of Rettungen essays in which he works to redeem the reputations of 
allegedly “heretical” authors who were slandered, censored, and forgotten as a result of theological 
                                               
336 Here I have in mind the question that Lessing posed in his Beweis essay: “Was bindet mich denn 
dazu?” [what, then, binds me to [my faith]?]. To develop a cataphatic answer to this question was 
essential for Lessing to overcome Reimarus’ skeptical claims. 
337 Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, “Von der heiligen Poesie,” in Klopstocks Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10 
Leipzig: Göschen, 1854–55, pp. 237–38.  
338 Lessing was censored by the Duke of Braunschweig at the request of Goeze. 
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prejudice.339 For instance, in his Rettung des Hier. Cardano, Lessing reevaluated the writings of 
Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576), a sixteenth-century Italian Renaissance mathematician, 
physician, and theologian, who was targeted by the Inquisition for his book De Subtilitate (1552). 
In the work, Cardano created dialogues in which representatives from major world religions 
(Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Paganism) disputed the different proofs that were used to 
legitimize their respective faith traditions and, much to the chagrin of Cardano’s biased audience, 
Christianity did not emerge as the one and only true religion. This led Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–
1558) to accuse Cardano of atheism in his Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV, de Subtilitate, 
ad Hieronymus Cardanum (1557). Scaligar’s attack on Cardano spread like brush fire and his 
reputation did not start to recover until Pierre Bayle defused the charge of atheism in his 
Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697). In his Rettungen des Cardanus, Lessing claims to only 
be supplementing what Bayle began: “Man wird es als einen guten Zusatz zu dem Artikel ansehen 
können, welchen Bayle, in seinem kritischen Wörterbuche, von diesem Gelehrten gemacht hat340” 
[One will be able to view it as a good addition to the article that Bayle, in his critical dictionary, 
wrote about this scholar]. However, Lessing’s apology does much more than that. It pinpoints three 
theological reasons why Cardano’s work was considered heretical by his peers: 1) it argued against 
the immortality of the soul, 2) it used astrology to construct a horoscope for Christ’s life, and 3) it 
did not identify Christianity as the one true religion. The last reason is the one that Lessing is most 
concerned about because it was the one that Scaligar and subsequent generations of theologians 
                                               
339 See Lessing’s Rettung des Hier. Cardano, Rettung des inepti religiosi, Rettung des Cochläus aber nur 
in der Kleinigkeiten, Rettung des Lemnius; and I would also count his better-known defense of pietism, 
Gedanken über die Herrnhuter, among these. For a study on the Cardano essay, see: Moore, Evelyn K., 
The Passions of Rhetoric: Lessing’s Theory of Argument and the German Enlightenment, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1993, pp 19–38.  
340 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, p. 286. 
Translation mine. 
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used as the basis for describing Cardano as an atheist. Lessing translated this key section of 
Cardano’s work into German and afterwards wrote: “Warum verdammt man eigentlich diese 
Stelle? Ist die Vergleichung der verschiednen Religionen, an und vor sich selbst, strafbar; oder ist 
es nur die Art, mit welcher sie Cardan unternommen hat? […] Was ist nötiger, als sich von seinem 
Glauben zu überzeugen, und was ist unmöglicher als Überzeugung, ohne vorhergegangene 
Prüfung341?” [Why does one actually condemn this? Is a comparison of the various religions in 
and of itself punishable? Or is it just the manner in which Cardano went about his comparison? 
[…] What is more necessary than to be convinced of one’s faith and what is more impossible than 
conviction without first examining that faith?]. Whether it was Cardano or even Lessing himself, 
being able to freely test the strength of one’s religious convictions was non-negotiable, and it was 
Lessing’s insistence that this testing be conducted in the court of public opinion that drove much 
of the controversy with respect to the Reimarus fragments.342 
To mitigate the anticipated backlash from the public, Lessing initially released a small, 
seemingly innocuous portion of Reimarus’ fragments (Von der Duldung der Deisten/On Tolerating 
Deists) that called on religious institutions to stop persecuting theologians, who wanted to 
incorporate principles of rationalism into their study of religion. Gradually he released additional 
fragments that expressed more radical views against foundational doctrines of Christianity.343 With 
respect to Lessing’s call for greater tolerance, it is especially illuminating to think through the first 
lines of his Gegensätze [counter-propositions], which accompanied the more offensive fragments. 
In these lines Lessing provides his rationale for publishing: 
                                               
341 Ibid., 293. Translation mine. 
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Wer von meinen Lesern mir sie [die Fragmenten] aber lieber ganz geschenkt hätte, 
der ist sicherlich furchtsamer, als unterrichtet. Er kann ein sehr frommer Christ 
sein, aber ein sehr aufgeklärter ist er gewiß nicht. Er kann es mit seiner Religion 
herzlich gut meinen: nur müßte er ihr auch mehr zutrauen.344 
 
[But any one of my readers who would rather I had kept them [the fragments] to 
myself is surely more faint-hearted than well informed. He may be a very pious 
Christian, but he is certainly not a very enlightened one. He may genuinely mean 
well by his religion, but he ought also to have more faith in it.] 
To turn a pious, well-intentioned blind eye to the fragments is to give up on the prospect 
that Christianity and enlightenment are at all compatible. This was, after all, Reimarus’ expressed 
conclusion. The passage also suggests that religious intolerance sustains forms of ignorance that 
transform piety into prejudice. Lessing’s call for the public to “have more faith in religion” is less 
insipid than it may appear. Taken in context, he specifically refers to feeling confident in religion’s 
ability to withstand even the most devastating critiques against its letter. As I have already 
described, for Lessing, the purpose of the bible is not to construct a philosophical system, but to 
provide ethical wisdom that helps religious subjects realize their own salvation. Henry Alison aptly 
described Lessing’s Gedanken über die Herrnhuter [Thoughts about the Moravians] as “the 
clearest expression of Lessing’s practical stance toward religion.”345 In this text, Lessing writes: 
“Der Mensch ward zum Tun und nicht zum Vernünfteln erschaffen […] Was hilft es, recht zu 
glauben, wenn man unrecht lebt?”346 [Man was created for action and not for speculation […] 
What help is it to believe properly, if one cannot live properly?]. In other words, the letter is only 
a vehicle that helps religious subjects learn “how to live properly,” and no matter how much 
                                               
344 Lessing, E.G. Werke und Briefe: Zur Geschichte und Literatur: Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, 
Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 312. 
345 See: Allison, Henry, Lessing and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and its Relation to 
Eighteenth-Century Thought, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. 
346 See Lessing’s Gedanken über die Herrnhuter, p. 272–77. Translation mine. 
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Reimarus rages against the inadequacies of the letter, his criticism remains fixed on the 
“Aussenwerk” [external structures] of religion. In this sense, Reimarus’ criticism fails to penetrate 
the spirit of religion as he cannot provide a moral argument for why Christians should disregard 
the ethical wisdom scattered across the various books of religion.  
Even though orthodox theology was largely responsible for silencing critical voices of 
opposition by fomenting religious intolerance and promoting the absolute authority of the letter of 
religion, Lessing still valued its ability to maintain a positive stance towards the letter. The failure 
of neology and deism to define itself positively (rather than negatively) in relation to the biblical 
tradition provided the basis for Lessing’s critique against modern theology.347 His subtle praise of 
orthodoxy, by contrast, was owing to the fact that it neither rejected (deism) nor mediated 
(neology) revealed knowledge, but wholly accepted it.348 For Lessing, this is what modern 
theology lacked and, unlike his contemporaries, he turned to the spirit of religion to develop a 
cataphatic theology that could celebrate the continued relevance of the biblical tradition. Lessing 
announced his desire for a positive faith at the very start of the fragment controversy by suggesting 
that Christianity could easily absorb the damage caused by Reimarus’ arguments. He writes: 
Aber was gehen dem Christen dieses Mannes Hypothesen, und Erklärungen und 
Beweise an? Ihm ist es doch einmal da, das Christentum, welches er so wahr, in 
welchem er sich so selig fühlet.—Wenn der Paralyticus die wohltätigen Schläge 
des Elektrischen Funkens erfähret: was kümmert es ihn, ob Nollet, oder ob 
Franklin, oder ob keiner von beiden Recht hat?349 
 
[What does this man’s hypotheses, explanations, and proofs matter to the Christian? 
For him, Christianity is simply there, that same Christianity which he feels is so 
true and in which he feels himself so blessed.—When the paralyzed patient 
                                               
347 For a study on Lessing’s relationship to cataphatic theology, see Dilthey, Wilhelm, Das Erlebnis und 
die Dichtung: Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin, durchgesehene aufl., Leipzig: Reclam, 1991. 
348 See Lessing’s letter to his brother in my chapter 2, section III. 
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experiences the salutary shock of the electric spark, what does he care whether 
Nollet, or Franklin, or neither of the two is right?] 
In other words, the “hypotheses, explanations, and proofs” contained in Reimarus’ 
fragments do nothing to undermine the fact that Christians continue to take moral recourse in their 
religion to navigate everyday experiences. For modern theologians like Reimarus, faith becomes 
detached from any conception of a living religion and is evaluated solely according to the standards 
set by philology and natural science. 
Yet, if there was one advantage that modern theology brought to the table, it was that its 
historical-critical approach to scripture drove a wedge between the present moment and the 
historical remoteness of revealed truths. Rather than seeing this gap as a source of irreconcilable 
alienation, Lessing saw it as an opportunity to reshape modernity’s relationship to the biblical 
tradition. His theology of spirit does not demand a “hairsplitting” knowledge of the letter, but it 
does require a sense of history that is able to grasp the differences between the past and the present. 
In other words, the spirit of religion becomes a site of interpretation, whereby the significance of 
these differences must be confronted. By insisting that religious subjects interpret the spirit of 
religion by reflecting on the history of the Church, the letter of religion suddenly becomes 
dialogical and no longer enjoys absolute authority. 
 
 
 
V. From the Page to the Heart: Lessing’s Theology of Spirit 
 
 
What good does it do me to know that some obscure “king” of long ago 
was hung on a double wood? […] For if you consider only the 
insignificance of the thing in itself, it will seem to you unworthy of God. 
But “if you look at the grandeur of the mystery” that is contained in it, 
then you will be edified. [Spiritual] exegesis is not at all a negation of the 
literal which has often been claimed. It is, on the contrary, although in an 
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indirect way, its justification.350 
 
—Henri de Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of 
Scripture according to Origen. 
Nearly twenty years before the fragment controversy erupted, Lessing aired literary 
grievances to one of his most trusted friends. On December 18, 1756 Lessing wrote Mendelssohn: 
“Ich bin überzeugt, daß meine Worte oft meinem Sinne Schaden thun, daß ich mich nicht selten 
zu unbestimmt oder zu nachlässig ausdrücke. Versuchen Sie es also, liebster Freund, sich durch 
Ihr eignen Nachdenken in den Geist meines Systems zu versetzen. Und vielleicht finden Sie es 
weit besser, als ich es vorstellen kann”351 [I am convinced that my words often do harm to the 
sense I wish to communicate. It is often the case that my expressions are too uncertain, too careless. 
So, my dear friend, try to place yourself into the spirit of my system by means of your own 
reflection and perhaps you will be able to express the meaning far better than I can imagine]. 
Lessing’s insight—that language fails to adequately preserve the full significance of our ideas—
might initially sound like a banal variation of Platonic dualism. Yet the antagonism between “Wort” 
and “Sinn” establishes a red thread running throughout Lessing’s work which I have been pursuing 
throughout this chapter. Curiously, that which is here described in terms of the dramatist’s 
“Schaden” (i.e. the inadequacy of language) actually acquires value when taken from other 
standpoints within Lessing’s work. As I noted in his aesthetic writings, for instance, it is precisely 
the lack of a completed “Sinn” [sense] that leaves room for the imagination to freely combine a 
manifold of parts into a lively presentation of the whole.352 Therefore, the “Schaden” [defect] that 
                                               
350 Lubac, Henri De, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen, trans. 
Anne Englund Nash, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007. 
351 Briefe an Mendelssohn, 18 December 1756, in Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel. 
352 See my chapter 2, section II, and Lessing’s Laokoon (especially his chapters III and VI). 
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Lessing laments evaporates into the larger spirit of his system once it becomes evident that the 
inadequacy of language provides Mendelssohn with the necessary conditions for further enquiry—
to think for himself [Selbstdenken] and try his luck at finding a “far better” representation of 
Lessing’s elusive “Sinn.”353 
Of course, the disjunction between “Worte” and “Sinne” is phrased differently across 
Lessing’s oeuvre and, consequently, acquires distinct theological, philosophical, ethical, or 
aesthetic significance depending on the environment in which it emerges.354 As I have tried to 
show, in Lessing’s theological writings, the “Worte/Sinne” distinction is primarily conjugated as a 
difference between the “Buchstabe” and the “Geist” of Christianity. In several manuscripts from 
his religious writings, Lessing pursues a logic similar to that expressed both in his letter to 
Mendelssohn and in his Laokoon treatise. More generally, the letter to Mendelssohn captures 
Lessing’s preference for an open epistemology, that is, an epistemology which holds provisional 
knowledge in better standing than knowledge subjugated to philosophical closure or religious 
prejudice. This is best expressed through one of the most cited passages of Lessing’s theological 
writings, in which he distinguishes between absolute truth and the search for truth: 
Wenn Gott in seiner Rechten alle Wahrheit, und in seiner Linken den einzigen 
immer regen Trieb nach Wahrheit, obschon mit dem Zusatze, mich immer und ewig 
zu irren, verschlossen hielte, und spräche zu mir: wähle! Ich fiele ihm mit Demut 
                                               
353 For a work that develops the idea of the public (something I do not fully treat here) as a necessary 
condition for Lessing’s “Selbstdenken,” see Hannah Arendt’s introduction to Men in Dark Times, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
354 For a systematic study of Lessing’s distinction between the “Wort” and “Sinn” across his published 
writings, see Bohnen, Klaus, Geist und Buchstabe: Zum Prinzip des kritischen Verfahrens in Lessings 
literaräesthetischen und theologischen Schriften, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1974. Also, David Wellbery 
deduces a “global model of signification” from Lessing’s Laokoon in his book Laocoon: Semiotics and 
Aesthetics in the Age of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
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in seine Linke, und sagte: Vater gib! Die reine Wahrheit ist ja doch nur für dich 
allein!355 
 
[If God held fast in his right hand the whole of truth and in his left hand only the 
ever-active quest for truth, albeit with the provision that I should constantly and 
eternally err, and said to me: ‘choose!’ I would humbly fall upon his left hand and 
say: ‘Father, give!’ For pure truth is for you alone!] 
Echoing the late medieval theology of Nicholas of Cusa,356 Lessing suggests that without 
error there would be no horizon for improvement and, consequently, nothing to strive after; the 
hope of the “pregnant moment” dashed by absolute knowing. In other words, taking from the right 
hand of God would end the labor of Bildung by placing God and humanity on an equal footing. 
My guiding argument in this section is that Lessing’s conception of spirit acquires a 
historical dimension by placing religious truth on a developmental continuum, which effectively 
secures a future for religion. By reposturing modern faith towards the spirit of religion rather than 
its letter, Lessing attempts to show that revealed knowledge is not entirely revealed, that the 
miracles and prophecies of the remote past are not completely fulfilled and that human culture and 
education are tasked with advancing the work of revelation, whose primary objective is the 
improvement of humanity. In this sense, Lessing does not abandon or undermine revelation (as his 
critics feared); rather, he views revelation as perpetually unfolding, whereby each generation is 
responsible for creating new interpretations of scripture and biblical history (i.e. the development, 
                                               
355 Lessing, Eine Duplik. These words were directed against Johann Heinrich Ress, an orthodox Lutheran 
who subscribed to the inerrancy theory of scripture and, therefore, denied Reimarus’ claim that the four 
gospel narratives contained contradicting witness testimony. 
356 See Cusanus, Nicholas, Of Learned Ignorance, Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock, 2007, chapter 3, “Absolute 
Truth is Beyond our Grasp”: “It is clear, therefore, that all we know of the truth is that the absolute truth, 
such as it is, is beyond our reach. The truth, which can be neither more nor less than it is, is the most 
absolute necessity, while, in contrast with it, our intellect is possibility. Therefore, the quiddity of things, 
which is ontological truth, is unattainable in its entirety; and though it has been the objective of all 
philosophers, by none has it been found as it really is. The more profoundly we learn this lesson of 
ignorance, the closer we draw to the truth itself” (p. 12). 
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transmission, and canonization of religious doctrines and practices) in order to access an ethos that 
transcends historical contingencies. Most important for our context is the fact that Lessing does 
not exclude literature from participating in this interpretive process. In fact, in his Anti-Goeze 8, 
Lessing defends the integrity of his “dramatic style” [“Theaterlogik”] of theologizing: “Ich suche 
allerdings, durch die Phantasie mit, auf den Verstand meiner Leser zu wirken. Ich halte es nicht 
allein für nützlich, sondern auch für notwendig, Gründe in Bilder zu kleiden; und alle die 
Nebenbegriffe, welche die einen oder die andern erwecken, durch Anspielungen zu bezeichnen”357 
[Above all, I try to act on the understanding of my readers with the help of imagination. I consider 
it to be not only be useful, but also necessary, to dress concepts [Gründe] in images; and to describe 
by means of allusions all the secondary concepts inspired by the concepts or the images]. 
Excluding his theological drama Nathan der Weise (1779), however, statements like this remain 
relatively scarce in Lessing’s theological writings, and after reading his Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts it becomes clear that all the imaginative labor is understood more as 
scaffolding that needs to be kicked away once human reason reaches a certain stage of maturity. 
More will be said about this paradox in the following chapter on Novalis. To support the claims of 
this section, however, I will work through Lessing’s Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, 
which clarifies the epistemic status of history in theological discourse and the Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts, which performs what I am calling Lessing’s theology of spirit by presenting 
an interpretation of history that shows revealed knowledge to play a vital role in the progress 
humanity. 
                                               
357 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, p. 
523. Translation mine. 
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Before turning to these texts, however, it should be noted that Lessing’s distinction between 
the letter and the spirit of religion is by no means an original insight within the history of Christian 
thought. The distinction has been applied in vastly different contexts and has itself been subject to 
historical transformations. It was already used in the Epistles of Paul to declare mankind competent 
ministers of a new covenant with God;358 it was taken up again by Irenaeus of Lyons in the second 
century to discredit gnostic interpretations of scripture;359 and later still by Spinoza in the 
seventeenth century to prevent a corrupt clergy from further legitimizing superstitious beliefs and 
practices.360 However, Lessing’s reoccupation of the distinction is unique in that he directs it 
towards solving a specific problem within enlightenment theology, namely, its inclination to 
fetishize the Buchstabe, which Lessing called “Bibliolatrie.”361 What does this mean? Again, it 
means accepting only that part of scripture standing in the “natural light of reason”; it means 
paraphrasing the Word of God to appease popular morality; it means adopting Wolffian methods 
                                               
358 See 2 Corinthians, 3:1–3, “You yourselves are our letter, written on our hearts, known and read by 
everyone. You show that you are a letter from Christ, the result of our ministry, written not with ink but 
with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts.” 
359 See Irenaeus, On Heresies, section 4.2: “Many foreign peoples believe in Christ and […] possess 
salvation, written by the Spirit in their hearts without paper or ink.” In Grant, Robert M. Irenaeus of 
Lyons. Routledge, 1997, p. 96. 
360 See Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, ed. 
Jonathan Israel, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, Chapter 13: “I fear that [my adversaries] 
are too anxious to be pious, and that they are in danger of turning religion into superstition, and 
worshipping paper and ink in place of God’s Word.” 
361 In his posthumously published Theologische Nachlass (1784), Lessing comes close to expressing this 
view himself in his essay Bibliolatrie, which was intended to be worked into his collection of writings 
titled Sogennante Briefe an verschiedene Gottesgelehrte though he never completely finished it before his 
death. In the essay, Lessing writes: “Ich verstehe unter Bibliolatrie diejenige Verehrung, welche man für 
die Bibel und besonders für die Bücher des N. Testaments zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschiedentlich 
gefordert hat” [By Bibliolatry I understand the veneration which has been demanded at various times for 
the Bible, and especially for the books of the New Testament]. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und 
Briefe: In Zwölf Bänden. Band 10. Hrsg. Von Arno Schilson und Axel Schmitt. Deutscher Klassiker 
Verlag, 1985.  p. 165. Translation mine. 
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to fortify theological doctrines against external criticism. In short, it means to bind oneself to the 
logos of scripture as though it were the primary object of faith instead of the underlying ethos that 
gave rise to scripture in the first place,362 a situation that, as discussed in the previous section, 
developed out of Luther’s doctrine of sola scriptura. The Beweis essay demonstrates that Lessing 
paid much greater attention to the historical context(s) of the biblical tradition (i.e. its transmission 
from the Early Church to the eighteenth century) than many of his contemporaries. Above all, it 
shows that he was more interested in the potential effects of scripture than the supposed “truth” of 
its origins, which ultimately made him less bound to the prevailing philological paradigms of his 
day. 
As I argued in the previous section, Lessing’s conception of spirit breathed new life into 
the letter/spirit distinction by reversing the hierarchy that Luther helped to establish. As a result, 
Lessing reshaped the discourse on “Geist,” which continued to preoccupy many of his peers and 
successors, who developed the aesthetic underpinnings of his theology.363 For instance, in the 
1780s and 1790s Kant made room for the aesthetic in his religious thought, if one considers the 
linchpins of his categorical imperative and moral proof of God’s existence to turn on their aesthetic, 
“as if” statements; that is, to think and act as if there was a God and as if our guiding maxims were 
at the same time universal maxims. Fichte, for his part, closely followed Lessing by wedding an 
                                               
362 Kant also develops this idea in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) and in his Religion 
innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793). In the latter he argues that taking the letter for the 
spirit is a “perversion of the heart that reverses the ethical order.” See part I, section II (6:30f). According 
to Kant, “a perversion of the heart” is the result of a “depraved moral disposition,” whereby a person acts 
virtuously merely because the letter of the moral law commands it. By contrast, if a person acts virtuously 
because the spirit of the law (i.e. the categorical imperative) incentivizes him to do so, then his actions 
acquire moral worth. 
363 See my chapter 2, section II. 
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aesthetic sense of spirit to Bildung. According to Fichte, spirit is defined as the productive 
imagination’s “Vermögen Gefühle zum Bewußtseyn zu erheben”364 [capacity to raise feelings to 
consciousness], which involves translating the immanent, self-activity of the “I” into mutually 
serviceable representations that inspire others to develop new and original representations of their 
own.365 In other words, spirit inspires spirit, according to Fichte’s definition, and when this 
capacity is ascribed to the bible itself, a dialogical relation between scripture and an individual 
reader, community, or epoch becomes possible. Hegel also made use of Lessing’s concept of spirit, 
secularizing it and then applying it to his history of art, in which the tripartite logical structure of 
Lessing’s Erziehung finds expression in the development of classical, symbolic, and romantic art 
forms.366 Finally, Lessing’s conception of spirit—as a constitutive feature of scripture that 
constantly needs to be reinterpreted—represents an early step towards Romantic irony, which 
Friedrich Schlegel described as being “instinctive” for Lessing.367 This instinct continues to be 
                                               
364 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, Von den Pflichten der Gelehrten: Jenaer Vorlesungen 1794/95, hrsg. von 
Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacob, Peter K. Schneider, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1971, p. 59. 
365 See Fichte, Über den Unterschied des Geistes, und des Buchstabens in der Philosophie.  Here Fichte 
writes, “[...] der Geist überhaupt, oder die productive Einbildungskraft läßt sich demnach beschreiben als 
ein Vermögen Gefühle zum Bewußtseyn zu erheben [...] er [Der geistvolle] muß, um mit andern in 
Wechselwirkung treten zu können, eine Erscheinung, die seine geistige Idee ausdrückt, insoweit der 
Körper den Geist ausdrücken kann, außer sich hervorbringen; er tut das, heißt es, wenn gesagt wird, er 
stellt den Geist im Körper dar“  [spirit as such, or productive imagination, may be described as a capacity 
for raising feelings to consciousness […] All he [a person with spirit] wanted to do was to enter into 
reciprocal interaction with another person. By means of his bodily presentation he only wished to provide 
the other person with an occasion for developing through his own efforts those spiritual ideas which dwell 
within him.”  Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Von den Pflichten Der Gelehrten: Jenaer Vorlesungen 1794/95. 
Meiner, 1971, pp. 59-62.  Translation by Daniel Breazeale. See. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1762-1814. 
Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press, 1988. 
366 Sections 85–90 of Lessing’s Erziehung were especially important to the logical structures of Hegel’s 
thought. In these sections Lessing develops the idea of the “three ages of the world,” in which the New 
Testament supersedes the Old Testament, and an even newer “eternal covenant” is poised to supersede the 
New Testament. 
367 In his Kritische Fragmente (no.108), Schlegel writes: “Sie [Irony] enthält und erregt ein Gefühl von 
dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und 
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present even in more recent scholarship like that of Gianni Vattimo, who affirms the need for a 
dialogical relationship with the Word of God by claiming that “salvation takes place through 
interpretation.”368 However, to fully flesh out the skeleton of this forward-looking intellectual 
history would exceed my purpose, though it is worth mentioning if only to show that the 
significance of Lessing’s concept of spirit extends well beyond the immediate concerns of the 
fragment controversy. 
Lessing’s Beweis essay is a short polemic addressed to the orthodox Lutheran theologian 
Johann Daniel Schumann, who, in his treatise Über die Evidenz der Beweise für die Wahrheit der 
Christlichen Religion (1778), rejected the controversial claim of Reimarus’ second fragment that 
holds “it is not possible to believe in revelation on rational grounds.”369 Adhering to Siegmund 
Baumgarten’s methodology and completely ignoring the arguments that Lessing put forward in his 
Gegensätze, Schumann built an elaborate “historical proof” using witness testimony in the New 
Testament to demonstrate that Christianity did in fact rest on sound truth.370 To begin his argument, 
Schumann cited Origen’s Contra Celsum (248 CE), an apologetic treatise written by a Church 
Father deemed heretical by the Second Council of Constantiople in 553. In this work, Origen 
                                               
Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mitteilung. […] Lessings Ironie ist Instinkt” [Irony contains and 
arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the 
impossibility and the necessity of complete communication […] For Lessing, irony is instinct]. In 
Schlegel, Friedrich von, Ausgewählte Werke: 1772-1829.  Dom-Verlag, 1922, p. 207. Modified 
translation mine. 
368 Vattimo, Gianni, Belief, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 60. The full passage reads: 
“From the perspective of religious experience, the actuality of hermeneutics, which with good reason 
regards itself as the philosophy of modernity, means that for us, more than in past epochs, salvation takes 
place through interpretation.” 
369 See Reimarus’ zweite Fragment, titled “Unmöglichkeit einer Offenbarung, die alle Menschen auf eine 
gegründete Art Glauben könnten.” 
370 See especially Schumann’s “Historische Gewißheit der neutestamentlichen Wunderwerke, dargetan 
aus dem Zeugnis aller Christen, die zur Zeit Jesu und der Apostel, aus dem Zeugnis der frühesten Ketzer, 
aus dem Zeugnis der Apostel. Authenticität dieses Zeugnisses.” 
 
 152 
attempted to elevate the status of Christian proof (i.e. revealed truth) for an audience accustomed 
to Greek methods of proof (i.e. dialectics). Origen’s opponent, Celsus, argued that Christians must 
“use sundry methods of persuasion, and invent a number of terrifying incentives” to convert their 
followers and that “only a blind faith can explain the hold that Jesus has on [the Christian’s] 
imagination.”371 “Above all,” Celsus objects, “they have concocted an absolutely offensive 
doctrine of everlasting punishments and rewards, exceeding anything the philosophers could have 
imagined.”372 Origen defends the doctrine of eternal reward and punishment, asserting that it 
provides a public service by helping people conduct themselves in accordance with virtue 
irrespective of whether or not this end is achieved through rational arguments.373 However, 
Origen’s apology is not limited to just the moral ends of Christianity; he also reflects on the 
effectiveness of the means, acknowledging, together with Celsus, that Greeks are perhaps better at 
judging human wisdom than Christians.374 According to Origen, if Christians make use of Greek 
                                               
371 Celsus, On the True Doctrine: A Discourse Against the Christians, trans. R. Joseph Hoffman, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 61. 
372 Ibid., p. 70. Another major source of concern for Celsus was the Christians’ seemingly hostile 
relationship to the law. On this he writes: “societies which are public are allowed by the laws, but secret 
societies are illegal.” Celsus was especially opposed to the Christian doctrine of love insofar as it 
appeared to stand above law. 
373 Origen writes: “Moreover, concerning the multitude of believers who have renounced the great flood 
of evil in which they formerly used to wallow, we ask this question—is it better that those who believe 
without thought [i.e. blindly] should somehow have been made reformed characters and be helped by the 
belief that they are punished for sin and rewarded for good works, or that we should not allow them to be 
converted with simple faith until they might devote themselves to the study of rational arguments?” 
Origen, Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, 1:9, 
p. 12. 
374 Elsewhere, Origen stresses the distinction between human and divine wisdom. Whereas “worldly 
things” incentivizes human wisdom, divine wisdom concerns “eternal things.” He writes: “Human 
teachings, for example, the art of grammar or rhetoric or even dialectic. Nothing should be taken from this 
teaching for sacrifice, that is, for what is to be thought about God. But it is commanded that clarity in 
speech and the glory of eloquence and the skill of argumentation be fittingly admitted to the ministry of 
God’s word.” See Balthasar, Hans Urs von, ed., Origen: Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His 
Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001, p. 207. 
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wisdom and methods to ground their doctrines, then Christianity might carry broader appeal. 
Origen hoped that by appealing to the disposition of the Greeks they might help to improve the 
presentation of its doctrines. Ideally this would lead to more conversions and allow him to assert 
the truth of Christianity by indexing its practical implementation among the Greeks: “A man 
coming to the gospel from Greek conceptions and training would not only judge that it was true, 
but would also put it into practice and so prove it to be correct; and he would complete what 
seemed to be lacking judged by the criterion of a Greek proof, thus establishing the truth of 
Christianity.”375 
Unlike Origen, Schumann’s apology showed little interest in making concessions to his 
opponents. Rather, he viewed deists like Reimarus and literary figures like Lessing simply as 
external threats to the Lutheran Church. Schumann’s allusion to Origen at the start of his treatise 
served to conflate the ancient quarrel with modern controversies that were caused by the fragments. 
In fact, Schumann explicitly reduced the significance of Reimarus’ fragments to a mere renewal 
of ancient hostilities between secular and religious cultures: “The old complaint about the 
deficiency of evidence still drags on,” Schumann lamented. “However much divine proof has been 
put into perspective, one still seeks to avoid it, and our more recent enemies of religion do so with 
even greater subtlety; the more knowledge of philosophy and literature they acquire, the more 
                                               
375 Origen, Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, 1:2, 
emphasis added. The passage is central for both Schumann and Lessing; it continues: “Moreover, we have 
to say this, that the gospel has a proof which is peculiar to itself, and which is more divine than a Greek 
proof based on dialectical argument. This more divine demonstration the apostle [Paul] calls a 
‘demonstration of the Spirit and of power’—of spirit because of the prophecies and especially those 
which refer to Christ, which are capable of convincing anyone who reads them; of power because of the 
prodigious miracles which may be proved to have happened by this argument among many others, that 
traces of them still remain among those who live according to the will of the Logos” (p. 8). 
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excuses they find to avoid it.”376 Schumann misappropriated Origen’s apologetic writings to 
suggest that the Early Church Father had already solved the problem of evidence for Christianity 
and that the unnamed author of the fragments should just go back and read Origen to restore his 
faith.377 Yet this gesture ignores the vast and complex history separating the Early Church from 
the Protestant Church of the eighteenth century. In my view, a major difference between Origen 
and Schumann is that the former actually engaged with his conversation partner and showed an 
interest in using the methods of his adversary to “complete what seems to be lacking” in Christian 
proofs. There is, in other words, a sense of tolerance that permeates Origen’s apology.378 
Schumann, by contrast, viewed Lessing and Reimarus as enemies that either needed to be 
censored, or beaten into submission by reasserting historical “facts,” which did little to resolve the 
specific contradictions discussed in the fragments.379 
                                               
376 “Die alte Klage über die Mangelhaftigkeit des Beweises dauert noch fort. So sehr auch jener göttliche 
Beweis nachher ins licht gesetzt worden, sucht man doch demselben auszuweichen, und die neueren 
Religionsfeinde tun das mit desto größerer Spitzfindigkeit, je mehr sie Kenntnis der Philosophie und 
Literatur in den Stand setzt, scheinbare Ausflüchte zu finden finden.” Schumann, Johann Daniel, Über die 
Evidenz der Beweise für die Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion, in Lessing, E.G. Werke und Briefe: Zur 
Geschichte und Literatur: Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker 
Verlag, 1989, p. 358. 
377 In some ways, the preface of Contra Celsum is itself complicit in this reading. Here Origen describes 
his target audience as “those of weak faith” and he refers them back to Paul to strengthen their resolve. He 
writes: “This book is not written at all for true Christians, but either for those entirely without experience 
of faith in Christ, or for those whom the apostle [Paul] calls, ‘weak in faith’; for he says this: ‘Him that is 
weak in faith receive ye’ [Romans, 14:1].” Origen, Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1953, 1:6, p. 6. 
378 Origen’s writings on “Human Wisdom and Divine Wisdom” offer some of the clearest expressions of 
his tolerance: “If we sometimes come across something which has been said wisely by the pagans, we 
should not immediately spurn what was said just because of the author’s name; nor is it right for us, 
because we observe God’s law, to spurn the words of prudent people. We should do as the Apostle says: 
‘Test everything; hold fast what is good’ (1 Thess 5:21).” In Balthasar, Hans Urs von, ed., Origen: Spirit 
and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly, Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2001, p. 207. 
379 See my chapter 2, section I for a gloss on these specific contradictions. 
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Lessing was so unsettled by Schumann’s reading of Origen that he changed the entire tone 
of his theological writings to polemics. In fact, he began his Beweis essay by likening Schumann 
to Erysichtthon, a character in Ovid’s Metamorphosis who was cursed by the goddess of 
agriculture (Ceres) for desecrating a sacred forest. As punishment Erysichtthon experienced a 
devastating famine that drove him to eat anything he could get his hands on—even selling his 
daughter for food. In a final act of absurd desperation, Erysichtthon tried to satisfy his hunger by 
eating the air and eventually his own limbs.380 “Ich hungere nach Überzeugung so sehr,” Lessing 
wrote, “daß ich, wie Erischton, alles verschlinge, was einem Nahrungsmittel nur ähnlich sieht"381 
[I hunger so greatly for conviction that, like Erysichtthon, I devour anything that looks remotely 
like food]. Even though the “ich” seems to project Lessing into the figure of Erysichton, it is far 
more likely that he conjured up this myth to satirize theologians like Schumann, who relied on 
historical evidence to nourish their faith in Christianity. As far as Lessing was concerned, 
Schumann—and others like him—would do anything to prove that the truths of Christianity were 
necessary and universal. However, as the main argument of Lessing’s Beweis essay emphatically 
states, “zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können der Beweis von notwendigen Vernunftswahrheiten 
nie warden”382 [it is not possible to derive necessary or absolute claims from historically contingent 
ones], and any effort to distort this amounts to a deception—like convincing oneself that eating 
the air could satisfy one’s hunger. 
                                               
380 See Ovid’s Metamorphosis, Book VII, lines 725–884. 
381 Lessing, Werke und Briefe: Zur Geschichte und Literatur, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt 
am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 439. 
382 The exact quote reads: “zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können der Beweis von notwendigen 
Vernunftswahrheiten nie werden” [contingent truths of history can never become the proof of necessary 
truths of reason]. Ibid., p. 441. 
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Lessing’s Beweis essay corrects Schumann’s reading of Origen by urging enlightenment 
theology to search for “Zeit angemessenere Beweise”383 [other kinds of evidence more appropriate 
to his time]. The problem was that Schumann omitted an essential detail when he cited Origen. To 
acknowledge the oversight, Lessing used Schumann’s omitted detail as the epigraph for his essay, 
making it the starting point for his critique against historical proofs. After going back to the original 
source, Lessing noticed that the binding force of religion is not limited to just historical proofs, 
which he makes explicit almost immediately in the Beweis essay through the following passage: 
Den Origens anführen, und ihn sagen lassen, “daß der Beweis der Kraft wegen der 
erstaunlichen Wunder so heiße, die zur Bestätigung der Lehre Christi geschehen,” 
ist nicht allzuwohl getan wenn man das, was unmittelbar bei dem Origenes darauf 
folgt, seinen Lesern verschweigt. Denn die Leser werden den Origenes auch 
aufschlagen, und mit Befremden finden, daß er die Wahrheit jener bei der 
Grundlegung des Christentums geschehenen Wunder, ἐκ πολλων μεν ἀλλων, und 
also aus der Erzählung der Evangelisten wohl mit, aber doch vornehmlich und 
namentlich aus den Wundern erweiset, die noch damals geschahen.384 
 
[To quote Origen to the effect that “the proof of power is so called on account of 
the prodigious miracles which have taken place to confirm the teachings of Christ” 
is not very helpful if one omits to tell one’s readers what Origen says immediately 
afterwards. For these readers will consult Origen and discover to their astonishment 
that he demonstrates the truth of these miracles which occurred at the foundations 
of Christianity “by this argument among many others,” i.e. from the narrative of 
the evangelists among many other things, but primarily and specifically through the 
miracles which were still happening then.] 
For Lessing, the citation of Origen in Schumann’s introduction was “not very helpful” to 
its readers because it appeared as if the truth of Christianity rested entirely on historical testimony, 
when in fact Origen viewed history as just one means “among many other[s]”385 in which religious 
                                               
383 Ibid., p. 440. 
384 Ibid., p. 440–41. 
385 This holds true elsewhere in Origen as well. In his writings on the letter of religion (“From word-
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subjects could bind themselves to their faith. According to Lessing, Schumann’s preference for 
historical proof was held up by his belief in the inerrancy of scripture,386 which claims that the 
bible—in its “original manuscripts”387—is void of any errors with respect to its teachings since the 
authors were divinely inspired. To undermine this theory, Lessing claimed that the belief in 
scripture’s inerrancy is itself “no more than historically certain.”388 More central to Lessing’s 
                                               
scripture to word-spirit”) he argues that “The kingdom of heaven is likened to a net of varied texture 
because the scripture of the old and new testament is woven together from all kinds of variegated 
thoughts. And just as with the fishes that fall into the net, some are found in one part of the net and others 
in another, and each in the part where it was caught, so too will you find in the case of those who have 
come into the net of the scriptures that some have been caught by the prophetic net, others by the net of 
the law, and others by that of the gospel, and some by the apostolic net. In Balthasar, Hans Urs von, ed., 
Origen: Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly, Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2001, p. 95. 
386 For a sense of Schumann’s views on the inerrancy of scripture see the section of his treatise titled 
“Ohngeachtet der Evidenz der Beweise ist der göttliche Glaube dennoch notwendig” [Regardless of the 
evidence, divine faith is nevertheless necessary]. Here he writes, for instance, “Ich nehme die bemerkten 
Zeugnisse der Schrift von der übernatürlichen Wirkung der Gnade mit aufrichtigem herzen und nach 
ihrem wahren Sinne an. Ich erkenne die Notwendigkeit einer göttlichen Befestigung der Seele, auch bei 
dem Gelehrten, der die Stärke menschlicher Überzeugungsmittel in ihrer ganzen Kraft fühlt; und finde in 
dieser Behauptung nichts, welches mit der Natur unsers Verstandes in einem Streite läge” [I accept the 
written testimonies grounded on the supernatural effects of grace with a sincere heart and according to 
their true sense. I recognize the necessity of a divine attachment of the soul, even to the scholar, who feels 
the strength of human means of persuasion in all its power; and find nothing in this assertion which would 
be in conflict with the nature of our reason]. From Über die Evidenz der Beweise, in Lessing, Werke und 
Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 366–
68. Translation mine. 
387 The assumption that the “original manuscripts” of scripture have been transmitted without any 
“corruption” is a highly fraught claim. For a discussion of how theologians in the eighteenth century 
learned ancient Greek and Hebrew in order to clear up controversies that were detrimental to Church 
doctrines, see Karl Aner’s Theologie der Lessingzeit, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964. Aner argues that 
theologians used their knowledge of ancient languages to alter the canon, rejecting certain manuscripts 
that conflicted with their doctrines by claiming that they were added after the original manuscripts had 
been written (i.e. they were not divinely inspired and could therefore be forgotten). 
388 See both Lessing’s Beweis and his Axiomata, where he engages with Goeze on this same issue. Here 
he writes that he opposes not only Goeze, but also Luther and “the entire Wittenberg compendia”: Die 
historischen Worte sind das Vehiculum des prophetischen Wortes. Ein Vehiculum aber soll und darf die 
Kraft der Natur der Arzenei nicht haben” [The historical words are the vehicle for the prophetic word. But 
a vehicle should not and cannot have the strength and nature of the medicine it contains]. Lessing, 
Axiomata, II (4). In: Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, 
Band III, p 452. 
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attack, however, was the fact that enlightenment theologians continued to advance historical 
arguments for the truth of Christianity, which was about as legitimate as Schumann’s reading of 
Origen. Lessing described the problem by putting it into perspective, claiming that if he had lived 
during the times of Origen and saw miracles and fulfilled prophecies first hand, then there would 
be no room for doubt. “Aber ich,” Lessing writes, “der auch nicht einmal mehr in dem Falle des 
Origenes bin; der ich dem 18ten Jahrhunderte lebe, in welchem es keine Wunder mehr giebt; wenn 
ich anstehe, noch jetzt […] zu glauben […] woran liegt es?”389 [But if I, who am no longer in 
Origen’s position, live in the eighteenth century in which miracles no longer happen, if I hesitate 
now to believe why is this so?]. Lessing “hesitates” because the medium of history is itself 
inadequate to the task of demonstrating the necessity of Christian truth: “Daß Nachrichten von 
erfüllten Weissagungen nicht erfüllte Weissagungen sind; daß Nachrichten von Wunder nicht 
Wunder sind” [reports of fulfilled prophecies are not fulfilled prophecies; reports of miracles are 
not miracles]. This much is non-negotiable for Lessing. Anyone who denies this must absurdly 
assume, along with Schumann, that there is no epistemic difference between reading testimonies 
of events and directly experiencing them.390 To drive his point home, Lessing poses the following 
                                               
389 Lessing, Beweis, in Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche 
Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 440. 
390 With respect to his argument, Lessing makes no distinction between sacred and secular histories. In 
fact, he includes an example of Alexander the Great’s life to advance his point: “Wir alle glauben, daß ein 
Alexander gelebt hat, welcher in kurzer Zeit fast ganz Asien besiegte […] Wer wollte, diesem Glauben zu 
Folge, aller Kenntnis auf ewig abschwören, die mit diesem Glauben stritte? Ich wahrlich nicht. Ich habe 
jetzt gegen den Alexander und seine Siege nichts einzuwenden: aber es wäre doch möglich, daß sie sich 
eben so wohl auf ein bloßes Gedicht des Choerilus, welcher den Alexander überall begleitete, gründeten, 
als die zehn-jährige Belagerung von Troja sich auf weiter nichts, als auf die Gedichte des Homers 
gründet” [We all believe that someone called Alexander lived who in a short time conquered almost the 
whole of Asia […] Who, as a result of this belief, would permanently disavow all knowledge that 
conflicted with this belief. I certainly would not. I have at present no objection to raise against Alexander 
and his victories; but it might still be possible that they were based on a mere poem of Choerilus, who 
accompanied Alexander everywhere, just as the ten-year siege of Troy is based on nothing more than the 
poems of Homer]. Ibid., 442. 
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rhetorical question: “[…] ist ohne Ausnahme, was ich bei glaubwürdigen Geschichtschreibern 
lese, für mich eben so gewiß, als was ich selbst erfahre?” [is what I read from reliable historians 
invariably just as certain as what I experience myself?]. 
Here, at the center of the fragment controversy, the problem of doubting Thomas finds 
expression in the crisis of historical proof that has consumed enlightenment theology. However, 
unlike Klopstock, Lessing did not attempt to overcome religious skepticism by introducing a new 
poetic language (i.e. using poetry to increase the affective force of biblical history); unlike neology, 
he did not seek to maintain and preserve church doctrine by overlooking ignominious details of 
scripture (i.e. “harmonizing” revelation with reason); unlike deism, he did not reject revealed 
knowledge on rational grounds;391 finally, unlike orthodox Lutherans, he did not view biblical 
history as free of contradiction. Rather, Lessing lifts himself out of the quagmire of historical 
proofs by looking for evidence elsewhere. If, Lessing asks, history can no longer bind modernity 
to its faith, then what does? “Was verbindet mich denn dazu” [What, then, binds me to my faith]. 
His answer: “Nichts, als diese Lehren selbst” [Nothing but the teachings themselves]. As I have 
already suggested elsewhere, this solution locates the binding force of Christianity in the ethos 
embedded in the stories of the bible rather than in a higher logos (or pathos) made available through 
a specialized understanding of history or through rigorous intellectual labor. In fact, Lessing 
reminds his audience that the teachings were designed to “help common sense find the right 
track.”392 For Lessing, this movement, which I would describe as a movement from the page to 
                                               
391 This is explicit in his Beweis essay: “Ich leugne gar nicht, daß in Christus Weissagungen erfüllt 
worden; ich leugne gar nicht, daß Christus Wunder getan” [I do not deny for a moment that prophecies 
were fulfilled by Christ; I do not deny for a moment that Christ performed miracles]. Ibid., p. 444. 
392 The complete German quote reads, “Die Menge aber auf etwas aufmerksam machen, heißt, den 
gesunden Menschenverstand auf die Spur helfen.” Ibid., p. 444. The link between common sense and the 
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the heart, can only be measured by the efficacy of the stories (i.e. how well they condition their 
reader to willfully reproduce the underlying ethos in a very mundane sense). In other words, to 
ascertain the truth of Christianity one does not need to force the outward facts of history into a 
closed rational system; rather its legitimacy can be proved independent of history by evaluating 
how well the ethical doctrines of the stories serve practical life. 
After Lessing articulates his main argument against historical proofs, he significantly 
changes the style of his writing. He stops offering arguments and becomes more figurative in his 
use of language.393 Consider, for instance, Lessing’s appeal to the experiential value of short, 
powerful narratives at the end of his Beweis essay. Here Lessing’s theology clearly pivots away 
from historical veracity by attempting to ground the legitimacy of a story on the potential effects 
that it occasions in a reader: 
Diese Früchte sähe ich vor mir reifen und gereift, und ich sollte mich damit nicht 
sättigen dürfen? Weil ich die alte fromme Sage, daß die Hand, die den Samen dazu 
ausgestreuet, sich siebenmal bei jedem Wurfe in Schneckenblute waschen 
müssen—nicht etwa legnete, nicht etwa bezweifelte—sondern bloß an ihren Ort 
gestellt sein ließe?—Was kümmert es mich, ob die Sage falsch oder wahr ist: die 
Früchte sind trefflich.394 
 
                                               
metaphor of the heart was central to pietism. Gadamer explains in his Truth and Method how Christoph 
Friedrich Oetinger translated Shaftesbury’s essay on Sensus Communis: “the pietist Oetinger explicitly 
relied on Shaftesbury’s defense of the sensus communis. We find sensus communis translated simply as 
‘heart’ and the following description: ‘The sensus communis is concerned only with things that all men 
see daily before them, things that hold an entire society together, things that are concerned as much with 
truths and statements as with the arrangements and patterns comprised in statements’” (p. 25–26). 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 
393 Insofar as his conception of spirit unfolds along metaphorical lines, Lessing’s use of the term breaks 
with the Hebrew tradition that uses the term “ruah” [wind or breath] for spirit, which gives it with a sense 
of phenomenal concreteness, something which Tertullian (in opposition to Origen) fought vigorously to 
preserve. 
394 Lessing, Beweis, in Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher 
Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 444. 
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[And if I see these fruits ripening and ripened before me, am I not supposed to eat 
my fill of them? Because, while I did not deny or doubt the pious old legend that 
the hand which scattered the seed had to wash seven times in snails’ blood before 
each throw, I simply disregarded it? What does it matter to me whether the old 
legend is true or false? The fruits are excellent.] 
By investing subjective experience with just as much authority as a historical proof, 
Lessing pays lip service to pietism,395 which held practical wisdom above historical veracity and 
tradition. At the same time, for Lessing to legitimize the “pious old legend” even though it appears 
shot through with superstition represents a provocation insofar as enlightenment theology worked 
tirelessly to dilute superstition through a variety of means, including its translation practices.396 
More importantly, the central image of “eating excellent fruits” not only recalls Paul’s Letter to 
the Galatians, in which he urged community members to follow the spirit of the law rather than 
its letter,397 but it also smuggles in the aesthetic category of taste, which, is more concerned with 
establishing norms rather than determining objective truth. In the passage, Lessing essentially 
describes legends (containing miracles and prophecies) in terms of their mythological status, 
implying that they should not be dismissed because they lack demonstrative power in a 
                                               
395 In his Pia Desideria Johann Spener worked through related problems and used a similar language to 
confront those problems. At the time, he was concerned about the different religious sects constantly 
disputing the letter of religion, arguing that these polemicists “think that everything has turned out well if 
only they know how to give [the correct] answer to the errors of the papists, the Reformed, the 
Anabaptists, etc. They pay no attention [however] to the fruits of those articles of faith [under dispute], 
which we presumably still hold in common with them or of those rules of morality which are 
acknowledged by us all.” See Spener, Philipp Jacob, Pia Desideria, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Fortress 
Press, 1964, p. 49. 
396 Jonathan Sheehan writes that “in the case of the demoniacs, then, modernization demanded rewriting 
the Jewish superstition of spiritual possession as a form of ordinary madness. Possession might have rung 
true to the ancient Hebrew ear, but it would not do for the modern German one.” The Enlightenment 
Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 140. 
397 The image also calls back to Paul’s Letter to the Galatians (5:22) in which he too prioritizes practical 
wisdom over the letter of the law: “the fruit of the Spirit [as] love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.” 
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philosophical sense.398 Rather, the power of the “legends” is demonstrated immanently through 
their ability to shape the moral universe within. Here, in the “inner truth” of religion, as Lessing 
puts it elsewhere,399 is where enlightenment theologians should search for the fruits of their 
conviction. After all, it was the inner truth of religion, according to Lessing, that prompted the 
evangelists to compose their “legends” in the first place: “Die Religion ist nicht wahr, weil die 
Evangelisten und Apostel sie lehrten: sondern sie lehrten sie, weil sie wahr ist. Aus ihrer innern 
Wahrheit müssen die schriftlichen Überlieferungen erklärt werden, und all schriftliche 
Überlieferungen können ihr keine innere Wahrheit geben, wenn sie keine hat“400 [The religion is 
not true because the evangelists and apostles taught it; on the contrary, they taught it because it is 
true. The written records must be explained by its inner truth, and none of the written records can 
give it any inner truth if it does not already have it]. 
 However, the “inner truth” of religion should not be understood as a vulgar form of 
subjectivism that stands in hostile opposition to the letter of religion or hermeneutic conventions 
more generally. As Lessing explains to Goeze, who challenged this aspect of his theology,401 
                                               
398 Of course Reimarus’ “solution” to the problem of evidence was to reject Christianity wholesale. 
399 See Lessing’s Gegensätze and also his Axiomata X. 
400 Lessing, Gegensätze, in Werke und Briefe, Band 8, hrsg. von Arno Schilson, Frankfurt am Main, 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 313. 
401 Goeze feared that Lessing was setting a bad precedent in the way he distinguished between the letter 
and spirit of religion. In the opening paragraph of his Etwas Vorläufiges he invoked Luther’s confession 
on the sacrament of communion, writing: “Wer so kühn ist, dass er tut Gott leugnen und Lügen strafen in 
einem Worte, und tut solches mutwillig wieder und über das, so er ein oder zwei mal ermahnet oder 
unterrichtet ist, der tut Gott in allen Worten leugnen und Lügen strafen. Darum heißt es rund und rein, 
ganz und alles geglaubt, oder nichts geglaubt. Die heilige Schrift läßt sich nicht trennen oder theilen, daß 
sie ein Stück sollte wahrhaftig, und das andere falsch lehren und glauben laßen” [Anyone who is so bold 
that he denies and blasphemes against God in one word, and wilfully does so again and again, if he is 
once or twice admonished or taught, will deny and blaspheme against God in every word. That is why we 
are told, pure and simple, believe everything or nothing at all. Holy Scripture cannot be separated or 
divided, so that one part is believed to instruct truly, another falsely]. Goeze, Melchior Johann. “Etwas 
Vorläufiges…” in Goezes Streitschriften gegen Lessing, hrsg. von Erich Schmidt, in Deutsche 
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“Wenn [die Absichten der Ausleger] keine innere Güte haben: so können die Religionssätze, die 
er mir beibringen will, auch keine innere Wahrheit haben. Die innere Wahrheit ist keine wächserne 
Nase, die sich jeder Schelm nach seinem Gesichte bossieren kann, wie er will“402 [If the 
interpreter’s intentions have no inner goodness, then the religious propositions which he wishes to 
impart to me can have no inner truth either. The inner truth is not a wax nose which any rogue can 
shape to fit his face as he pleases.] In other words, the integrity of a spiritual reading of scripture 
depends on how well an exegete captures the inner truth of religion through a particular reading of 
it, much like Lessing described to Mendelssohn in his letter. 
In my view Lessing does not, as some scholars have implied, “dispense” with biblical 
history, but instead he asks his modern readers to bring a different Denkungsart403 [manner of 
thinking] to it.404 For example, Lessing’s argument against historical proofs does not seek to 
secularize religion and its history (as Schumann feared), though it does attempt to secularize 
human reason, which, in the context of enlightenment theology, was trained to treat scripture as it 
                                               
Litteraturdenkmale des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts, Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein: Nendeln, 1968, p. 4. 
Translation mine. 
402 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, Band III, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, p. 
467.Translation mine.  
403 If one looks back far enough, the manner of historical thinking that Lessing advocates is not so 
“different” or “new.” It would perhaps be better described in Blumenbergian terms as a reoccupation of 
the interpretive practices of the Church Fathers to confront the absolutism of “scientific” theology that 
flourished during the Enlightenment. A good source on the subject of the interpretive practices of Early 
Church is the chapter on “Figura” in Eric Auerbach and Paolo Valesio, Scenes from the Drama of 
European Literature, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
404 In his otherwise excellent study on Novalis, Nicholas Saul claims that Lessing’s Beweis essay 
encourages readers to “think of the historical document and the event as secondary, if not quite 
conclusively dispensable” (p. 29). See Saul, Nicholas, History and Poetry in Novalis and in the Tradition 
of the German Enlightenment, London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1984. John 
Smith reaches a similar conclusion in his Dialogues between Faith and Reason, claiming that if historical 
truths “become a burden, we can drop them without fear” (p. 82). See Smith, John H., Dialogues between 
Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in Modern German Thought, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2011. 
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did God, namely as absolute, omnipotent, and transhistorical. This different manner of thinking is 
admittedly dangerous insofar as it reduces the significance of Christianity to its spiritual history, 
in which case the urgency of knowing the particular historical facts diminishes. However, parts of 
the Old Testament already exhibit the manner of thinking that Lessing advocates. For instance, the 
psalmists who composed the so-called ascent psalms ascent psalms (120–134) interpreted the 
historical conquest of Palestine anagogically, as a kind of upward ascent or pilgrimage to the 
“promised land,” sweeping the particularities of that history into a (Zionist) narrative about 
salvation.405 There will be further occasion to explore the implications of this danger in the 
following chapter on Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa, but for now it is worth 
acknowledging before considering some of the salient features of Lessing’s Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts in which he offers a spiritual reading of Christian history in terms of its 
salvific potential. In this text, Lessing interprets the bible not as an empirical history that discloses 
a set of binding laws to be obeyed, but rather as signs that reveal the edifying potential of history—
as signs that demand interpretation and re-interpretation. 
It is already evident from the preface of Lessing’s Erziehung that he reads biblical history 
more in terms of signs that serve to dimly illuminate future pathways for humanity’s improvement, 
rather than as a set of facts needing to be verified prior to any confession of faith. However, before 
turning to the preface some attention must be paid to the epigraph Lessing includes. He again cites 
an Early Church Father, this time Augustine, who, in his Soliloquies, sustains a fictitious dialogue 
                                               
405 Compare lines 3–8 of Psalm 121, which speak of the Lord as a “keeper,” or guardian of Jerusalem with 
Exodus 23:20, which assures the pilgrim: “I am going to send an angel in front of you, to guard you on 
the way and to bring you to the place that I have prepared.” 
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with himself and (personified) reason to search for knowledge of God and the soul’s immortality.406 
Lessing used the following passage from Augustine’s Soliloquies as his epigraph: “All these things 
are in certain respects true for the same reason that they are in certain respects false.” The “things” 
that Augustine referred to were works of art, and the “dialogue” in this context turns on questions 
of art’s truthfulness. Much like in his Beweis essay here too the epigraph offers a rich back-story. 
Prior to the passage in question, Augustine described the difference between lies and deception, 
stating that those who lie “differ from those who are deceptive, in that everyone who is deceptive 
wishes to deceive, but not everyone who lies wishes to deceive.”407 From there, Augustine 
provided some examples to help clarify his point, one of which involved a Roman actor by the 
name of Roscius (126–62 BC), who, on the stage, “was a true tragic actor, because he played his 
part, but a false Priam, because he imitated Priam though he was not Priam.”408 In being “false,” 
Roscius is able to demonstrate something true, namely, that he is a great actor of tragedy. From 
these reflections and examples Augustine reaches a conclusion that Lessing left out of his epigraph. 
It reads, “if some things are helped to be true by their being somewhat false, [then] why do we so 
greatly fear falsehoods and strive for truth as though for some great good?”409 In other words, the 
“falsehoods” of an artwork can help reveal truths that may otherwise be obscure to reason, thus 
                                               
406 For a historical investigation into the formal significance of the soliloquy in relation to the platonic 
dialogue see Stock, Brian, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Stock writes, for instance: “At a theoretical level 
soliloquies have their place in [Augustine’s] philosophy of language. In his view, inner words are closer 
to truth than outer words within the hierarchy of communication which leads upwards to the Word of 
God. Augustine also sees internal dialogue as a way of uniting the rational methods of the Platonic 
dialogue with the inward, elevational, and transcendental orientation of Plotinian Neoplatonism” (p. 230). 
407 Augustine, Soliloquies: Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, New York: New City Press, 2000, p. 72. 
408 Ibid., p. 74. 
409 Ibid. 
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pursuing things that are false could also lead to “some good.” Of interest to this study is how 
Lessing applies Augustine’s insight on artworks to historical narratives.410 
By including this fragment of Augustine’s argument, Lessing attempts to condition his 
readers to think differently about historical truth prior to reading his Erziehung. As scholars like 
Hayden White and Reinhart Koselleck have noted, around 1750 perspectives on historiography 
begin to shift from “Historie,” as the mere reportage of facts and occurrences, to Geschichte, as 
narratives that use poetic conventions like emplotment to create coherent and didactic stories.411 
In many ways, Lessing’s Erziehung manifests the concept of Geschichte, insofar as it does not see 
the entanglement of poetry and history, or the entanglement of truth and lies in the sense that 
Augustine indicates, as a problem.412 This much can be ascertained by considering the form of the 
Erziehung text, which is somewhat difficult to pin down, as some scholars have referred to it as a 
philosophical-religious manifesto,413 others calling it “the Magna Carta of chiliasm,”414 while most 
simply refer to it as an essay or treatise. Another option, which to my knowledge has not yet been 
explored, is that the form of Lessing’s Erziehung approximates that of an epigrammata, or 
collection of epigrams that can sometimes sustain coherent through-lines as in the sections 
                                               
410 Even Augustine’s example reflects a porous relationship between history and poetry insofar as Roscius 
is playing the part of Priam during the Trojan War. 
411 White, Hayden, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990; Koselleck, Reinhart, Future’s Past: On the Semantics 
of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe. MIT Press, 1985.  A more recent study on this subject is Robert 
Lehmann’s Impossible Modernisms, Stanford: Stanford Univerity Press, 2016. 
412 In his earlier Briefe, die neuste Literatur betreffend (1759–65) Lessing even described the poet as “the 
master of history” in the 63rd letter, in which he defends poets like Wieland and Milton who work with 
historical material in their poetic writings against their critics. Here he writes: “Doch lassen Sie mich 
nicht wie ein Gottschedianer kritisieren! Der Dichter ist Herr über die Geschichte!; und er kann die 
Begebenheiten so nahe zusammen rücken, als er will. Ich sage: der ist Herr über die Geschichte!” 
Lessing, Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend, Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1987, p. 195. 
413 See Yasukata, Toshimasa, Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 89. 
414 See Taubes, Jacob, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 2009, p. 133. 
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representing the idea of a “New Eternal Gospel” (§86–§92), while at other times appearing quite 
singular in their presentation. It is as if Lessing wished to introduce an entirely new form of 
historical writing that has become conscious of its status as both poetic and historical—a form of 
historico-mythical narration that regards the sublimity of Historie as a precondition for its aesthetic 
(trans)figuration into Geschichte which orders historical events into novel sequences. 
Formal considerations aside, the Augustine epigraph also serves as a useful heuristic for 
reading Lessing’s Erziehung, which is itself not empty of contradiction or apparent “falsehoods.” 
In fact, one can take recourse in the epigraph when confronting the infamous contradiction between 
§4 and §77 that continues to perplex Lessing scholars.415 The basic contradiction involves the 
assertion that Lessing makes in §4, in which revelation is said to give nothing to humanity that 
reason could not arrive at on its own, adding only that revelation expedites the process on a 
collective level. However, later in §77 Lessing appears to contradict himself when he writes: 
“warum sollten wir nicht auch durch eine Religion, mit deren historischen Wahrheit, wenn man 
will, es so mißlich aussieht, gleichwohl auf nähere und bessere Begriffe vom göttlichen Wesen, 
von unsrer Natur, von unsern Verhältnissen zu Gott, geleitet werden können, auf welche die 
menschliche Vernunft von selbst nimmermehr gekommen wäre?” [Why should we not 
nevertheless be guided by a religion whose historical truth, one may think, looks so dubious, to 
better and more precise conceptions of the divine being, of our own nature, and of our relations 
                                               
415 See for example Yasukata, Toshimasa, Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion and the German 
Enlightenment, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Yasukata writes at length to try and resolve 
the “apparent” contradiction between sections 4 and 77, even after working through the context of 
Augustine’s Soliloquies. Of sections 4 and 77 he writes: “Is this not a sheer contradiction? Or if these two 
propositions are not mutually contradictory but are supposed to hold true together, how, then, do they 
relate to each other? This is precisely the question that has tortured Lessing scholars” (p. 106–7). His 
solution is to read the subsequent sections as a sublation of the contradiction. 
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with God, which human reason would never have arrived at on its own?]. On the one hand, Lessing 
claims that reason can arrive at religious concepts independent of revelation (§4), but on the other 
hand he limits reason by suggesting that some religious knowledge is only made available through 
revelation (§77). This apparent contradiction is a source of vexation for scholars who believe that 
the main objective of enlightenment theology was to replace revelation by reason,416 though it 
must be emphasized that reason and revelation are not opposed in Lessing’s religious writings. In 
fact, as I mentioned earlier, Lessing saw education and culture as advancing the work of revelation, 
rather than as abandoning or undermining it, which he makes clear prior to the sections in question, 
writing: “Erziehung ist Offenbarung, die dem einzeln Menschen geschieht” [Education is 
revelation imparted to the individual].417 The point I wish to make is simply that reason and 
revelation interact symbiotically in a joint effort to improve humanity. Readers of Lessing’s 
Erziehung should also keep in mind that the first half of it was already published several years 
earlier in his Gegensätze, which took issue with Reimarus’ historical-critical approach to scripture. 
The “lesson” to be drawn from that context also applies here, namely, the law of contradiction 
cannot be the criterion by which we make historical judgments. 
                                               
416 Only natural theology (deism) was interested in supplanting revelation; Neology and Orthodox 
Lutheranism attempted to harmonize reason and revelation. See my section III of this chapter. 
417 That culture plays a vital role in education is obvious from §26, where Lessing discusses the 
“Gegenbilde der Offenbarung”: “Ich erkläre mich an dem Gegenbilde der Offenbarung. Ein 
Elementarbuch für Kinder, darf gar wohl dieses oder jenes wichtige Stück der Wissenschaft oder Kunst, 
die es vorträgt, mit Stillschweigen übergehen, von dem der Pädagog urteilte, daß es den Fähigkeiten der 
Kinder, für die er schrieb, noch nicht angemessen sei” [I shall explain myself by means of the counter-
image to revelation. A primer (here Lessing means the Old Testament and New Testament) for children 
may very well pass over in silence this or that important part of the science or art which it expounds, if the 
teacher judges that it is not yet appropriate to the capacities of the children for whom he is writing]. 
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The figure of the author/traveller in the preface of Lessing’s Erziehung is another point of 
interest for this study. It does a lot of work for the entire premise of the text, especially the idea of 
reading history in terms of signs, or “Fingerzeige”418 as the editor calls it,419 though an alternative 
to “sign” could be “figura.” Insofar as “Finger” preserves the Latin root fingere (to regulate), 
Lessing’s use of “Fingerzeige” maps on to Eric Auerbach’s historical exposition of figura,420 in 
which he traces the development of the term from antiquity to the Middle Ages. According to 
Auerbach, the Church Father Tertullian, by claiming that Christ represents “a figure of things to 
come,” introduced an entirely new application of figura which radically broke with Roman and 
Greek conventions. He writes, the “figura is something real and historical which announces 
something else that is also real and historical. The relation between two events is revealed by an 
accord or similarity [which] make the figura recognizable.”421 The classic examples of a figura are 
seeing Moses as a prefiguration of Christ and (more generally) the Old Testament as a prefiguration 
of the New Testament, both of which find expression in Lessing’s Erziehung. Regardless of 
whether “sign” or “figura” is the better term, a close reading of Lessing’s preface is in order. It 
                                               
418 I use the term “sign” rather than the literal “indicator” or “pointer” for several reasons. First, in the 
context of travelling, sign is more appropriate. Second, because the rich etymology of the term “Zeig” 
connotes the idea of something providing orientation in the sense of “auf etwas deuten,” or something that 
directs one’s attention to something “das, worauf man hindeutet, worauf man jemandes Aufmerksamkeit 
lenkt”; it also connotes that which allows one to see something: “sehen lassen; sichtbar werden.” (See 
Jacob Grimm, Das Deutsches Wörterbuch). 
419 Lessing tried to remain anonymous as the editor of the Gegensätze, and here plays on the relationship 
between an editor and an author, where the former holds the latter in check. See Peter Gilgen’s Lekturen 
der Errinerung, in which he identifies analogous structures between the editor and the author of Lessing’s 
Erziehung and Augustine’s monologue with reason in the Soliloquies. Gilgen, Peter, Lektüren der 
Erinnerung: Lessing, Hegel, Kant, Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2012. 
420 Auerbach, Erich, and Paolo Valesio, Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984. The connection is clear from the opening sentence: “Originally 
figura, from the same stem as fingere, figulus, fictor, and effigies, meant ‘plastic form’” (p. 11). 
421 Ibid., p. 28–29. 
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begins with the editor describing the author’s vantage point from which he can both retrace the 
steps he has travelled and also look out into a vast distance that has yet to be explored. In this way 
the traveler’s perspective is circumscribed by a theological dialectic, in which the view he enjoys 
reveals something about his journey, while also concealing something about the journey still 
ahead: 
Der Verfasser hat sich darin auf einen Hügel gestellt, von welchem er etwas mehr, 
als den vorgeschriebenen Weg seines heutigen Tages zu übersehen glaubt. Aber er 
ruft keinen eilfertigen Wanderer, der nur das Nachtlager bald zu erreichen wünscht, 
von seinem Pfade. Er verlangt nicht, daß die Aussicht, die ihn entzücket, auch jedes 
andere Auge entzücken müsse. Und so, dächte ich, könnte man ihn ja wohl stehen 
und staunen lassen, wo er steht und staunt! Wenn er aus der unermeßlichen Ferne, 
die ein sanftes Abendrot seinem Blicke weder ganz verhüllt noch ganz entdeckt, 
nun gar einen Fingerzeig mitbrächte, um den ich oft verlegen gewesen422! 
 
[The author has placed himself on a hill, from which he believes he can see rather 
more than the prescribed course of his present day’s journey. But he does not call 
on any hasty traveller, who wishes only to reach his overnight lodging, to deviate 
from his path. He does not expect that the view which delights him should also 
delight every other eye. And so, I should think, we could very well leave him to 
stand and wonder where he stands and wonders! But what if he were to bring back 
from that immeasurable distance, which a soft evening glow neither wholly 
conceals nor wholly reveals, a sign I have often felt in need of!]423 
The idea of a viewpoint is foregrounded through the traveler’s perspective. His position on 
top of a hill affords a view from which he can take stock of the day’s journey, seeing precisely the 
steps he took in order to arrive at that particular location. Such an image conjures up the idea of 
Historie as if each step held the status of an event that can be causally related to the next. Important 
                                               
422 Lessing, Werke in drei Bänden, Band III, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, Band III, p. 
637.  
423 Hugh Nisbet, the translator of Lessing that I have been using, translates Fingerzeige as “pointer,” 
which I have replaced with “sign” for the sake of conceptual consistency. 
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is the caveat that the traveler’s view might not “delight every other eye,” a detail that both indexes 
the famous Horatian dictum for poets,424 while denying the traveler’s perspective any claim to 
universality. This perspective is held in dramatic tension with another view, namely, that of the 
“immeasurable” horizon. This perspective of indeterminacy induces a state of wonder, in which 
the traveler is brought to a momentary standstill, which the editor emphasizes by repeating the 
expression of letting him “stand and wonder where he stands and wonders.” The repetition 
suggests that a roadblock stops the traveler from advancing any further. At that point, the editor is 
not satisfied and speculates about the possibility of the traveler retrieving a sign, which is useful 
to the extent that it satisfies a need. But what need could this sign possibly fulfill for the editor, 
who on all counts acts as a witness to this painfully limited history? In the greater context of the 
fragment controversy, I understand the sign to serve as compensation for the loss of historical 
proofs, as if it were a kind of epistemic contract in which theologians agree to interpret history in 
terms of meaning rather than certainty. In other words, the significance of the traveler’s steps 
(which yields two distinct perspectives) is more important for the editor than the fact that they did 
or did not happen. To read the steps of the traveller as a history of signs is to consider the 
significance of those steps in relation to a future destination, which ultimately satisfies the needs 
of the editor. 
In closing, Lessing’s epigrammatic narrative weaves a history of revelation and reason into 
an image of universal progress. Such images of progress should be (and have been) looked upon 
                                               
424 In his Ars Poetica, Horace writes that “poetry aims at both instruction and pleasure.” The German 
sentence carries the force of a “should” insofar as the traveller does not expect that “auch jedes andere 
Auge entzücken müsse.” In this way, it is not expected that the viewpoint delights every other eye, but it 
can still serve as a goal even if unrealizable. The structure is also consistent with Lessing’s aesthetic 
thought. See my section II, and the letter to Mendelssohn above. Horace, Satires, Epistles and Ars 
Poetica, London: W. Heinemann, 1929, p. 447. 
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both with a sense of suspicion and hope. There are too many examples to cite here, however, 
Lessing would have been familiar with at least one, which was published nearly twenty-five years 
before his Erziehung. Rousseau, in his Discourse on the Inequality of Man, challenged prevailing 
assumptions about historical progress by arguing that cultural advancement actually makes human 
life increasingly more difficult, essentially turning the enlightenment’s narrative of progress on its 
head.425 Perhaps a more “hopeful” example can be found in the works of Novalis, who intended 
to compose a sequel to Lessing’s Erziehung. I use the term hopeful with caution because Novalis 
made some rather critical interventions against Lessing, although he found enough material in 
Lessing’s theological writings to try his luck at better expressing the spirit of the Erziehung. Sadly, 
Novalis’ life was cut short and he never completed the project; however, his Die Christenheit oder 
Europa is perhaps the closest thing to a sequel we have. 
  
                                               
425 The analogy between the erosion of the statue of Glaucus over time and the erosion of mankind’s soul 
captures the spirit of his argument. See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Essential Writings of Rousseau, ed. 
Leo Damrosch, trans. Peter Constantine, New York: Modern Library, 2013. 
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CHAPTER THREE426 
Paradigms for a Romantic Conception of Spirit: Novalis and the Question of Mediation 
I. Toward a Redemption of the Letter: Novalis’ Fragments for a Poetic History  
Über die Verwandlung des Geistes in Buchstaben: Der Buchstabe 
ist—was ein Tempel oder Monument ist; Ohne Bedeutung ist es freylich 
todt. Es giebt geistvolle Historiker des Buchstabens—Philologische 
Antiquare, der eigentlich ein Restaurator des Buchstabens sind—ein 
Aufwecker.427 
 
[On the transformation of the spirit into the letter: the letter is like 
a temple or monument; without meaning it is truly dead. There are 
spirited historians of the letter—philological antiquarians, who actually 
restore and resurrect the letter.] 
 
—Novalis, Fragmente und Studien I, #196 
Even though Lessing helped enlightenment theology get out of the problem of historical 
proofs, the ambiguities contained in his religious writings brought new problems to light. One of 
those concerned the distinction between poetry and history, between art and religion, which 
became increasingly porous after 1780. As I argued in the first chapter of this study, the poetics of 
Der Messias assumed—at least nominally—a subordinate position as it worked to increase the 
force of revealed knowledge by paraphrasing scripture into the idiom of affect poetry. However, 
                                               
426 Unless otherwise indicated all translations from Novalis come from the two following English 
Translations: Novalis. Philosophical Writings. Trans. Margaret Mahony Stoljar. Albany: SUNY, 1997; 
Novalis. Henry von Ofterdingen. Trans. Palmer Hilty. Illinois: Waveland Press, 1964. 
427 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 777. Translation mine. 
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Klopstock’s adaptation of Doubting Thomas showed a different picture; one in which he did more 
than simply “walk in the footsteps of scripture,” but instead forged new pathways that expanded, 
revised, and clarified the historical narratives of the bible. Thus, Klopstock’s poetic amplifications 
tried to overcome religious skepticism by increasing the authority of biblical history, intensifying 
dogma through affective representation. Lessing, by contrast, did not wish to increase the authority 
of history, but rather wanted to empower modern readers of history. To accomplish this, he trained 
readers to forge the bonds of their faith in the living proof of the bible, which resides in the spirit 
of religion—in the ability of the stories themselves to “spark” feelings of conviction and to witness 
those convictions play out both in the immediate social field and across history. In the previous 
chapter, I argued that the aesthetic structures of Lessing’s Laokoon also found expression in his 
religious thought, especially with respect to his claim that revelation fulfills the function of 
education (i.e. gradually revealing more fully to human reason latent truths that at one point 
seemed like an incomplete torso). However, the strength of this argument diminishes if one reflects 
on the message of Lessing’s Testament des Johannis, which appears to work against the claim that 
the concept of the “pregnant moment” is operational in his theory of religious education. Taken 
out of context, this document demythologizes scripture by reducing its significance to the Christian 
doctrine of love, as if the rich particularities contained in the histories and myths of the bible were 
ancillary at best, distracting at worst. Taken in context, however, this document offers a 
hyperbolized polemic against the prevailing habitus of enlightenment theology, which accorded 
the logos of scripture more authority than its underlying ethos. Lessing’s Erziehung only provokes 
further confusion on the question of poetry’s relation to history. In sections §43–§47, for example, 
he portrays the historico-mythical status of miracles and prophecies as primers that prepare the 
way for more rational concepts of religion, thereby rendering the old primers obsolete. Yet his 
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aesthetic arrangement of biblical history into a narrative of progress shows him to be both an 
excellent and creative historian insofar as he translates the contingent Begebenheiten [occurrences] 
of history into a unified Handlung [action] attesting to the gradual perfection of humanity.428 The 
fact that Lessing was forced to theologize from a poetic platform (after his publishing rights had 
been rescinded by the Duke of Braunschweig) also brings no clarity to our question. In short, 
Lessing’s theology does not offer a definitive statement about how poetry and aesthetics relate to 
biblical history and religion. Readers of Lessing must either attempt to synthesize the various 
flashes of insight into an eclectic statement on the issue, or, as I have suggested at times, claim 
that an argument is at work on a performative or formal level. 
Novalis was so drawn to this ambiguity within Lessing’s work that it became a recurring 
subject throughout his writings, especially in his Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1800) and Die 
Christenheit oder Europa (1799), on which there will be occasion to reflect shortly. His goal was 
not simply to reject the rationalist architecture of Lessing’s theory of religious education, but to 
amplify it by according the poetic or intuitive moment of religious education much greater 
significance. This, Novalis argued, was central to his entire philosophy: “Die Poësie ist das ächt 
absolut Reelle. Dies ist der Kern meiner Philosophie. Je poëtischer, je wahrer”429 [Poetry is the 
                                               
428 See Lessing’s Erziehung §92: “Du hast auf deinem ewigen Wege so viel mitzunehmen! so viel 
Seitenschritte zu tun!—Und wie? wenn es nun gar so gut als ausgemacht wäre, daß das große langsame 
Rad, welches das Geschlecht seiner Vollkommenheit näher bringt, nur durch kleinere schnellere Räder in 
Bewegung gesetzt würde, deren jedes sein Einzelnes eben dahin liefert?” [You have so much to take with 
you on your eternal way! So many diversions to make! And what if it were as good as certain that the 
great, slow-moving wheel which brings the [human] race closer to its perfection is only set in motion by 
smaller, faster wheels, each of which makes its own contribution to this end?]. Lessing, Gotthold 
Ephraim. Werke 1754–1757. Band 3. Hrsg. von Conrad Wiedemann unter Mitwirkung von Wilfried 
Barner und Jürgen Stenzel. Deutsche Klassiker Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 2003. p. 615–16. 
429 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2, no. 473. Translation mine. 
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truly real. This is the core of my philosophy. The more poetic, the truer]. For Novalis “poetry is 
the truly real” and not just an unwelcome guest in scientific discourses, because he saw it as 
essential for any kind of knowledge production, including historical knowledge. Consequently, 
Novalis considered poetry to be a resource capable of reconciling contradictions and 
disagreements that afflict human reason such as the divide between Glaube [faith] and Wissen 
[knowledge],430 asserting that “[d]ie Poesie heilt die Wunden, die der Verstand schlägt”431 [Poetry 
heals the wounds that reason makes]. The disjuncture between the “ideal” (poetry) and the “real” 
(history) was not a source of skepticism or despair for Novalis; rather, he saw it as a motor for 
human exploration and discovery. This much is clear from the initial observation of his Vermischte 
Bemerkungen (1798), a text that develops multiple themes related to the subjects of religion, 
Bildung, and historiography which will be helpful to consider before investigating his Die 
Christenheit oder Europa and Heinrich von Ofterdingen. 
In his first observation Novalis asserts, “Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte und finden 
immer nur Dinge”432 [We search everywhere for the absolute, but always find only things]. The 
fact that the absolute cannot be pinned down is not what Novalis decides to emphasize; rather, he 
stresses the activities of “searching” and “finding,” which are more significant than actually 
grasping the absolute—an attitude he ultimately shares with Lessing. For Novalis, searching and 
finding constitute the inner, spiritual activities of the subject, whose interest becomes heightened 
                                               
430 For an account of the unifying function of romantic art see Tzvetan Todorov’s chapter on “The 
Romantic Crisis” in his Theory of the Symbol Trans. Catherine Porter. Cornell University Press: Ithaca 
NY, 1977. p 184–89. 
431 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2, no. 473. Translation mine. 
432 Ibid., vol. 2, no. 1 
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by the indeterminacy of the absolute. Similar to Lessing, the subject’s spiritual activity only 
manifests inadequate representations of the absolute,433 which Novalis vividly describes in his 
second observation: “Vier Buchstaben bezeichnen mir Gott—einige Striche eine Million Dinge. 
Wie leicht wird hier die Handhabung des Universi! Wie anschaulich die Konzentrizität der 
Geisterwelt!”434 [Three letters signify God to me—a few letters point to a million things. How 
easy it is then to make use of the universe! How visible is the concentricity of the spiritual world!]. 
The letters G-O-D are just abstract phonemes that in no way represent the full significance of the 
absolute, yet these letters do have the capacity to index “a million other things.” The image of a 
million concentric circles—each one a concrete manifestation of spirit—expanding outward from 
a point of absolute indeterminacy hangs tremendous value on the evocative power of obscurity.  
However, unlike Lessing, Novalis is unwilling to trade in that obscurity for a telos that 
limits the subject’s spiritual activity to fulfilling the imperatives of reason. Such a telos binds the 
activity of spirit to a utilitarian model of development that is still governed by categories of clarity, 
perfection, and imperfection.435 In the case of Lessing’s Erziehung, reason illuminates with 
increasing clarity the path towards greater perfection (of religious concepts), which is to say, the 
path towards the new eternal gospel in which reason discovers that it no longer needs to be morally 
                                               
433 See Frank, Manfred, “Unendliche Annäherung”: die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997; and Lacoue-Labarthe, Phillippe and Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Literary 
Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism. New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1988. 
434 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2, no. 2. 
435 See Lessing’s Erziehung §47: “In solchen Vorübungen, Anspielungen, Fingerzeigen besteht die 
positive Vollkommenheit eines Elementarbuchs; so wie die oben erwähnte Eigenschaft, daß es den Weg 
zu den noch zurückgehaltenen Wahrheiten nicht erschwere, oder versperre, die negative Vollkommenheit 
desselben war” [Such preparatory exercises, allusions, and pointers constitute the positive perfection of a 
primer, just as the above-mentioned quality of not blocking or rendering more difficult the way to those 
truths which are still withheld was its negative perfection]. 
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incentivized by a system of rewards and punishments—that salvation can be a lived experience. 
Novalis, by contrast, wants the activities of spirit to be completely free; not just searching for 
outward “signs” capable of sweeping the particularities of disparate histories into a universalizing 
narrative—he also wants to include a mode of searching that turns inward: “Wir träumen von 
Reisen durch das Weltall—Ist denn das Weltall nicht in uns? Die Tiefen unseres Geistes kennen 
wir nicht—nach Innen geht der geheimnißvolle Weg. In uns, oder nirgends ist die Ewigkeit mit 
ihren Welten—die Vergangenheit und Zukunft”436 [We dream of travelling through the universe—
but is not the universe within ourselves? The depths of our spirit are unknown to us—the 
mysterious way leads inwards. Eternity with its worlds—the past and future—is in ourselves or 
nowhere]. The “mysterious” path inward is, I will argue, crucial for understanding the theological 
significance of Novalis’ work, which addresses the problem of modernity’s spiritual blindness by 
internally appropriating the often obscure, outward signs of biblical history (e.g. miracles and 
prophecies) to advance a process of self-discovery oriented more towards creation and synthesis 
than perfection. In this way, Novalis internalizes rather than secularizes the miracles and 
prophecies of religion, which deism (for instance) wanted to banish from modern faith 
altogether.437 As a result, confessions of faith begin to represent outward expressions of an inner 
miracle. In a later fragment, Novalis provides evidence of this when he asks: 
                                               
436 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2 no. 17. Translation mine. 
437 Here I have in mind Schmitt’s Political Theology, which understands the relation between religion and 
modernity exclusively in terms of secularization. He writes, for example, that “the idea of the modern 
constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle 
from the world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature 
through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the 
sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal order” (p. 36–37). Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
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Können Wundern Überzeugung wirken? Oder wäre nicht wahrhafte Überzeugung, 
diese höchste Funktion unsers Gemüts und unsrer Personalität, das einzige, wahre, 
Gott verkündende Wunder? Jedes Wunder muß isoliert in uns bleiben, unverknüpft 
mit unserem übrigen Bewußtsein, ein Traum. Aber eine innige moralische 
Überzeugung, eine göttliche Anschauung, dies wäre ein reales bleibendes 
Wunder.438  
 
[Can miracles bring about conviction? Or would true conviction, this highest 
function of our mind and our personality, be the only, true, God-proclaiming 
miracle? Every miracle must remain isolated within us, unconnected from the rest 
of our consciousness, a dream. But an intense moral conviction, a divine attitude, 
this would be a real lasting miracle.] 
Novalis’ underlying question is what causes true conviction: the outward miracles recorded 
in biblical history or an individual’s own spiritual engagement with those miracles? In the end, 
Novalis describes “intense moral conviction” as a true miracle, noting that they remain isolated 
dreams which have not yet been integrated into “the rest of our consciousness.” Much of Novalis’ 
religious writings are concerned with vividly representing the internal significance of miracles so 
that they will become integrated into human consciousness and ideally play a role in ethical life.439 
In contrast to Lessing, who treated miracles and prophecies as “primers” that can eventually be 
dispensed with, Novalis treats them as essential for the creation of new “miracles” and 
“prophecies” that will become relevant for modern faith.  
Novalis did not make too many explicit statements against Lessing. However, of the few 
scattered comments he did make, none expresses more clearly his critique of Lessing than the 
                                               
438 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2, no. 341. 
439 Novalis acknowledges the interplay between poetry, religion, and ethics writing: “Poesie ist die Basis 
der Gesellschaft, wie Tugend die Basis des Staats. Religion ist eine Mischung von Poesie und Tugend.” 
Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und 
Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 323. 
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following fragment: “Lessing sah zu scharf und verlor darüber das Gefühl des undeutlichen 
Ganzen, die magische Anschauung der Gegenstände zusammen in mannichfacher Erleuchtung und 
Verdunklung”440 [Lessing saw too sharply and lost the feeling for the indistinct whole, the magical 
intuition of objects together in their manifold brightness and obscurity]. Lessing, it would seem, 
made so many concessions to rationalism that, in the end, intuition and feeling were pushed to the 
margins of his thought. In response to Lessing’s allegedly myopic acumen, Novalis ventured to 
reintegrate the sensuous or intuitive dimension of Lessing’s thought into a more expansive theory 
of education. His efforts can be detected (again) in the Vermischte Bemerkungen in which the 
theme of religious education is explored. For example, he argued that “intermediaries” were 
needed to obtain a connection with God, claiming that “nichts ist zur wahren Religiosität 
unentbehrlicher als ein Mittelglied—das uns mit der Gottheit verbindet […] In der Wahl dieses 
Mittelglieds muss der Mensch durchaus frei sein”441 [nothing is more indispensable for true 
religiosity than an intermediary—which connects us to the godhead (…) The human being must 
be wholly free in choosing an intermediary]. Whereas Lessing accorded the faculty of reason 
exclusive rights as the intermediary of individual religious education442, Novalis called for more 
options. His use of the term “Religiosität” untethers religion from any single institution or set of 
doctrines that might assume a mediating role, a detail that invites wider possibilities in terms of 
                                               
440 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 3, no. 34. Translation mine. 
441 Ibid., vol. 2, no. 73. 
442 In the second paragraph of his Erziehung he writes: “Erziehung ist Offenbarung, die dem einzelnen 
Menschen geschieht: und Offenbarung ist Erziehung, die dem Menschengeschlecte geschehen ist, und noch 
geschieht. [Education is revelation imparted to he individual; and revelation is education which has been, 
and still is, imparted to the human race].  Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und Briefe: In Zwölf Bänden. 
Band 10. Hrsg. Von Arno Schilson und Axel Schmitt. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985.  p. 75. 
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what has the power to occasion religious experience. In fact, Novalis fully embraced Spinoza’s 
pantheistic worldview which identifies god with nature, taking the latter as a mode of the divine,443 
even referring to Spinozism as “eine Übersättigung mit Gottheit”444 [a supersaturation with the 
divine]. Also, that human beings be “wholly free” to choose the intermediary that best connects 
them with “true religiosity” grants far more autonomy to the religious subject than had previously 
been envisaged in the history of Protestant theology. According to Novalis, without an 
intermediary—which can be “everything,”445 any person or “any object”446—“der Mensch [kann] 
schlechterdings nicht mit derselben [Gottheit] in Verhältnis stehn”447 [the human being simply 
cannot stand in a relation with the godhead]. Thus, intermediaries are “instruments of the godhead” 
that are needed to make “the spirit of the people visible.”448  
Central to Novalis’ theory of religious education, then, is how intermediaries yield images 
                                               
443 In his Ethics, Spinoza writes “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without 
God.” See Spinoza, Benedictus de. A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Edited by E. M. 
Curley, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 94. For a general account of Spinoza and pantheism in the 
context of German Enlightenment and Early German Romanticism see Friedrich Beiser’s The Fate of 
Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, and The Romantic Imperative: The Concept 
of Early German Romanticism, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
444 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 2, no. 356. 
445 In the context of the Vermischte Bemerkungen, Novalis uses the idea of pantheism to support this 
claim: “Ich bediene mich hier einer Lizenz—indem ich Pantheism nicht im gewöhlichen Sinn nehme—
sondern darunter die Idee verstehe—dass alles Organ der Gottheit—Mittler sein könne…” [I am allowing 
myself some licence here—in that I am taking pantheism not in the usual sense—but understand by it the 
idea—that everything could be an instrument of the godhead—could be a mediator…] (no. 73). In the 
“Vierte Handschriften Gruppe” of his Fichte Studien, Novalis asks “Was ist glauben? All—Weltall” 
[What is faith? Everything, the cosmos] (no. 493). He later describes faith as the “sensation of 
knowledge” (no. 503). 
446 In no. 73 of Novalis’ Vermischte Bemerkungen, he writes: “Jeder Gegenstand kann dem Religiösen ein 
Tempel im Sinn der Auguren sein” [Every object can be a temple for the religious person, in the sense of 
the augurs]. 
447 Ibid., vol. 2, no. 73. Translation mine. 
448 Ibid., vol. 2, no. 75. 
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or poetic visions449 that provide limited, yet vivid access to the absolute or “the godhead.” I will 
say more about the theological significance of the image in relation to the history of Lutheranism 
when discussing Die Christenheit oder Europa, but for now I wish to point out that Novalis’ 
insistence on the image conjures up the figure of Doubting Thomas, whose religious education 
depended exclusively on intuition (both haptic and visual). While Novalis does not exclude the 
plastic arts from acting as intermediaries,450 it is far more likely that he means poetic images, which 
are not concerned with perceptual experience in any strict sense, but rather with images that result 
from the spiritual activity of the individual (after encountering an intermediary). In other words, 
images that are produced in the mind’s eye or “mental images.”451 Novalis’ desire for images 
brings him closer to Klopstock than Lessing insofar as he too is interested in poetically amplifying 
religious history to inspire greater faith, though his approach to scripture seeks to retrieve material 
that engages the reader’s eye rather than ear.452 Nevertheless both Klopstock and Novalis wish to 
expand modernity’s knowledge of religion by means of intuition.453 By contrast, Lessing’s concept 
                                               
449 Géza von Molnár’s Romantic Vision, Ethical Context: Novalis and Artistic Autonomy discusses the 
status of poetic vision in his book (though mostly in passing). Surprisingly, Lessing is not mentioned once 
in this monograph, which takes Fichte, Kant, and Schiller as Novalis’ primary interlocutors. 
450 For an account of how Caspar David Friedrich’s paintings were able to “mediate a religious 
experience” in accordance with Novalis’ theory, see: Koerner, Joseph Leo, Caspar David Friedrich and 
the Subject of Landscape, 2nd edition, Reaktion Books, 2009, p. 22. (See parts I/II especially). 
451 For a study on mental images see Mitchell, W.J.T. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1986. pp.14-31.  
452 Klopstock’s Der Messias was intended to be heard in order to achieve the full range of its effects. See 
Klaus Weimar’s “Reading for Feeling” in Wellbery, David E., et al. A New History of German Literature. 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004. p. 357. 
453 With respect to Klopstock, Joachim Jacob makes a similar observation: “Die Erweiterung der 
Vorstellungskraft und das Interesse an anschaulicher Erkenntnis, die sich der Heiligen Poesie als 
wesentliche Motive zuschreiben lassen, berühren sich nicht zufällig mit dem Grundgedanken der sich 
gleichzeitig formierenden philosophischen Ästhetik” [It is no coincidence that the expansion of the 
powers of imagination and the interest in intuitive knowledge, which can be ascribed to sacred poetry as 
essential motifs, coincide with the basic idea of philosophical aesthetics that was developing at the time]. 
Jacob, Joachim. Heilige Poesie: zu einem literarischen Modell bei Pyra, Klopstock und Wieland. M. 
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of the “Fingerzeige” [signs] downplays the need for images insofar as each “sign” reveals to 
humanity a more abstract way of cognizing religious truths. This is especially apparent when 
Lessing compares the religious education of ancient Hebrews and Christians, in which he claimed 
that the former needed “immediate punishments and rewards of a sensuous kind” (16) to grasp the 
Word of God (i.e. to obey God’s commandments).454 According to Lessing, the ancient Hebrews’ 
need for a “sensuous” or intuitive system of rewards and punishments was so great that their 
“vision did not yet extend beyond this life.” Thus, the Christian doctrine of eternal salvation—
which Lessing understood as a more abstract, rational cognition of a religious truth455–was closed 
off to the ancient Hebrews. In short, the narrative trajectory of Lessing’s Erziehung points to a 
subtle iconoclasm.456 The “Fingerzeige,” which Lessing speaks of in his preface, guide the 
traveller of the preface further away from the image, towards the “Unsichtbare Loge” [invisible 
church] of Freemasonry that Lessing describes in his short, dialogical text Ernst und Falk.457 Yet 
the closing epigrams of Lessing’s Erziehung (§92–§100) ambiguously authorize a certain kind of 
nostalgia that humanity can have towards its earlier, sensuous education: “Die Erinnerung meiner 
vorigen Zustände, würde mir nur einen schlechten Gebrauch des gegenwärtigen zu machen 
erlauben. Und was ich auf jetzt vergessen muß, habe ich denn das auf ewig vergessen458?” [The 
                                               
Niemeyer, 1997. p. 3. Translation mine. 
454 See Lessing’s Erziehung, §16. 
455 See Lessing’s Erziehung, §17. Kenneth Calhoon makes a similar observation, finding that Lessing’s 
earlier Abhandlungen über die Fable anticipates the structures found in his Erziehung. He writes, for 
example, that the “movement toward the self-sufficiency of reason characterizes the direction of both Die 
Abhandlungen and Die Erziehung and is commensurate with Lessing’s conception of history.” Calhoon, 
Kenneth, “The bible as Fable: History and Form in Lessing and Novalis,” Lessing Yearbook, 1984, p. 56. 
456 I mean subtle in the sense that Lessing did not explicitly adopt a hostile attitude toward the image in 
any emphatic sense. His attitude toward images was perhaps consistent with Luther’s, who believed that 
as long as they were no longer in the heart, they could do no harm when seen with the eyes. See Koerner, 
Joseph Leo. The Reformation of the Image. University of Chicago Press, 2008. p. 93. 
457 See Lessing’s Ernst und Falk (Zweite Gespräch). 
458 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und Briefe: In Zwölf Bänden. Band 10. Hrsg. Von Arno Schilson und 
Axel Schmitt. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985.  p. 99. 
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memory of my previous states would only permit me to make poor use of the present one. And 
does what I must forget for the present have to be forgotten forever?]. Statements like these 
inspired Novalis to build on Lessing’s ideas, and on this particular question I will attempt to show 
that he answers with a resounding no. It is precisely these previous states that need to be 
prophetically repurposed, redeployed, and remembered so that new intermediaries can grow from 
the soil of old ones and make religion relevant for the present. 
In another of Novalis’ “vermischte Bemerkungen” [mixed observations] the historian 
emerges as the religious intermediary par excellence.459 According to Novalis, “[Der Historiker] 
trägt ja Evangelien vor, denn die ganze Geschichte ist Evangelium”460 [The historian presents 
gospels, because all of history is a gospel]. To view all of history as a gospel, which means “good 
news” or “good story,” transforms the content of history into Heilsgeschichte [sacred history] and 
attributes a divine perspective to the historian, who situates the significance of singular 
occurrences within a larger narrative of redemption concerning the whole of human history.461 
                                               
459 Schleiermacher arrives at similar ideas in his Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern (1799), as he writes: “Geschichte im eigentlichsten Sinn ist der höchste Gegenstand der 
Religion, mit ihr hebt sie an und endigt mit ihr—denn Weissagung ist in ihren Augen auch Geschichte 
und beides gar nicht voneinander zu unterscheiden—und alle wahre Geschichte hat überall zuerst einen 
religiösen Zweck gehabt und ist von religiösen Ideen ausgegangen. In ihrem Gebiet liegen dann auch die 
höchsten und erhabensten Anschauungen der Religion.” Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Über die Religion: 
Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. F. Meiner, 1958. p. 56. [History, in the most proper 
sense, is the highest object of religion. It begins and ends with religion—for in religion’s eyes prophecy is 
also history, and the two are not to be distinguished from one another—and at all times all true history has 
first had a religious purpose and proceeded from religious ideas. In its realm, therefore, lies also the 
highest and most sublime intuitions of religion. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. On Religion: Speeches to Its 
Cultured Despisers. Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 42. 
460 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 3, no. 214, p. 586. Translation mine. 
461 F. Schlegel describes history as a point of intersection between the human and the divine: “Die 
Geschichte ist das Höchste, denn sie ist die Synthese der Gottheit und der Menschheit” [History is the 
highest because it is a synthesis of divinity and mankind]. Schlegel, Friedrich. Friedrich Schlegel: 
Kritische Ausgabe seiner Werke: Fragment zur Poesie und Literatur, erste Teil. Bd. 16. Hrsg. Von Hans 
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Consequently, this perspective invites suspiciously optimistic interpretations of history, which, 
earlier in the eighteenth century, became point of contention for Voltaire, who, in his Candide, 
created the figure Pangloss to satirize the philosophical system of optimism that Leibniz 
authorized.  This debate stands in the background of Novalis’ reflections on historical 
representation and, as I described in the first chapter of this study, Leibniz was responding to 
Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697 ), a document that sent shockwaves through the 
Christian imaginary by claiming that “history is simply a collection of the crimes and misfortunes 
of the human race.”462 The scandal, of course, was that Bayle suggested God was complicit in 
these crimes by doing nothing to prevent them despite His omnipotent power to do so.463 Leibniz, 
however, saw thing differently. In response to Bayle, he developed a very popular counter-
narrative that emphasized the “good news” of history.464 According to this narrative, all the 
individual crimes and misfortunes recorded in human history can be subsumed under the premise 
of a greater good, which makes “all the apparent deformities of our little world combine to become 
                                               
Eichner. Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag: 1981. p. 292, no. 476. 
462 Bayle, Pierre. Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections. “Manicheans.” Translated by Richard H. 
Popkin, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991. p. 147. 
463 An excellent source on the philosophical history of the theodicy question is Susan Nieman’s recent 
book Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (2015). Another source on the 
subject is Odo Marquard. His Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie (1982), Skepsis in der 
Moderne: Philosophisches Studien (2007), and Apologie des Zufälligen (1986) trace the theodicy question 
to the emergence of the philosophy of history in the late eighteenth century. 
464 Many have cited Leibniz’s Theodicy as a source of inspiration for Alexander Pope’s poem Essay on 
Man (1734), which Lessing and Mendelssohn wrote about in an essay contest put on by the Preußische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften in 1755. The essay question asked the public to evaluate the line of Pope’s 
essay that reads “Everything is good” and to compare the poem with Leibniz’s Theodicy. Lessing and 
Mendelssohn’s essay Pope ein Metaphysiker! anticipates some of the controversy with Goeze in terms of 
the relationship between poetic styles and philosophical/theological styles. Similar to his Anti-Goeze 2/8, 
Lessing writes: “Doch ein Dichter braucht nicht alle Zeit ein Dichter zu sein. Ich sehe keinen 
Widerspruch, daß er nicht auch ein Philosoph sein könne” [But a poet does not need to be a poet all the 
time, and I see no contradiction suggesting that he cannot also be a philosopher]. Translation mine. 
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beauties [and that] God, by a wonderful art, […] makes evil serve the greater good.” Leibniz’s 
theory of a greater good unfolds in three distinct ways. First, it functionalizes “evil” by making it 
appear as if it were necessary to actualize a greater good. Second, it represents “evil” as if it were 
compensation for “sins” previously committed.465 Third, it attributes the presence of “evil” in the 
world to human freedom, which shifts the responsibility of its presence in the world back onto the 
shoulders of humanity. According to Leibniz, insofar as humans were designed with intelligence 
they are like “miniature Gods.” “Man,” Leibniz wrote, is “like a little god in his own world or 
Microcosm, which he governs after his own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders there and 
his art often imitates nature […] but he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to 
the passions, and because God abandons him to his own way.”466 Once Leibniz deduced this 
optimistic metaphysics from human history, he even extended it to the book of nature, arguing that 
it holds true “not only in theology, but in nature as well, since a seed flung to the ground must 
suffer before it bears fruit.”467 Both Lessing and Novalis were equally won over by Leibniz’s 
optimistic approach to history. From it they learned that the creative imagination plays an essential 
role in mediating historical knowledge, although in the case of Lessing’s Erziehung the wings of 
the creative imagination appear bound to representing just the development of human reason across 
religious history, which, to use Lessing’s own phrase against him, makes a “religion of reason.”468 
 With this background in mind, I disagree with recent commentators who argue that the 
                                               
465 In his Candide (1759), Voltaire lampooned the first two of these propositions. 
466 Leibniz, Gottfried. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of 
Evil. Open Court, 1998. p. 215–16. 
467 See Leibniz, G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays. Translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, 1st 
edition, Hackett Publishing Company, 1989. p. 154. 
468 See Lessing’s Gegensätze, or my Chapter 2, section 1. 
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only lesson Novalis learned from history was to “turn away from it.”469 To my mind, Novalis 
attempts to recuperate history not as proof, but as epic in order to show that it still plays a vital 
role in establishing a uniquely modern faith. Furthermore, in his Die Christenheit oder Europa 
Novalis explicitly “refers [his audience] to history” in order to break out of an eternally recurring, 
Sisyphean cycle of reformation and counter-reformation. Before getting into the finer points of 
Die Christenheit oder Europa, however, it is worth considering a few additional observations that 
Novalis makes with respect to the historian as an intermediary of religious conviction. Initially, 
Novalis claims, “poet priests” served as the preeminent intermediaries of religion, but they were 
eventually rendered obsolete once a “philistine” modernity entered the scene and transformed 
religion into an “opiate,” conflating religious concepts with mundane human activities; for 
example, confusing the idea of heaven with “festivals, weddings, and balls.”470 The historian, 
however, is able to rise above bourgeois existence by vividly representing the remote past in ways 
that speak to both the “now” and also to an obscure future. In other words, the historian looks for 
what actually happened in the past, but presents that story in a way that foregrounds its living 
significance (i.e. grasping the meaning of the past in terms of the present). By moving from the 
strange (remote past) to the familiar (now) and then again to the strange (unknown future), Novalis’ 
                                               
469 See O’Brien, Arctander William. Novalis: Signs of Revolution. Duke University Press, 1995. p. 240. I 
also take issue with O’Brien’s characterization of Novalis as “irreligious” (p. 217), which he arrives at by 
way of Barth’s chapter on Novalis in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, a text that describes 
Novalis as “dangerous” and “menacing.” From the standpoint of the Church (i.e. Barth’s standpoint) 
someone like Novalis might appear irreligious because of his unconventional approach to religion. 
However, I view Novalis as working alongside Lessing in trying to articulate a positive model of faith 
after historical proofs have been shown to be a poor source of religious conviction. 
470 Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim 
Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 3, no. 75, 76. 
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historian engages in a Romantic dialectic471 that was arguably prefigured in Lessing’s Erziehung. 
Novalis realized that if the internal coherence of the “stories themselves”—to borrow Lessing’s 
phrase—is more essential to historical representation than proving the veracity of the facts, then 
the criteria by which history is judged comes closer to the work of art. Thus, for Novalis history is 
not just an object of knowledge for reason. It is also a beautiful object, molded by a quasi-divine 
hand working to bring unity to its otherwise sublime multiplicity: 
Der Geschichtsschreiber organisiert historische Wesen. Die Data der Geschichte 
sind die Masse, der der Geschichtsschreiber Form giebt—durch Belebung. Mithin 
steht auch die Geschichte unter den Grundsätzen der Belebung und Organisation 
überhaupt und bevor nicht diese Grundsätze da sind, giebt es auch keine ächten 
historischen Kunstgebilde—sondern nichts, als hie und da, Spurren zufälliger 
Belebungen, wo unwillkürliches Genie gewaltet hat.472 
 
[The historian organizes historical beings. The data of history is a mass that the 
historian shapes—giving it life. Thus history, too, is subject to the principles of life 
and organization, and, until these principles are in play, there can be no artistically 
formed images of history, only scattered traces of accidental life, in which 
spontaneous genius has prevailed.] 
The Pygmalion fetish, which features prominently in Klopstock’s theory of Darstellung–– 
his idealized account of poetic representation473––finds expression in Novalis’ views on the 
historian, who subjects history to “principles of life.” To create “Kunstgebilde” [artistically formed 
images] from the essence of history requires a certain kind of genius, which involves identifying 
                                               
471 “Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimnisvolles Ansehn, dem 
Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen unendlichen Schein gebe, so romantisiere 
ich es” [By endowing the commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious respect, the 
known with the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am making it (the 
world) romantic]. Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-
Joachim Mähl und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 334. 
472 Ibid., vol. 2. no. 92. Translation mine. 
473 Klopstock’s poem “Beschreibung und Darstellung” presents a distinction that will be pulled through 
his theoretical writings (e.g. Zur Poetik and Von der Darstellung). If a poet merely describes the image of 
Pygmalion, then it fails to come to life, whereas if a poet (re)presents [darstellt] it, then ekphrasis, viewed 
as a governing principle of art, has been achieved. 
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and organizing empirical data in a way that aspires to “bring history to life.” Failing to do so means 
that the historian only (re)arranges the dead letters of history into a “monument” void of any living 
significance. Though difficult to prove from his correspondence or from explicit reference to 
Lessing in his works, I suspect that Novalis discovered—at least in part—these “principles of life” 
at work in Lessing’s Erziehung, which offers a spiritual reading of biblical history consonant with 
Novalis’ description of the historian. Like Lessing, Novalis also looks for a better means of judging 
biblical history than the law of contradiction, which, as noted in the previous chapter, still served 
as a guiding criterion for enlightenment theology. Against the law of contradiction, Novalis writes, 
“Den Satz des Widerspruchs zu vernichten ist vielleicht die höchste Aufgabe der höheren 
Logik”474 [To negate the law of contradiction is perhaps the highest task of higher logic].  
However, Lessing’s critique of the “Bibliolatrie” that turned the Word of God into an idol 
left the theological letter/spirit distinction in a state of confused conflict—as if modernity should 
confess its faith solely upon the evidence of the spirit rather than the letter. Other than Lessing’s 
vague reference to the inner truth of “the stories themselves” and pointing to the continued 
relevance of the Christian ethos throughout its history, he did not adequately explain how to make 
the truth of religion known by means of the spirit. From the Erziehung it appears that an advanced 
knowledge of history is needed, but if, as Lessing states in his defense of the Moravian 
Brotherhood, “der Mensch ward zum Tun und nicht zum Vernünfteln erschaffen”475 [man was 
created for action and not for speculation], then he seems to betray the pietist tradition informing 
his theology. Novalis, by contrast, realized that poetry must “mix” with biblical history to make 
                                               
474 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band, II, no. 101, p. 767. Translation mine. 
475 See my Chapter 2, section 3 on pietism and Lessing’s Gedanken über die Herrnhuter in Lessing, 
Gotthold Ephraim, Werke in drei Bänden, Hrsg. von Herbert Göpfert. DTV, 2003. p. 272. 
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the inner, spiritual evidence of religion intuitively accessible: “Über die heilige Geschichte 
überhaupt—ihre Poësie, ihre innre Evidenz. Wer hat die Bibel für geschlossen erklärt? Sollte die 
Bibel nicht noch im Wachsen begriffen seyn? Der Biblische Vortrag ist unendlich bunt—
Geschichte, Poësie, alles durcheinander”476 [About biblical history in general, its poetry, its inner 
evidence. Who declared the Bible closed? Should not the Bible still be growing? Biblical discourse 
is infinitely colorful: history, poetry, all mixed up]. In this passage, Novalis suggests that the spirit 
of religion dwells in the poetry of scripture and, as I will attempt to show presently, by further 
poeticizing (or romanticizing) biblical history he can mediate a more complete revelation of spirit. 
In other words, poetry becomes a source of “life,” a way for biblical history renew itself 
“infinitely.” In this sense, poetry is no longer just an aid to religion as it was for both Klopstock 
and Lessing; now it is called upon to save religion.477 At the same time, Novalis acknowledges in 
his encyclopedia project, Das Allgemeine Brouillon (1798–99), that the idea of the bible can serve 
as the model for all books, since it allows the real (history) and the ideal (poetry) to perpetually 
cross-pollinate and bring forth new ideas: “Mein Buch soll eine scientifische Bibel werden—ein 
                                               
476 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 97. p. 766. Translation mine. 
477 Schleiermacher reached a similar conclusion in his third speech in Über die Religion, which develops a 
nuptial language to describe the emergence of a new religion: “Sie [Religion und Kunst] 
zusammenzuleiten und in einem Bett zu einigen, das ist das Einzige was die Religion, auf dem Wege den 
wir gehen, zur Vollendung bringen kann, das wäre eine Begebenheit aus deren Schoß sie bald in einer 
neuen und herrlichen Gestalt bessern Zeiten entgegen gehen würde. Sehet da, das Ziel Eurer 
gegenwärtigen höchsten Anstrengung ist zugleich die Auferstehung der Religion!” Schleiermacher, 
Friedrich. Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. F. Meiner, 1958. p. 94–95. 
[To bring art and religion together and to unite them in one bed is the only thing that can bring religion to 
completion on the path on which we are headed; that would be an event from whose womb religion, soon 
in a new and splendid form, would face better times. Look there, the goal of your present highest 
endeavors is at the same time the resurrection of religion!]. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. On Religion: 
Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 69–70. 
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reales, und ideales Muster—und Keim aller Bücher”478 [My book shall be a scientific Bible—a 
real and ideal model—and the seed of every book]. Here the dynamics are reversed. Now religion 
appears to supply poetry with a source of “life” by serving as the ideal model for all books, a 
gesture that brings the sacred and secular into a symbiotic relationship, both claiming a power to 
reveal knowledge.479  
If the now poet-historian is in the business of revelation, then prophecy becomes part of 
the job description. The clearest expression of what the historian is charged to do emerges in 
fragment 123 of Novalis’ Vermischte Bemerkungen, in which he articulates his conception of a 
“geistige Gegenwart” [spiritual present] that the historian poetically constructs by uniting memory 
and premonition: 
Nichts ist poetischer als Erinnerung und Ahndung oder Vorstellung der Zukunft. 
Die gewöhnliche Gegenwart verknüpft beide durch Beschränkung—es entstehe 
Kontiguität durch Erstarrung—Kristallisation. Es gibt aber eine geistige 
Gegenwart—die beide durch Auflösung identifiziert—und diese Mischung ist das 
Element, die Atmosphäre des Dichters. Nicht-Geist ist Stoff.480 
 
[Nothing is more poetic than memory and premonition, or the conception of the 
future. The everyday present joins both of these together through limitation. 
Contiguity comes into being through atrophy—crystallization. But there is a 
spiritual present—which fuses them together through dissolving them—and this 
mixture is the element, the atmosphere of the poet. What is not spirit is matter.]  
“What is not spirit is matter” becomes a familiar chorus across Novalis’ writings and it 
indicates the failure to poetically synthesize disparities between inner, spiritual life and outward, 
                                               
478 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 557. p. 599. Translation mine. 
479 For recent scholarship that explores literature as a mode of revelation see William Franke’s Theology 
of Literature: The Bible as Revelation in the Tradition of the Humanities, Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2017, 
and The Revelation of Imagination: From Homer and the Bible through Virgil and Augustine to Dante, 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2015. 
480 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 123. p. 282. 
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material existence. In the passage, the defining characteristic of the spiritual present is 
discontinuity; its ability to interrupt the natural flow of time experienced in terms of past, present, 
and future. In other words, Novalis’ “spiritual present” is a historical concept promising to unify 
the three discrete temporalities into a single, vivid representation that, at least in the case of Die 
Christenheit oder Europa, aspires to serve as a regulative idea that conditions future reflection and 
action. In this way, the spiritual present is circumscribed by prophecy, though neither by fanatically 
negating the “sins” of the present for the sake of a future, nor by dogmatically renewing the 
authority of bygone traditions; rather, the spiritual present seeks to incorporate and redeploy the 
historical letter so that the present horizon of significance can be brought into view for the present.  
Questions inevitably emerge from Novalis’ idea of a “spiritual present.” Perhaps the most 
obvious one can be posed by adopting a Marxist perspective that stands ready to accuse Novalis 
of legitimizing historical inaccuracy by authorizing fantastical representions of history, as if it were 
acceptable to disregard empirical facts for the sake of an idealized, poetic image of history. To my 
mind, this deploys a Marxist critique too hastily. Earlier, in his “mixed observation” 92 (cited 
above), Novalis implies that without the empirical data of history the historian would be left with 
no material to “shape” history, no object to endow with “life.” Also, in the very next observation 
(93), Novalis confers to his “genius” historian the desire to cultivate a balance between a 
“subjective” and “objective” sense of history: “Beynah alles Genie war bisher einseitig—resultat 
einer kranckhaften Konstitution. Die Eine Klasse hatte zu viel äußern, die andere zu viel innern 
Sinn”481 [Almost all genius up to now was one-sided—the result of a sickly constitution. One type 
had too much sense of the external, the other too much inner sense]. To assume that history could 
                                               
481 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, no. 93. p. 270. Translation mine. 
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objectively speak for itself is, of course, itself a form of ideology and Novalis’ concept of history 
makes no pretensions toward that; in fact, quite the contrary, it is always the inner, spiritual (i.e. 
subjective) activity of the historian that brings unity to the multiplicity of historical phenomena. 
The “more serious” or difficult question, as one commentator described it, is whether or not 
historical judgments should be aestheticized in a way that makes the regulative ideal of a “spiritual 
present” appear as if they were constitutive of history.482 Does this transform history into a 
fairytale? Does it, as Carl Schmitt feared, promote political indecision by making history a matter 
of aesthetic pleasure?483 I will attempt to answers to these questions as I develop close readings of 
the father/son relationship in Heinrich von Ofterdingen and Novalis’ attempt at constructing a 
“spiritual present” from the religious history of medieval Europe in his Christenheit oder Europa.  
II. In Praise of Images: Novalis contra Lessing in Heinrich von Ofterdingen 
Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802) begins with a description of the protagonist’s 
parents, who “lagen schon und schliefen, [als] die Wanduhr schlug ihren einförmigen Takt” 
[already lay asleep in bed as the clock on the wall was ticking monotonously]. In the meantime, 
their son Heinrich “lag unruhig auf seinem Lager”484 [lay restless in his bed], reflecting on a 
                                               
482 See Saul, Nicholas. History and Poetry in Novalis and in the Tradition of the German Enlightenment. 
Bithell Series of Dissertations. Volume 8. Maney and Son, 1984. p. 80. 
483 On this subject, Schmitt writes: “What is perceived as romantic rationalism and intellectualism is this 
ironic deflation of the reality of the world into a fanciful construction. In this way, the two new realities—
humanity and history—also became figures that could be manipulated […] It is almost comical that 
serious historians regard romanticism as the originator of the historical sense […] In the romantic, 
everything—society and history, the cosmos and humanity– serves only the productivity of the romantic 
ego.” Schmitt, Carl, Political Romanticism.  MIT Press, 1986. pp. 74–75.  
484 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 240. English translation modified. 
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stranger’s tale of a blue flower, while outside “vor den klappernden Fenstern sauste der Wind; 
abwechselnd würde die Stube hell von dem Schimmer des Mondes”485 [the wind rattled the 
windows [and] from time to time the moon’s glimmer lit up the room]. These opening lines of 
Novalis’ unfinished Bildungsroman are deceptively straightforward. However, upon closer 
inspection the narrator establishes a subtle conflict between the parents and their child marked not 
only by the contrasting states of the characters (i.e. the slumbering parents and their restless son), 
but also by their different experiences of time. Whereas the parents’ room fills with the 
mechanically measured tick-tock of the wall clock, Heinrich’s is filled with punctuations of 
moonlight that ebb and flow as the wind spontaneously pushes away clouds. The descriptions 
present contrasting temporalities in which the parent’s mechanized, linear experience of time 
registers as antithetical to Heinrich’s natural, quasi-cyclical experience of it. These differing 
temporal perspectives help prepare the reader to understand how Heinrich and his father hold 
opposing views of history. As the first chapter progresses this generational conflict comes more 
sharply into focus and highlights, I will argue, several of the observations made in the previous 
section regarding the role of images in Novalis’ theory of education, which culminates in a 
symbolic confrontation between Augsburg and Rome—the respective geographical centers of 
Protestantism and Catholicism. The first chapter supplies evidence that images, dreams, and 
visions are indispensable for Heinrich’s education, thereby providing a perspective from which to 
understand the initial premises of the novel as a corrective against Lessing’s assumption that 
human reason gradually replaces the need for a sensible, image-based faith.  
Before I explore the father/son confrontation, I want to take a closer look at the opening 
scene to get a sense of how the novel builds up the significance of the dream-images that become 
                                               
485 Ibid., p. 240. 
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central to Heinrich’s education. The stranger’s tale of a blue flower appears to be the source of 
Heinrich’s restlessness. It leads to the following confessional soliloquy: “‘Nicht die Schätze sind 
es, die ein so unaussprechliches Verlangen in mir geweckt haben,’ sagte er zu sich selbst; ‘fern ab 
liegt mir alle Habsucht: aber die blaue Blume sehn ich mich zu erblicken. Sie liegt mir unaufhörlich 
im Sinn, und ich kann nichts anders dichten und denken’”486 [It is not the treasures that have 
awakened such an inexpressible yearning in me, nothing is further from me than greed: but I do 
long to behold the blue flower. It is perpetually in my mind, and nothing else occupies my thought 
and imagination.] At the heart of Heinrich’s reflection stands the distinction between beholding 
[erblicken] and possessing [Habsucht], in which the former is held in higher esteem because it 
functions as the point on which all of Heinrich’s cognitive activity turns. Similar to what was found 
in Lessing’s aesthetics, actually possessing the flower would terminate Heinrich’s cognitive 
activity. Of course, it must be acknowledged that Heinrich’s desire to see the blue flower is the 
result of him listening to a stranger’s tale and not the result of him actually having seen it, which 
introduces another level of mediation. Thus, in order for Heinrich to see the object of his 
“inexpressible yearning” requires him to visualize the blue flower based on what he hears from 
the tale. In other words, to have access to the blue flower, Heinrich must become an image-maker 
himself.487 The act of becoming an image-maker is best captured in Novalis’ fragment Über 
Goethe, in which he assigns spirit the task of visualizing that which is not intuitively available, 
                                               
486 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und 
Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 240. 
487 For a theory on images providing access to the invisible or absolute see Freedberg, David, The Power 
of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989. See 
his chapter “Invisibilia per Visibilia,” in which he describes legends from the thirteenth century as 
providing “abundant evidence for the use of images in meditational processes” (p. 168). 
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including the remote past. “Die Antike [wird], mit Händen gemacht. Der Geist bringt sie durch das 
Auge hervor—und der gehauene Stein ist nur der Körper, der erst durch sie Bedeutung erhält, und 
zur Erscheinung derselben wird488” [Antiquity is not made with hands. The spirit produces it 
through the eye—and the carved stone is only the body which first receives meaning through 
antiquity and becomes its appearance]. Thus, in order to “see” the past, spirit must conjure up a 
body, a letter, or a sensible form that makes the invisible both present and meaningful.  
Saving Novalis’ spiritual (re)construction of history for the next section, a more immediate 
question presents itself here: why should Heinrich, or anyone for that matter, trouble themselves 
with visualizing an image as seemingly trivial as a blue flower? In fact, this is Heinrich’s initial 
response to his own experience, for he tells himself that he has likely been carried away by a 
dream, prompting him to reassert the primacy of the waking world: “denn in der Welt, in der ich 
sonst lebte, wer hätte da sich um Blumen bekümmert, und gar von einer so seltsamen Leidenshaft 
für eine Blume hab’ ich damals nie gehört” [For in the world where I have always lived, who ever 
bothered about flowers? Such a strange passion for a flower is something I have never heard of 
before]. Yet following his initial doubts, Heinrich’s curiosity reemerges with added urgency. He 
starts to wonder where the stranger came from; why none of the other listeners were as affected 
by the stranger’s tale as he was; and what to make of his “wunderliche[r] Zustand” [strange 
condition]. Emerging from Heinrich’s ruminations on the stranger’s poetic tale—for it is, after all, 
poetry that produces his feelings of alienation489—are his “expectations” with respect to the blue 
                                               
488 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 413. 
489 More specifically, Heinrich seems to have the fable in mind: “Ich hörte einst von alten Zeiten reden; 
wie da die Thiere und Bäume und Felsen mit den Menschen gesprochen hätten” [Once I heard tell of the 
days of old, how animals and trees and cliffs talked with people then]. Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und 
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flower. Above all, it should signify something. As soon as he believes that the blue flower points 
to something beyond itself, the flower transcends its own apparent banality by familiarizing 
Heinrich with new ideas and perspectives: “Ich glaubte, ich wäre wahnsinnig, wenn ich nicht so 
klar und hell sähe und dächte, seitdem [ich die Blume erblickte,] ist mir alles viel bekannter”490 [I 
believe I were mad if I did not see and think so clearly. Indeed, since seeing the blue flower 
everything is much more familiar to me]. It is only when Heinrich does not have the flower “recht 
gegenwärtig” [right before his mind’s eye] that a “tiefes, inniges Treiben”491 [deep inner turmoil] 
takes hold of him. Insofar as the significance of the blue flower eludes Heinrich, it becomes the 
point of departure for his spiritual odyssey, providing him with a provisional goal (i.e. to determine 
its meaning) and setting him on a journey of (self) discovery. 
The start of that odyssey appears strikingly similar to the preface of Lessing’s Erziehung. 
Here the traveller (Heinrich) searches for orientation not in the “unermessliche Ferne” 
[immeasurable distance], but rather in the “unabsehliche Ferne” [unforeseeable distance], a slight 
modification that foregrounds a problem of optics or perception rather than one of rational 
calculation. At first glance, Heinrich seems to confirm Lessing’s assumption that rational concepts 
provide a better, more advanced mode of cognizing truth than sensuous images. He does this by 
contemplating whether a more robust command of abstract language would enable him to grasp 
the meaning of the stranger’s tale better: “Es muß noch viel Worte geben, die ich nicht weiß: wüßte 
ich mehr, so könnte ich viel bessert alles begreifen”492 [There must be many words I do not know; 
                                               
Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser 
Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 240. 
490 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 240. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid., p. 240–41. 
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if I knew more, I could grasp everything much better]. However, the narrator implies that the 
stranger’s tale adheres to the conventions of the fable, which means that Heinrich should not need 
to take recourse to complex abstraction in order to grasp the meaning of the story: “Mir ist gerade 
so, als wollten sie [die Thiere, Bäume und Felsen] allaugenblicklich anfangen, und als könnte ich 
es ihnen ansehen, was sie mir sagen wollten”493 [I feel just as though nature might start to talk any 
moment now and I could tell by the looks of the animals, trees, and cliffs what they wanted to say 
to me]. By referring to the fable, Novalis puts himself in dialogue with Lessing’s earlier 
Abhandlungen über die Fabel (1759), which, over the course of five essays, develops a logic of 
progress similar to that found in his Erziehung.494  
After criticizing a number of fabulists who prioritize allegory and ornament at the expense 
of simplicity,495 Lessing defines the fable as a “Lehre von der anschauenden Erkenntnis”496 [lesson 
of intuitive cognition]. The fabulist should be able to present general moral truths by narrating 
specific events, either imagined or historical.497 The general moral truth of the fable, Lessing 
                                               
493 Ibid., p. 240. 
494 For scholarship on Lessing’s theory of the fable, see Pritzner, John, “Lessing and the Fable,” in 
Fischer, Barbara and Fox, Thomas C., A Companion to the Works of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, New 
York: Camden House, 2005, pp. 89–105; Calhoon, Kenneth, “The Bible as Fable: History and Form in 
Lessing and Novalis.” Lessing Yearbook, 1984. 55–78; and Wellbery, David. Lessing’s Laocoon: 
Semiotics and aesthetics in the Age of Reason. Anglica Germanica Series 2. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, pp. 183–203. 
495 Lessing expresses this most clearly when discussing Breitinger’s theory of the fable, arguing: “die 
moralische Lehre [soll] in die Handlung weder versteckt noch verkleidet, sondern durch sie der 
anschauenden Erkenntnis fähig gemacht.” Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und Briefe: 1758–1759. 
Band IV. Hrsg. von Gunter E. Grimm. Deutsche Klassiker Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1997. p. 361. 
496 Ibid., p. 372. 
497 That fables should be based on real or imagined events was expressed through Lessing’s reading of 
Aesop’s fables. “Aesopus machte die meisten seiner Fabeln bei wirklichen Vorfällen. Seine Nachfolger 
haben sich dergleichen Vorfälle meistens erdichtet, oder auch wohl an ganz und gar keinen Vorfall, 
sondern bloß an diese oder jene allgemeine Wahrheit, bei Verfertigung der ihrigen, gedacht. Diese 
begnügten sich folglich, die allgemeine Wahrheit, durch die erdichtete Geschichte ihrer Fabel, erläutert zu 
haben; wenn jener noch über dieses, die Ähnlichkeit seiner erdichteten Geschichte mit dem 
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argues, “existiert nur in dem Besonderen, und kann nur in dem Besonderen anschauend erkannt 
werden” [exists only in the particular and can only be intuitively cognized in the particular]. Thus, 
the fabulist localizes general truths by working backward; transforming broad moral postulates 
into particular instantiations that are placed “sogleich in die Augen”498 [immediately before the 
eyes of the audience]. Lessing is quite emphatic about readers being able to immediately grasp the 
moral of the fable, demanding that “es muß gar keine Mühe kosten, die Lehre in der Fabel zu 
erkennen”499 [it must not require any effort to cognize the truth of the fable]. Thus Lessing and 
Novalis appear to be in agreement on the need for fables to aspire towards intuitive clarity. 
However, disagreements begin to emerge as soon as Lessing describes the “heuristic use” 
of the fable.500 Here, it becomes apparent that grasping the intuitive clarity of the fable is merely 
an exercise to prepare pupils for a more advanced form of cognition, which Lessing calls 
“symbolische Erkenntnis” [symbolic cognition]. Unlike intuitive cognition, symbolic cognition 
does not require particular examples to comprehend general truths; instead it can grasp them 
discursively by evaluating the arbitrary signs of language. Thus, the fable is pulled in two 
directions. On the one hand, the fable strives to make symbolic cognitions intuitively available for 
                                               
gegenwärtigen wirklichen Vorfalle faßlich machen, und zeigen mußte, daß aus beiden, so wohl aus der 
erdichteten Geschichte als dem wirklichen Vorfalle, sich eben dieselbe Wahrheit bereits ergebe, oder 
gewiß ergeben werde” [Aesop composed most of his fables according to actual occurrences: his 
successors have for the most part either invented such occurrences, or have merely been thinking not of 
any particular occurrence at all but of some general truth or other while producing their own fables.  The 
latter, therefore, have contented themselves with explaining a general truth through the invented fable; 
while the former, in addition to this truth, had to show the similarity of the invented story to the real case 
before him, and that both the invented story and the true occurrence established or would establish the 
same truth]. Ibid., p. 345. Translation mine. 
498 Ibid., p. 346. Translation mine. 
499 Ibid., p. 360. Translation mine. 
500 See the essay titled “Von einem besondern Nutzen der Fabeln in den Schulen” [On the Special Use of 
Fables in Schools], in Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke und Briefe: 1758–1759. Band IV. Hrsg. von 
Gunter E. Grimm. Deutsche Klassiker Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1997. pp. 407–11. 
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readers. On the other hand, it prepares readers to reach a higher level of maturity or education so 
that they become less dependent on intuitive cognition for grasping general, abstract truths. In 
terms of Lessing’s larger pedagogical agenda, he accords intuitive cognition a lower status than 
symbolic cognition––a hierarchy that fully embraces Wolffian rationalism.501  This hierarchy 
becomes palpable through a sudden outburst at the end of Lessing’s Abhandlungen essay, in which 
he asks: “Warum fehlt es in allen Wissenschaften und Künsten so sehr an Erfindern und 
selbstdenkenden Köpfen? Diese Frage wird am besten durch eine andre Frage beantwortet: Warum 
werden wir nicht besser erzogen?”502 [Why is there such a lack of inventors and self-thinking 
minds in all the arts and sciences? This question is best answered by another question: why are we 
not better educated?]. When properly educated, the “self-thinker” no longer needs to intuitively 
cognize the lesson of the fable but can arrive at it autonomously by means of his own cognitive 
powers. Along these lines Lessing continues: 
Ein knabe […] den man angewöhnt, alles, was er täglich zu seinem kleinen Wissen 
hinzulernt, mit dem, was er gestern bereits wußte, in der Geschwindigkeit zu 
vergleichen, und Acht zu haben, ob er durch diese Vergleichung nicht von selbst 
auf Dinge kömmt, die ihm noch nicht gesagt worden; den man beständig aus einer 
Scienz in die andere hinüber läßt; den man lehret sich eben so leicht von dem 
Besondern zu dem Allgemeinen zu erheben, als von dem allgemeinen zu dem 
Besondern sich wieder herab zu lassen: der Knabe wird ein Genie werden, oder 
man kann nichts in der Welt werden.503  
 
[A boy accustomed to compare at speed everything he learns today with what he 
already knew yesterday; who endeavors, by his own exertions, to obtain a 
knowledge of things which have not yet been taught him; who is constantly guided 
from one science to another; who is taught just as easily to ascend from the 
particular to the general, as to descend again from the general to the particular; such 
                                               
501 For a discussion on how Lessing’s theory of the fable maps onto Wollfian rationalism see Calhoon, 
Kenneth. “The Bible as Fable: History and Form in Lessing and Novalis.” Lessing Yearbook, 1984. p. 55. 
502 Ibid., p. 408. Translation mine. 
503 Ibid., p. 408. Translation mine. 
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a boy will either turn out a man of genius, or education has nothing to do with the 
formation of one.] 
Thus, the self-sufficiency of reason (i.e. its ability to move freely between inductive and 
deductive modes of inquiry without taking recourse to intuitive cognition) serves not only as the 
primary goal of education, but it also becomes necessary for “obtaining knowledge of things not 
yet learned” (i.e. cultivating genius). From this standpoint intuitive cognition appears unable to 
produce new knowledge but is instead limited to aiding reason to grasp obscure premises. Most 
important in the context of this study, is that Lessing treats the simple form of the fable as a 
stepping stone toward the self-sufficiency of reason. The fable provides the pupil with an intuitive 
way to access general truths, yet it eventually becomes obsolete as soon as the mind is able to 
grasp the general truth independently. In this way, Lessing’s developmental theory of the fable 
closely parallels the historical process described in his Erziehung in which faith gradually becomes 
less dependent upon intuitive or material mediation. This becomes a point of contention for 
Novalis. 
Unlike Lessing, Novalis values intuitive clarity without thinking of it as simply a bridge to 
a “higher,” discursive clarity. In fact, for Novalis religious education or knowledge production 
more generally requires embodied rather than disembodied processes, ones that involve material 
objects, pictures, dreams, texts, rhetorical speeches, and other media that make the spiritual or 
transcendent “worlds” of religion(s) manifestly present and intelligible. This tension between a 
material and immaterial approach to religious education has a much longer history than 
Protestantism,504 yet it became a central debate within the Reformation and one that contributed to 
                                               
504 Art historians like Alain Besançon, David Freedberg, and Hans Belting (to name only a few) have 
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serious conflicts amongst reformers.505 For example, the differences between Novalis and Lessing 
that I have been tracing call back to an earlier debate that Martin Luther had with a fellow reformer 
by the name of Andreas Karlstadt (1486–1541), who considered the presence of images in 
churches to be an affront to God’s commandment against idolatry.506 Luther, by contrast, 
developed a more neutral position, claiming that the charge of idolatry can only be properly applied 
if viewers mistakenly venerate the image (the material itself) rather than what the image refers to–
a gesture that assigns blame to the person rather than the image.507 In the end, Luther viewed 
images as “adiaphora,” or things of which God neither commands nor forbids with respect to 
religious practices.508 To my mind, Novalis comes closer to Luther than Lessing on this particular 
issue, although Novalis’ attitude towards the role of images is far less neutral. In the context of 
Novalis’ unfinished Bildungsroman, images are essential for Heinrich’s religious education; 
                                               
explored this longer history in their works. See Besançon, Alain, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual 
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without them he would never have experienced the “heavenly sensations flowing through his 
soul.” In other words, images are not divested of power; rather they condition religious experience 
itself. For Novalis, the purpose of images starts to approximate the sixteenth-century mystic St. 
Ignatius of Loyola, who described “spiritual exercises,” as a process in which the human mind 
visualizes saints, monuments, and relics to induce meditative states promising closer unity with 
God and also secret knowledge of His will.509 The crucial difference between Novalis and earlier 
traditions like the one St. Ignatius belonged to, is that the image points to something wholly 
indeterminate, changing its status as an allegorical object or religious icon to a Romantic 
symbol.510  
In the opening scene of Heinrich von der Ofterdingen, new images begin to proliferate and 
crystalize around the original image of the blue flower, which has an enchanting effect on Heinrich. 
This proliferation of images runs counter to the gradual dissolution of material mediation that, for 
Lessing, testifies to historical progress. Here, by contrast, we find the protagonist surrendering 
himself to the authority of the images he perceives, allowing them to guide him through the content 
of his dreams rather than placing all his confidence in human reason to impose an order (i.e. to act 
as sovereign mediator). In the following passage images become objects of desire, which demands 
a material relationship to the supernatural substrate of the blue flower:  
                                               
509 For example, in the prelude to Loyola’s first spiritual exercise he writes, “When a contemplation or 
meditation is about something that can be gazed on, for example, a contemplation of Christ our Lord, who 
is visible, the composition consists of seeing in imagination the physical place. By physical place I mean, 
for instance, a temple or a mountain where Jesus Christ or Our Lady happens to be, in accordance with 
the topic I desire to contemplate.” See Loyola, Ignatius of, Ignatius of Loyola: Spiritual Exercises and 
Selected Works. Edited by S. J. George E. Ganss, 1st edition, Paulist Press, 1991, p. 136. 
510 See Todorov, Tzvetan. Theories of the Symbol. Cornell University Press, 1982, especially pp. 198–
221. 
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Es dünkte ihn, als umflösse ihn eine Wolke des Abendroths; eine himmlische 
Empfindung überströmte sein Inneres; mit inniger Wollust strebten unzählbare 
Gedanken in ihm sich zu vermischen; neue, nie gesehene Bilder entstanden, die 
auch in einander flossen und zu sichtbaren Wesen um ihn wurden, und jede Welle 
des lieblichen Elements schmiegte sich wie ein zarter Busen an ihn. Die Flut schien 
eine Auflösung reizender Mädchen, die an dem Jünglinge sich augenblicklich 
verkörperten.511 
 
[It seemed as if a sunset cloud was enveloping him; a heavenly sensation flowed 
through his soul; with voluptuous delight countless thoughts strove to mingle 
within him. New images never seen before arose and interfused and became visible 
beings around him, and every wave of the lovely element clung to him like a tender 
bosom. The waves appeared to be charming girls dissolved, which momentarily 
embodied themselves as they touched the youth.] 
That the images “cling” to Heinrich suggests that they represent more than a dispensable 
form or a vehicle serving merely to transport him to a more “enlightened” state of religious 
consciousness. Instead, the images become “visible beings” that generate, shape, and authenticate 
his belief in the supernatural power of the blue flower by engaging his perception. “Alle 
Empfindungen,” the narrator writes, “stiegen bis zu einer niegekannten Höhe in ihm”512 [every 
sensation mounted to hitherto unknown heights in him]. By letting himself be guided by these 
sensations, Heinrich “durchlebte ein unendlich buntes Leben; starb und kam wieder, liebte bis zur 
höchsten Leidenschaft, und war dann wieder auf ewig von seiner Geliebten getrennt”513 [lived 
through an infinite variety of colorful experiences; he died and came to life again, loved most 
passionately, and was then separated from his loved one forever]. Standing in the background of 
these “colorful experiences” are a multiplicity of images that become “klarer und bleibender” 
                                               
511 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 242. 
512 Ibid., p. 241. 
513 Ibid., p. 241. 
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[clearer and more abiding], rather than gradually less relevant. However, Heinrich is never in 
“possession” of the images; they constantly change into new forms that always assume sensible 
(and sensual) forms like waves appearing as “dissolved charming girls” who nevertheless have the 
power to “touch” him.514  
I understand these details from the opening scene to set the stage for Heinrich’s 
confrontation with his father, which I read as an imagined debate between Novalis and Lessing 
over the status of images in their respective theories of Bildung. The dialogue between Heinrich 
and his father begins shortly after he is awoken. “Du langschläfer” [late riser] is the first direct 
speech we hear from the father, whose hyperbolized industriousness anticipates Max Weber’s 
arguments linking the ethics of Protestantism to the spirit of capitalism. “Wie lange sitze ich hier 
und feile,” the father continues. “Ich habe deinetwegen nichts hämmern dürfen; die Mutter wollte 
den lieben Sohn schlafen Lassen”515 [How long do I sit here and file. I was not allowed to hammer 
because your mother wanted to let her dear son sleep]. Heinrich asks his father not to get mad at 
his perceived laziness and eagerly tells him how his dream felt more significant than a random 
sequence of fleeting images; that the blue flower seemed “als sey es mehr als bloßer Traum 
gewesen” [as though it were more than mere dream]. The father then launches into a rather lengthy 
                                               
514 For recent materialist approaches to religious studies, see Meyer, Birgit, “An Author Meets Her 
Critics,” Religion and Society; New York, vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 205–54; Gertsman, Elina, “Mater 
Matters,” in Downes, Stephanie et al., ed., Feeling Things: Objects and Emotions through History, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 27–42; See also Arendt, Hannah, Love and Saint Augustine, 
ed. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Arendt attempts to recover a “pre-theological” moment in St. Augustine’s writings, which involves a 
notion of “craving” as the common denominator of both Christian Caritas and Greek Cupitas. The idea of 
“craving” foregrounds an expectation of a determinate, or material object in this context. 
515 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl und 
Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 243. 
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monologue that reconstructs the rationalism informing Lessing’s tripartite scheme of religious 
history, which progresses from a religion based on outward images and laws (Judaism), to a 
religion that establishes a spiritual, inner relationship to law (Christianity), and then finally to a 
religion that no longer needs a system of rewards and punishments to adhere to the law (the “new 
eternal gospel”). The telos of this history suggests that the general truths of the bible can eventually 
be grasped without any reference to their particular historical expression in the bible.516 The father 
says:  
Träume sind Schäume, mögen auch die hochgelehrten Herren davon denken, was 
sie wollen, und du thust wohl, wenn du dein Gemüth von dergleichen unnützen und 
schädlichen Betrachtungen abwendest. Die Zeiten sind nicht mehr, wo zu den 
Träumen göttliche Gesichte sich gesellten, und wir können und werden es nicht 
begreifen, wie es jenen auserwählten Männern, von denen die Bibel erzählt, zu 
Muthe gewesen ist. Damals muß es eine andere Beschaffenheit mit den Träumen 
gehabt haben, so wie mit den menschlichen Dingen.517 
 
[Dreams are nothing but lies, whatever your learned men may think of them; and 
you would do better to turn your mind away from such useless and harmful 
reflections. The times are past when divine apparitions appeared in dreams, and we 
cannot and will not fathom the state of mind of those chosen men the Bible speaks 
of. The nature of dreams as well as of the world of men must have been different 
in those days.]  
Heinrich’s father rejects the idea that his son’s dream carries any potential for revealing 
knowledge. Rather, he judges them to possess only a negative value since they distract the mind 
from performing its more industrious duties. He dismisses the necessity of prophecy altogether, 
claiming that the times in which dreams were considered a form of divine communication are long 
gone, and that the modern world is no longer governed by such superstition. Instead, the father 
                                               
516 See especially Lessing’s Erziehung §85. 
517 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 243. 
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believes society has progressed so much that the prophetic stories of the bible are no longer 
serviceable to practical life. He argues, “in dem Alter der Welt, wo wir leben, findet der 
unmittelbare Verkehr mit dem Himmel nicht mehr statt. Die alten Geschichten und Schriften sind 
jetzt die einzigen Quellen, durch die uns eine Kenntniß von der überirdischen Welt, so weit wir 
sie nöthig haben, zu theil wird”518 [In the age we live in there is no longer any direct intercourse 
with heaven. The old stories and records make up our only source of knowledge, in so far as we 
need it, of the supernatural world]. Here the father describes his perspective in terms of a rupture 
between a modernity ordered by reason and earlier traditions that found orientation by means of 
the legends and myths contained in scripture—a prejudice that expects modernity to progress 
“from mythos to logos,” as Blumenberg and Cassirer have discussed (differently) in their 
respective projects.519 The father then ventriloquizes a central argument in Lessing’s Erziehung, 
suggesting that reason no longer requires the prophetic mediation of dreams: “statt jener 
ausdrücklichen Offenbarungen redet jetzt der heilige Geist mittelbar durch den Verstand kluger 
und wohlgesinnter Männer und durch die Lebensweise und die Schicksale frommer Menschen zu 
uns”520 [instead of those expressed revelations the holy spirit now speaks to us indirectly through 
the minds of wise and well-disposed men and through the customs and fates of the pious]. Central 
                                               
518 Ibid., p. 243. 
519 For a comparison between Blumenberg’s Work on Myth and Cassirer’s Symbolic Forms, see Robert 
Wallace’s introduction to Blumenberg, Hans, Work on Myth, trans. Robert M. Wallace, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988. Wallace makes the following observation: “While Blumenberg honors Cassirer’s 
work on this problem (as on others), he has one fundamental criticism of Cassirer’s theory: That he did 
not manage to overcome the unstated assumption that once science emerges, myth, despite its supposedly 
autonomous dignity as a “symbolic form,” is fundamentally obsolete; that once the step “from mythos to 
logos” has been taken, it can only be perverse to, as it were, turn back” (p. viii). 
520 Novalis.  Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs.  Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel.  Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I,  p. 243. 
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to the father’s statement is the assumption that reason has taken over religious mediation for the 
modern world. He eventually goes on to strip the sensible forms (intuitions, images, miracles, 
prophecies) associated with revealed knowledge of all their edifying power: “Unser heutigen 
Wunderbilder haben mich nie sonderlich erbaut, und ich habe nie jene großen Thaten geglaubt, 
die unsre Geistlichen davon erzählen. Indeß mag sich daran erbauen, wer will, und ich hüte mich 
wohl jemanden in seinem Vertrauen irre zu machen”521 [Our present-day miracle-working images 
have never edified me especially, and I have never believed the great deeds that our spiritual 
leaders attribute to them. However, anyone who wants to may derive edification from them, and I 
am careful not to make another stray from his faith]. These final words of the father’s speech 
expose a paradox with respect to the status of tolerance in Lessing’s religious thought. On the one 
hand, the father tolerates the different ways in which others arrive at their faith, claiming that he 
does not want to interfere in this process. On the other hand, he regards those who still need 
sensible forms to grasp religious truth as failing to catch up with the rest of the modern world. This 
prejudice is precisely what Novalis seeks to correct in his philosophy of religion.  
Heinrich’s response to his father points to significant differences between Lessing and 
Novalis. Their debate begins as soon as Heinrich asks: “Aber, lieber Vater, aus welchem Grunde 
seyd Ihr so den Träumen entgegen, deren seltsame Verwandlungen und leichte zarte Natur doch 
unser Nachdenken gewißlich rege machen müssen?”522 [But father, what makes you so opposed 
to dreams? Their strange transformations and light, tender nature must certainly promote our 
reflections]. Here Heinrich challenges his father’s assumption that dreams only yield “useless” and 
“harmful” reflections. For Heinrich, dreams represent a “Wunderbarkeit” [miraculous 
                                               
521 Ibid., p. 243. 
522 Ibid., p. 244. 
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phenomenon] not only because of their ability to influence thought and action, but also because of 
their ability to reveal knowledge about his inner experiences. In his words, they reveal “ein 
bedeutsamer Riss in den geheimnivollen Vorhang […] der mit tausend Falten in unser Inneres 
hereinfällt” [a significant rent in the mysterious curtain that hangs a thousandfold about our inner 
life]. This miraculous power of dreams appears to be rooted in their vivid particularities rather than 
in a general truth subsequently supplied by reason. From Heinrich’s perspective, the vividness of 
dreams, which resist being pinned down by one master narrative, makes them better didactic 
instruments than general truths, or the symbolic mode of cognition that Lessing holds in such high 
esteem. This becomes clear from Heinrich’s own dream analysis of the blue flower, in which he 
tells his father: “Gewiß ist der Traum, den ich heute Nacht träumte, kein unwirksamer Zufall in 
meinem Leben gewesen, denn ich fühle es, daß er in meine Seele wie ein weites Rad hineingreift, 
und sie in mächtigem Schwunge forttreibt” [Certainly the dream I dreamt last night will not have 
been an ineffectual accident in my life, for I feel that it reaches into my soul as into a giant wheel, 
compelling it onward with a mighty swing]. To Heinrich there is nothing “useless” about his dream 
insofar as it both compels him “onward” and reveals knowledge about his inner life, a perspective 
that invests the image with a power to mediate between inner and outer experience.523  
Unlike his father, Heinrich also values dreams for their ability to break apart the monotony 
of routine life. He finds dreams to be “eine Schutzwehr gegen die Regelmäßigkeit und 
                                               
523 In his book Caspar David Friedrich and the Subject of Landscape, Joseph Koerner argues that Caspar 
David Friedrich introduces a confessional or reflexive dimension to Romantic painting that also serves as 
a means of mediating between inner and outer realities. According to Koerner, this established a new 
standard within Romantic landscape painting: “the whole of represented nature will appear as the picture 
of the artist’s inner experience of self and world.” Koerner, Joseph Leo, Caspar David Friedrich and the 
Subject of Landscape, 2nd ed., Reaktion, 2009, p. 89. 
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Gewöhnlichkeit des Lebens, eine freye Erholung der gebundenen Fantasie, wo sie alle Bilder des 
Lebens durcheinanderwirft und die beständige Ernsthaftigkeit des erwachsenen Menschen durch 
ein fröhliches Kinderspiel unterbricht”524 [a defense against the regularity and monotony of life, a 
playground where the imagination is freed and revived and where it fuses together all the pictures 
of life and interrupts the constant soberness of grown-ups by means of a merry child’s play]. In 
this instance, Heinrich’s perspective on dreams comes much closer to Schiller’s theory of aesthetic 
education than anything encountered in Lessing’s Erziehung. Novalis, who studied under Schiller 
at Jena, seems especially influenced by his mentor if one considers the claim that dreams can 
reconcile the antagonism between the “soberness” of mature life and the playfulness of childhood, 
a dialectic that redescribes the dynamics of Schiller’s “Formtrieb,” “sinnliche Trieb,” and 
“Spieltrieb” in which the latter synthesizes material and spiritual existence by producing a 
beautiful object or a “living form.”525 Above all, Heinrich seeks to establish a different relationship 
between dreams and waking life than his father; one that suggests the two need not be so radically 
(and asymmetrically) opposed and that the one can influence the other.  
After responding to his father’s critique of dreams, Heinrich’s mother reminds the father 
that he too once had a profound dream during his adolescence that inspired him to propose to her 
at Augsburg. She asks the father if he remembers “daß du mir damals auch von einem Traume 
erzählest, den du in Rom gehabt hattest, und der dich zuerst auf den Gedanken gebracht, zu uns 
nach Augsburg zu kommen, und um mich zu werben?” [that you told me at that time about a dream 
                                               
524 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 244. 
525 See Schiller, Friedrich, “Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen,” in Sämtliche Werke in fünf 
Bänden, dtv Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, especially letter 15. For an excellent study on the relationship 
between Schiller and Novalis, see Saul, Nicholas. History and Poetry in Novalis and in the Tradition of 
the German Enlightenment. Institute of Germanic Studies, 1984. 
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you had in Rome, which put into your head to come to Augsburg and try for my hand?]. By naming 
Rome and Augsburg in the context of this debate involving dream images, Novalis alludes to a 
long and contentious history of iconoclasm that actually began in the eighth century and then 
reappeared during the reformation.  In the earlier eighth century iconoclasm the Byzantine emperor 
Constantine V (718–775) prohibited the use of religious images because he believed the devil, 
“under the appearance of Christianity, had surreptitiously led humanity back to idolatry” by 
inhabiting icons.526 At this time, iconoclasts siding with Constantine thought that icons “corrupted 
human intelligence by arousing shameful pleasures,”527 and that the material used to construct 
them was incommensurable with the immaterial, divine spirit they sought to reference. The Roman 
Catholic Church challenged Constantine’s policy on religious icons at the Second Council of Nicea 
(787), in which Church leaders fought to restore confidence in the use of images for the purpose 
of worship, arguing that the Byzantine iconoclasts were the only ones “surreptitiously” misleading 
people, and that both word and image harmoniously referred to the same “sacred” things. During 
the sixteenth century—which is of greater concern for this study—similar concerns to the ones 
Constantine expressed would be revisited by a number of reformers, who were generally divided 
over the question of what role images should play in religious worship.528 Philipp Melanchthon 
                                               
526 See Besançon, Alain. The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm. University of 
Chicago Press, 2000. p. 124. Besançon notes how the emperor proliferated his own images (on coins for 
example), while at the same time limiting the legitimate use of religious images to that of Christ; a 
discrepancy that is not without political motivations. 
527 Quoted in Besançon, Ibid., p. 123. 
528 See Alain Besançon’s The Forbidden Image for a comparison between the iconoclasm of the eighth 
century and the iconoclasm during the Reformation. Besançon writes: “The destruction in 726 of the 
Christ of the Chalkitis, the image protecting Constantinople, placed above the Golden Gate of the 
imperial palace, can be compared to the posting of Luther’s theses on the door of the Wittenberg Church: 
it had the value of a reformation.” Ibid., p. 123. 
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(1497–1560), author of the Augsburg Confession (1530), wrote the following article on using 
images of Saints to facilitate worship: 
Of the worship of Saints they teach that the memory of saints may be set before our 
eyes, that we may follow their faith and good works, according to our calling, as 
the Emperor may follow the example of David in making war to drive away the 
Turk from his country; for both are kings. But Scripture teaches not the invocation 
of saints or to ask help of saints, since it sets before our eyes the one Christ as the 
Mediator, Propitiation, High Priest, and Intercessor.529  
While the lives of saints might be useful to remember as particular examples of how to be 
faithful and how to perform “good” works, the Lutheran doctrine of Solus Christus holds that only 
Christ can act as the mediator in matters of human salvation and that these subordinate figures 
contribute nothing to that end.  Much like the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, which reduced the number 
of sacred texts included in the canon to only the most essential, so too did Melanchthon’s twenty-
first article of the Augsburg Confession reduce the number of appropriate images that one could 
view while praying to just one: Christ.530 The Roman Catholic Church responded to this article of 
the Augsburg Confession in the twenty-fifth session of the Council of Trent (1545–63), in which 
relics and images of saints were said to “instruct the faithful diligently in matters relating to the 
intercession,” and that it was “good and beneficial to invoke [images of saints] and to have recourse 
to their prayers, assistance, and support in order to obtain favors from God through His Son.”531 
So images of saints and the prayers associated with such images were seen more as aids and 
supplements for the purpose of religious worship than as a ruse devised by the devil. The Council 
                                               
529 Melanchthon, Philipp. The Augsburg Confession. Translated by Gerhard Friedrich Bente, CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2017, p. 32 
530 For more on how Sola Scriptura significantly reduces the scope of the biblical tradition that was made 
available for public consumption, see my Chapter 2, section 3, “excursus.” 
531 Church, Fathers of the, The Canons and Decrees of the Council Of Trent, trans. Rev H. J. Schroeder, 
Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books, 2009, p. 218. 
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of Trent also celebrated the pedagogical benefits that images had for the illiterate, arguing that: 
by means of the stories of the mysteries of our redemption portrayed in paintings 
and other representations the people are instructed and confirmed in the articles of 
faith [and] all holy images [are profitable], not only because the people are thereby 
reminded of the benefits and gifts bestowed on them by Christ, but also because 
through the saints the miracles of God and salutary examples are set before the eyes 
of the faithful, so that they may give God thanks for those things, may fashion their 
own life and conduct in imitation of the saints and be moved to adore and love God 
and cultivate piety.532 
As long as images could be instrumentalized to instruct and edify viewers, the council 
considered them to be of great value.  
With this history of iconoclasm in mind, the stakes of the debate between Heinrich and his 
father increase dramatically. The father, who appears to be moderately sympathetic towards 
iconoclasm, reluctantly agrees to tell his story about a dream he once had in his youth. The father’s 
dream has an uncanny similarity to Heinrich’s. Prior to recounting the dream, Heinrich’s father 
recalls the events of that day in which he was the guest of an old man from the country. The two 
discussed ancient poetry, sculpture, and painting until late in the evening. Like his son, the father 
was deeply impressed by the poetic manner in which the old man narrated his stories: “Noch jetzt 
heitert mein Herz sich auf, wenn ich mich des bunten Gewühls der wunderlichen Gedanken und 
Empfindungen erinnere, die mich in dieser Nacht erfüllten”533 [Even to this day my heart cheers 
up whenever I recall the motley crowd of strange thoughts and feelings that filled me that night]. 
These strange thoughts and feelings made their way into the father’s dream that night, which 
culminated in him being led by the old man from a cave to an open meadow containing many 
                                               
532 Ibid., 219. 
533 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band I, p. 246. 
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flowers, in which one was “especially pleasing” to him. The old man tells him “Du hast das 
Wunder der Welt gesehen […] Nimm wohl in Acht, was ich dir sage: wenn du am Tage Johannis 
gegen Abend wieder hieher kommst, und Gott herzlich um das Verständnis dieses Traumes bittest, 
so wird dir das höchste irdische Los zu Theil werden”534 [You have seen the miracle of the world. 
Heed carefully what I tell you: if you come back here again towards evening on St. John’s day and 
pray earnestly to God for the meaning of this dream, then the highest earthly lot will be yours]. In 
this context, citing John the Baptist, whose head was chopped off and brought to King Herod’s 
court on a platter, is not without irony given the father’s proclivity to rationally mediate all forms 
of revealed knowledge. But for a fleeting moment, the father experiences the transformative effect 
of poetic imagery: “Ich war darauf im Traume unter den herrlichsten Gestalten und Menschen, 
und unendliche Zeiten gaukelten mit mannichfaltigen Veränderungen vor meinen Augen vorüber. 
Wie gelöst war meine Zunge, und was ich sprach, klang wie Musik”535 [After that dream I found 
myself among the most glorious shapes and people, and endless periods of time fluttered by in 
manifold changes. My tongue was as though set free, and my words had the ring of music]. In this 
passage history, conceived here as “endless periods of time” fluttering by, is emancipated from 
any singular telos, which the father describes in terms of a plurality of constantly changing 
historical and cultural experiences—an environment that opens up a space for the creative 
imaginative to freely play. Yet, rather than returning to visit the old man on Saint John’s day to 
determine the meaning of his dream, the father quickly left Rome to travel to Augsburg, thinking 
that the dream was urging him to propose to Heinrich’s mother. Immediately after his 
                                               
534 Ibid., 247. 
535 Ibid., 247. 
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transformative experience the father noted that “darauf ward alles wieder dunkel und eng und 
gewöhnlich; ich sah deine Mutter mit freundlichem, verschämten Blick vor mir; sie hielt ein 
glänzendes Kind in den Armen […]”536 [Then everything became dark and confined and ordinary 
again. I saw your mother with an amiable, abashed look before me. She held a shining child in her 
arms…]. 
The potential for multiple meanings with respect to the father’s dream is swiftly curtailed 
by a singular interpretation that reinforces the status quo of bourgeois family life. Instead of 
negotiating the meaning of the dream by praying “earnestly to God” and socially interacting with 
the old man, the father breaks his promise to return on St. John’s Day and confidently hastens to 
Augsburg in order to actualize what he considered to be the dream’s ultimate meaning: marriage 
and procreation. To my mind, Novalis uses this scene to emphasize how the father’s dream 
experience quickly becomes disenchanting as soon as he reduces the diverse variety of images to 
just one meaning––a meaning that purges both inner and outer life of its poetic vitality. By 
juxtaposing Rome and Augsburg in the father’s recollection, Novalis subtly throws his support 
behind the Roman Catholic Church vis-à-vis its stance on images, a position that would earn him 
a share of ridicule from his largely Protestant peers in the Jena circle. However, he leaves the 
Roman Catholic Church behind the moment he expresses a desire to transform religious images 
and history into symbols that can take on a life of their own independent of any religious 
affiliations. For Novalis, dream images and even historical narratives, insofar as they too present 
images of the past that assert authority over posterity, must retain an ability to generate multiple 
meanings and new experiences that promise alternative configurations of spiritual life. In his 
Christenheit oder Europa, Novalis develops a manifesto for reenchanting the history of 
                                               
536 Ibid., 247. 
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Christianity so that it can more adequately serve the changing spiritual needs of modernity. It is to 
this text that I now turn.  
III. The Legibility of Spirit: Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa and the Question of 
Historical Mediation 
Alles, was wir erfahren ist eine Mittheilung. So ist die Welt in der 
That eine Mittheilung—Offenbarung des Geistes. Die Zeit ist nicht mehr, 
wo der Geist Gottes verständlich war. Der Sinn der Welt ist verlohren 
gegangen. Wir sind beym Buchstaben stehn geblieben. Wir haben das 
Erscheinende über der Erscheinung verlohren. Formularwesen537  
 
[Everything we experience is a communication. Thus the world is 
indeed a communication—a revelation of the spirit. The age has passed 
when the spirit of God could be understood. The meaning of the world is 
lost. We have stopped at the letter. As a result of the appearance we have 
lost that which is appearing. Formulary beings]. 
 
—Novalis, Vorarbeiten 1798 
Die Christenheit oder Europa was and is a controversial text. When Novalis first presented 
it as a speech, or rather a sermon, to members of the Jena Circle in November of 1799 it 
immediately sparked controversy. For instance, Goethe, while not himself a participant of the 
circle but still an authoritative voice for its members, strongly advised Friedrich Schlegel against 
publishing it in the Anthenaeum journal. Schleiermacher, who had just finished his treatise Über 
die Religion, found it too sympathetic towards the Catholic tradition, even accusing Novalis of 
being a papist. Schelling responded to the work with a satirical poem titled Epikurisch 
                                               
537 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 383, no. 316. 
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Glaubensbekenntnis von Heinz Widerporstens (1799), which targets the religious writings of both 
Schleiermacher and Novalis for their insistence on a new religiosity that paradoxically calls for 
material mediation on the one hand, and spiritual or inner mediation on the other.538 The most 
vocal dissenter, however, was Dorothy Schlegel. Her extreme antipathy towards Novalis himself 
compelled her to obstruct the publication of Die Christenheit oder Europa by any means necessary, 
which included appealing to her husband Friedrich and brother-in-law August to reject it. In fact, 
once she learned of Goethe’s negative review of the work, Dorothy had the following to say in a 
letter to Schleiermacher: “Ich war gleich von vorne herein sehr dagegen, aber das war eine Stimme 
in der Wüste. Endlich wollte es [August] Wilhelm nicht ohne eine Note, die wollte Schelling nicht, 
Goethe ward zum Schiedsrichter genommen und der hat es ganz und gar verworfen! Vivat 
Goethe!”539 [I was strongly against it from the beginning, but mine was a voice in the wilderness. 
Finally, [August] Wilhelm did not want to publish it without a note, Schelling did not want that, 
Goethe was called in to make the final decision, and he completely quashed it. Vivat Goethe!]. 
Beyond its immediate late-eighteenth-century context, Die Christenheit oder Europa 
continued to stir controversy. Its poetic idealization of the Medieval Christian world overlooks the 
divisiveness associated with both the Church’s military campaigns against Byzantium and the 
                                               
538 Against material mediation, Schelling sarcastically writes: “Die Materie sei das einzig Wahre, / Unser 
aller Schutz und Rather, / Aller Dinge rechter Vater, / Alles Denkens Element, / Alles Wissens Anfang 
und End” [Matter is our only true, / omnipresent protector and counsellor, / All things proper, Father, / 
All thinking elements, / All knowledge from beginning to end]. And against spiritual, or inner mediation 
he writes: “Wie sie sprechen vom inner Licht, / Reden viel und beweisen nicht, / Füllen mit großen 
Worten die Ohren, / Ist weder gesotten noch gegohren” [ How they speak of inner light, / speak much but 
do not prove much, / fill the ears with big words, / neither is boiled or formented]. Schelling, Friedrich. 
Epikurisch Glaubensbekenntnis von Heinz Widerporstens. In Muller, Andreas, Satiren Und Parodien. 
Reclam, 1935. p. 177–86. 
539 Briefe an Schleiermacher. December 9, 1799. Novalis. Schriften. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. by 
Paul Kluckhohn, Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mähl and Gerhard Schulz. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1960. vol. 
4, pp. 648–49. Translation mine. 
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Christian mission, which, even at its inception, chronicles a political rather than philanthropic 
agenda.540 In his book Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (1947), Karl Barth confirms 
this account of Novalis’ disregard for historical accuracy, claiming: “far more important to 
[Novalis] than an assessment of the significance of exact research into the details of history is here 
once again the polemic against its ‘degeneration,’ against every study of history which is merely 
analytic, unphilosophic, unpoetic, and the [demand] that ‘a student of history must also of necessity 
be a poet,’ and the assertion that there is more truth in the fanciful tales of the poets than in the 
learned chronicles.”541 In his book Political Romanticism (1919), Carl Schmitt expressed outrage 
that the reception of Die Christenheit oder Europa archives serious political engagement with the 
essay, lamenting that “in its content, mood and cadence, the essay is a fairy tale. It is not an 
intellectual achievement, but rather a beautiful poetic fantasy […] But it is not treated as a fairy 
tale, and even today it is quoted with pedantic seriousness in the same breath as the utterances of 
responsible statesmen and philosophical thinkers and is given equal weight as proof.”542 At the 
very least, these problematic aspects of Novalis’ poetic idealization of religious history should be 
acknowledged prior to any investigation into its potential value. 
Die Christenheit oder Europa has also received more recent scholarly attention from 
Pauline Kleingeld, whose article “Romantic Cosmopolitanism: Novalis’ Christianity or Europe” 
                                               
540 Jacob Taubes develops a similar reading in his Political Theology of Paul, arguing that Paul’s letter to 
the Romans represents “a declaration of war.” Taubes goes on to describe Paul’s missionary work in 
Rome as a business trip that was taken “in order to obtain legitimation for himself,” further claiming that 
“If someone brings along a decent sum [of money], then it’s also a matter of legitimation, and not just 
philanthropy. Not philanthropy at all, but of legitimation.” Taubes, Jacob. The Political Theology of Paul. 
Stanford University Press, 2004. pp. 13–21. 
541 Barth, Karl. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History. New ed., 
SCM, 2001, p. 342. 
542 Schmitt, Carl. Political Romanticism. MIT Press, 1986. p. 126. 
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(2008), for example, views this document as one of the clearest expressions of Novalis’ broader 
philosophical commitments and argues that it develops a “version of the cosmopolitan ideal that 
is distinctly Romantic.”543 Central to Kleingeld’s argument is how Die Christenheit oder Europa 
moves away from the cosmopolitanism represented in Kant’s 1795 essay “Zum ewigen Frieden” 
[Perpetual Peace], claiming that Novalis found the Kantian assumption that “self-interest and 
social antagonism could help bring perpetual peace closer to be absurd and harmful.”544 Gianni 
Vattimo’s book After Christianity (2002) includes a chapter, titled “Christianity or the West,” 
which reflects on the significance of Novalis’ text in relation to contemporary debates about the 
continued relevance of religion in the context of the twenty-first century. Vattimo argues that Die 
Christenheit oder Europa is neither an attempt to restore a sacred cosmopolitan community that 
existed once upon a time, nor does it suggest that Europe rejects Christianity in favor of the 
modern, secular state. Rather, Vattimo understands the “oder” [or] in Novalis’ title to be synthetic, 
one in which Christianity and Europe are viewed as a “synonymous identity”: “What, then, is the 
meaning in the title of the equivalence, if not the synonymous identity, of the West and 
Christianity. Indeed, the ‘or’ immediately excludes another meaning that could be given to the use 
of the particle, which in part is identical: what we are talking about is a synonymous relation rather 
than an alternative one.”545 By reading the “or” in Novalis’ text as an “equivalence,” Vattimo 
views Christianity as a common denominator linking European nations. Moreover, he understands 
the basic premise of Novalis’ text to present a form of social cohesion that does not need to 
reference national borders, giving religion a more explicitly political function. However, neither 
                                               
543 Kleingeld, Pauline. “Romantic Cosmopolitanism: Novalis’s ‘Christianity or Europe.’” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy; Baltimore, vol. 46, no. 2, Apr. 2008, pp. 269–84. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Vattimo, Gianni. After Christianity. Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 70. 
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Vattimo nor Kleingeld situate Die Christenheit oder Europa within the theological background of 
the fragment controversy. Whereas Vattimo uses Novalis’ text to reflect on his broader interest in 
the hermeneutic afterlife of Christianity (i.e. modernity’s ceaseless desire to make sense of its own 
religious past546), Kleingeld limits her investigation to the question of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, 
both commentators overlook the many ways in which the work was in conversation with Lessing’s 
philosophy of religion.  
My reading of Die Christenheit oder Europa situates it in this post-fragment controversy 
context and compares the work (primarily) to Lessing’s Erziehung in order to show the continuities 
and discontinuities between these works. Specifically, I understand Die Christenheit oder Europa 
as an attempt to provide Lessing’s theory of the “new eternal gospel” with a vivid representation. 
According to Lessing’s Erziehung, human reason requires vivid representations, or “anschauliche 
Erkenntnisse” [intuitive cognitions], whenever it finds itself in a state of “immaturity,” wherein 
reason cannot arrive at general truth claims autonomously, but instead commissions the help of 
precepts, intuitions, and sensible forms in order to grasp them. Because Lessing’s new eternal 
gospel announces the start of a more advanced stage in mankind’s religious consciousness—one 
in which the authority of religion draws its legitimacy from the spirit rather than letter of religion—
its truth remains somewhat alien to reason; specifically, the idea that salvation can be understood 
                                               
546 Vattimo understands the Christian idea of salvation and the practice of hermeneutics to be inextricably 
linked, a view that he develops across several of works. In The Future of Religion, for example, he writes: 
“Hermeneutics has been the friendliest philosophy toward religion because of its critique of the idea of 
truth as conformity between propositions and objects. From the point of view of the return of religiosity, 
the prominence of hermeneutics in contemporary culture seems to indicate, much more than in any 
previous epoch, that the road to salvation does not pass through description and knowledge but through 
interpretation and edification.” Rorty, Richard and Gianni Vattimo, The Future of Religion. Edited by 
Santiago Zabala, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 13. Vattimo makes a similar claim in his book 
Belief: “to believe in salvation will not mean adhering to the letter of everything that is written in the 
Gospel and in the dogmatic teaching of the Church, but rather in trying to understand the meaning of the 
evangelical text for me, here, now.” Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 66. 
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as a lived experience rather than as a reward redeemable in an unknown future. It is, of course, not 
imperative to read Die Christenheit oder Europa alongside Lessing’s Erziehung, for the text also 
represents, as Kleingeld suggests, a convergent zone of Novalis’ own broader philosophical 
commitments. For instance, I understand Die Christenheit oder Europa as staging Novalis’ theory 
of a “geistige Gegenwart” [spiritual present], which, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, 
seeks to combine mnemonic and prophetic modes of thought into symbols that can serve as 
regulative ideals. Novalis’ text could also be contrasted with other works of Lessing such as his 
Das Testament Johannis, which advocates for a dematerialization (i.e. emptying it of all ornament) 
or demythologization of religion by reducing the message of the Gospel of John to the pragmatic 
words “little children love one another” (i.e. Christian caritas). Against this demythologizing 
process, Novalis writes: “Die Christenheit muß wieder lebendig und wirksam werden, und sich 
wieder ein[e] sichtbare Kirche ohne Rücksicht auf Landesgränzen bilden, die alle nach dem 
Überirdischen durstige Seelen in ihren Schooß aufnimmt und gern Vermittlerin, der alten und 
neuen Welt wird”547 [Christendom must again become lively and effective, and again form a 
visible church without regard to national borders, one which will take up into its bosom all those 
souls who thirst for the supernatural, and gladly become the mediator between the old world and 
the new]. Novalis’ demand to see religion, and to see it without reference to national borders, 
returns this inquiry back its initial point of departure by conjuring up the figure of Doubting 
Thomas, who required visual proof of the supernatural to become a member of the community of 
believers. At the center of this passage stands the question of mediation [vermitteln] and how a 
“visible church” can serve as a mediator for a distinctly modern form of faith, or a form of faith 
                                               
547 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 750. 
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that has undergone what Novalis describes as a “second reformation.” Lessing’s Ernst und Falk, 
which privileges the essence of Freemasonry (i.e. its status as an “invisible church” dwelling 
within human nature) as opposed to its ontological or institutional manifestations in a physical 
space,548 offers another occasion for comparison. In this case, the two speakers discuss the 
cosmopolitan potential of freemasonry,549 which must have been a source of inspiration for 
Novalis’ Christenheit oder Europa, which views religion as an alternative form of social cohesion.  
Above all, Die Christenheit oder Europa decidedly breaks with the underlying premise of 
Lessing’s Erziehung, which is that history unfolds along a progressive continuum. Novalis 
challenges this premise by developing a counter-image of history, one that uses the myth of 
Sisyphus to show the inability of Europe to transcend a circularity that he attributes to the 
Protestant Reformation and French Revolution: 
Ruhig und unbefangen betrachte der ächte Beobachter die neuen 
staatsumwälzenden Zeiten. Kommt ihm der Staatsumwälzer nicht wie Sisyphus 
vor? Jetzt hat er die Spitze des Gleichgewichts erreicht und schon rollt die mächtige 
Last auf der andern Seite wieder herunter. Sie wird nie oben bleiben, wenn nicht 
eine Anziehung gegen den Himmel sie auf der Höhe schwebend erhält. Alle eure 
Stützen sind zu schwach, wenn euer Staat die Tendenz nach der Erde behält, aber 
                                               
548 Lessing begins Ernst und Falk with a “preface by a third party,” which states: “Wenn nachstehende 
Blätter die wahre Ontologie der Freimäurerei nicht enthalten: so wäre ich begierig zu erfahren, in welcher 
von den unzähligen Schriften, die sie veranlaßt hat, ein mehr bestimmter Begriff von ihrer Wesenheit 
gegeben werde” [If the following pages do not contain the true ontology of Freemasonry, I would very 
much like to know in which of the countless writings inspired by it a more precise definition of its 
essential nature is provided]. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Werke in drei Bänden. Bd. III. Deutsche 
Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 2003, p. 599. 
549 At the start of their second dialogue, Ernst and Falk have the following exchange (Ibid., p. 606):  
Falk: Ordnung muß also doch auch ohne Regierung bestehen können.  
Ernst: Wenn jedes einzelne sich selbst zu regieren weiß: Warum nicht?  
Falk: Ob es wohl auch einmal mit den Menschen dahin kommen wird?  
[Falk: It must be possible for order to exist without a government. 
Ernst: If every individual knows how to govern himself, why not? 
Falk: I wonder whether human beings will ever reach that stage?]. 
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knüpft ihn durch eine höhere Sehnsucht an die Höhen des Himmels, gebt ihm eine 
Beziehung auf das Weltall, dann habt ihr eine nie ermüdende Feder in ihm, und 
werdet eure Bemühungen reichlich gelohnt sehn. An die Geschichte verweise ich 
euch, forscht in ihrem belehrenden Zusammenhang, nach ähnlichen Zeitpunkten, 
und lernt den Zauberstab der Analogie gebrauchen.550 
 
[Let the genuine observer contemplate the new revolutionary times calmly and 
without prejudice. Does not the revolutionary seem to him like Sisyphus? Now he 
has reached the zenith of his equilibrium and already the mighty burden is rolling 
down again on the other side. It will never stay up unless a force attracting it toward 
heaven keeps it balanced at the highest point. All your props are too weak if your 
state still tends toward the earth, but bind it by a higher longing to the heavenly 
heights and give it a connection to the universe, then you will never have a 
slackening spring within it and you will see your efforts richly rewarded. I direct 
your attention to history, search in its instructive context for similar moments, and 
learn to use the magic wand of analogy.] 
Of interest to this study is how Die Christenheit oder Europa synthesizes the human and 
the divine not by manipulating the letter of religion—an approach that corresponds more with 
Neologie and the poetic methodology of Klopstock’s Messias—but rather by interpreting the spirit 
of religious history. To my mind, Novalis’ analogical interpretation of religious history is 
unthinkable without Lessing’s reorientation of Protestantism around the spirit of religion. On the 
one hand, making the spirit of history the privileged site of interpretation presents the obvious 
danger of not reading history for what it “is” (i.e. in its literal sense of being a record of events 
filtered through different modes of historical narration551), but rather for what it ought to be. In 
this sense, Novalis’ criticism of Luther could ironically be turned around on him. According to 
                                               
550 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 743. 
551 Here I have in mind the three historical modes of representation as described by Hayden White. One 
problem that White’s research identifies is that the assumption that history can objectively represent what 
“is,” is itself a form of ideology since narratological modes of historiography always idealize, poeticize, 
and aestheticize the events they purport to represent. See White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: 
Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990. 
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Novalis, Luther “behandelte das Christenthum überhaupt willkührlich, verkannte seinen Geist, und 
führte einen andern Buchstaben und eine andere Religion ein, nehmlich die heilige 
Allgemeingültigkeit der Bibel”552 [treated Christianity altogether as he pleased, mistook its spirit 
and introduced another letter and another religion, namely the holy universal validity of the bible]. 
One can rightfully ask, however, whether or not Novalis, by asserting the “holy universal validity” 
of spirit, simply exchanges the normativity of the letter for the normativity of spirit. On the other 
hand, Novalis’ relationship to historical analogy seeks to restore something very fundamental to 
the Christian tradition that was imperiled by Lessing’s Beweis essay, namely, its ability to 
transcend the particular and establish a bond with the universal. The root word “trans” features 
heavily in Christian thought, as marked by concepts like transcendence, transubstantiation, 
transfiguration. Poetry and fantasy, thus, become instruments for revealing new configurations of 
the divine and the human that promise to transcend a politically polarized social field—to move 
beyond the “or” of Die Christenheit oder Europa. 
My simple thesis is that Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa advances Lessing’s 
theology by developing dream images and symbols in a mythico-historical narrative that attempts 
to mediate the idea of the new eternal gospel so that Europeans can access its underlying 
cosmopolitian ideal and seek to realize it. At the same time, however, Novalis seeks to correct an 
idea embedded in Lessing’s Erziehung that assumes modern faith involves an inwardness and 
immateriality that holds outward manifestations of spiritual life as ancillary at best, and 
superstitious at worst. The more fundamental question at stake, especially in view of similar 
Romantic projects like Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, is how Novalis makes the spirit of 
                                               
552 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 737. 
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religion legible. To answer this question, I apply a materialist approach to Die Christenheit oder 
Europa that understands its vivid representations according to what W.J.T. Mitchell describes in 
his book Iconology: Image, Text and Ideology as “mental images,” which are a species of images 
that include “dreams, memories, ideas, and fantasmata.”553 My analysis of Die Christenheit oder 
Europa is also informed by the work of Brigit Meyer and others, who call for a materialist approach 
to the study of religion, which should not be misunderstood as “a critique of religion in the name 
of sheer matter, but rather a critique of the study of religion from within that advocates coming to 
terms with materiality as part of the study of religion.”554 Meyer argues that the purpose of this 
methodology is “not to unmask religion and entities such as God, gods, and spirits as fictitious 
illusions, but to cast doubt on the very distinction between fiction and fact—or illusion and 
reality—on which such unmasking rests and instead concentrate on the material manifestation of 
religion—its Gestalt—in the world.”555 Laying importance on the material manifestation of 
religion is one of the central concerns of Novalis’ text, which postulates that Christianity appears 
in three forms: “Das Christenthum ist dreifacher Gestalt […] Eine [ist] das Mittlerthum überhaupt, 
als Glaube an die Allfähigkeit alles Irdischen, Wein und Brod des ewigen Lebens zu seyn”556 
[Christianity has three forms […] One is the notion of mediation itself, namely faith in the 
omnipotence of all earthly things to be the bread and wine of eternal life]. Thus, a materialist 
approach investigates religious phenomena that includes practices, objects, (mental) images, texts, 
                                               
553 Mitchell, W. J. T. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. University of Chicago Press, 1987. p. 10f. 
554 Meyer, Brigit. Inaugural Lecture: “Around Birgit Meyer’s Mediation and the Genesis of Presence: 
Toward a Material Approach to Religion.” Religion and Society, vol. 5, 2014, p. 206. 
555 Ibid., p. 206. 
556 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 749. The other forms include the 
following: “eine ist das Zeugungselement der Religion, als Freude an aller Religion […] Eine der Glaube 
an Christus, seine Mutter und die Heiligen” [one is the generative element of religion, namely, joy in all 
religion […] One is the faith in Christ, his mother and the saints]. 
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and other forms of media that seek to make religion present.  
The first image that readers of Die Christenheit oder Europa encounter is that of a medieval 
Europe unified by the extensive reach of the Catholic church. Novalis’ descriptions underscore the 
importance of sensible forms of mediation in religious practices, which range from olfactory 
stimulation generated from the burning of incense, to music, pictures, and monuments: 
Mit welcher Heiterkeit verließ man die schönen Versammlungen in den 
geheimnisvollen Kirchen, die mit ermunternden Bildern geschmückt, mit süßen 
Düften erfüllt, und von heiliger erhebender Musik belebt waren. In ihnen wurden 
die geweihten Reste ehemaliger gottesfürchtiger Menschen dankbar, in köstlichen 
Behältnissen aufbewahrt.–und an ihnen offenbahrte sich die göttliche Güte und 
Allmacht, die mächtige Wohlthätigkeit dieser glücklichen Frommen, durch 
herrliche Wunder und Zeichen. So bewahren liebende Seelen, Locken oder 
Schriftzüge ihrer verstorbenen Geliebten, und nähren die süße Glut damit, bis an 
den wiedervereinigenden Tod. Man sammelte mit inniger Sorgfalt überall was 
diesen geliebten Seelen angehört hatte, und jeder pries sich glücklich der eine so 
tröstliche Reliquie erhalten oder nur berühren konnte. Hin und wieder schien sich 
die himmlische Gnade vorzüglich auf ein seltsames Bild, oder einen Grabhügel 
niedergelassen zu haben.557 
 
[With what serenity one left beautiful gatherings in mysterious churches decorated 
with inspiring pictures, filled with sweet scents and enlivened by uplifting sacred 
music. There the sanctified remains of once God-fearing people were gratefully 
preserved in precious vessels. And there divine goodness and omnipotence and the 
mighty benevolence of these happy devout ones were revealed in splendid miracles 
and signs. Thus loving souls preserve locks of hair or the writing of their departed 
loved ones, and nourish their sweet ardor with these until death reunites them. 
Objects which had belonged to these beloved souls were collected with devoted 
care, and those who possessed such a consoling relic or even could only touch it 
held themselves fortunate. Now and then heavenly grace seemed to have been 
specially bestowed on a strange picture or a grave-mound.] 
While the idyllic image of a medieval Christian world deceptively overlooks the harsher 
realities that doubtless existed, it also imagines a world in which accessing the underlying ethos 
of religion or its spirit—the “goodness, omnipotence, and benevolence of the divine”—requires 
                                               
557 Ibid., p. 733. 
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miracles and signs and, more importantly, that the phenomenal world plays an essential role in 
mediating spririt. Traces of these miracles and signs inhere in the phenomena described in the 
passage, which affords religious subjects “Heiterkeit,” or a kind of serene edification that Novalis 
ultimately wants to repurpose as a means of fulfilling the wish of a new cosmopolitan Europe. In 
contrast to Lessing, Novalis expands the significance of worldly phenomena as a means of making 
the spirit of religion legible, rather than diminishing its significance by imagining a rationally 
“mature” system of faith that no longer needs to reference such phenomena. Yet similar to Lessing, 
the passage suggests that the concept of spirit can no longer be contained solely within the bible. 
Rather, for Novalis (and many of his contemporaries558), the spirit of religion moves outward by 
becoming visible in nature and aestheticized objects. At the same time, the concept of spirit also 
moves inward to human thoughts and feelings that wish to be raised to the level of consciousness 
by producing a new letter. Thus “spirit” begins to be revealed through manifold forms that include 
                                               
558 I have already mentioned Hegel’s Phenomenologie des Geistes in this context, but Kant’s concept of 
spirit in § 49 of his Kritik der Urteilskraft can also be of interest, to the extent that Fichte builds on it in 
his lectures Über den Unterschied des Geistes und Buchstabs in der Philosophie. Kant defines the 
concept of spirit aesthetically in the following passage: “Was ist denn das, was man hier unter Geist 
versteht? Geist, in ästhetischer Bedeutung, heißt das belebende Prinzip im Gemüte” [What is it then that 
is meant here by “spirit”? Spirit, in an aesthetic significance, means the animating principle in the mind. 
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Hrsg. Wilhelm Weischedel. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt am Main, 
1974, p. 249. Fichte, who further articulates the Kantian definition, argues that the “Geist überhaupt, oder 
die produktive Einbildungskraft läßt sich demnach beschreiben als ein Vermögen Gefühle zum 
Bewußtseyn zu erheben” [Spirit as such or the productive imagination can thus be described as a capacity 
for raising feelings to the level of consciousness]. For Fichte, spirit becomes connected to the productive 
imagination and it is responsible for externalizing the immanent, self-activity of the “I” into mutually 
serviceable representations (i.e. Buchstaben/letters) that can inspire others to develop new and original 
representations of their own. In Fichte’s words: “unmittelbar können Geister nicht aufeinander wirken: 
geister sind frei, u. können nicht bestimmt werden, sondern müßen nach Vorgabe irend einer Erscheinung 
in der Sinnenwelt sich selbst bestimmen” [Spirits are unable to affect each other immediately. They are 
free and cannot be determined; instead, they have to determine themselves according to the example of 
some appearance in the material world]. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, Von den Pflichten der Gelehrten: Jenaer 
Vorlesungen 1794/95, hrsg. von Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacob, Peter K. Schneider, Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1971, pp. 57–88. 
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secular literature, thereby marking a moment in the history of Early German Romanticism when 
aesthetic and religious experience begin to cross-pollinate more explicitly.559 For instance, in Die 
Christenheit oder Europa the creative will of the artist and the divine will start to overlap at a 
moment prior to any outward mediation: “Eine gewaltige Ahndung der schöpferischen Willkühr, 
der Grenzenlosigkeit, der unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit, der heiligen Eigenthümlichkiet und der 
Allfähigkeit der innern Menschheit scheint überall rege zu warden”560 [Everywhere there seems 
to be stirring a mighty sense of creative will, of limitlessness, of infinite diversity, of holy 
particularity, and the infinite capacity of the human spirit]. This moment prior to outward 
mediation presupposes that spirit has infinite freedom, which is here understood as a point of 
contact between the human and the divine. However, Novalis argues that not every historical epoch 
allows for such freedom.  
Die Christenheit oder Europa maintains an antagonistic stance towards the Reformation 
both for its role in causing Europe to fragment into discrete nations and for its role in curbing “the 
infinite capacity of the human spirit.” Thus, the Reformation functions as a counter-image to the 
                                               
559 The merging of religious and aesthetic experience is perhaps best captured in Wackenroder’s 
Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders, which in the story of Joseph Berglinger 
describes how Church music occasions both a religious and aesthetic experience in the protagonist: 
“Erwartungsvoll harrte er auf den ersten Ton der Instrumente;—und indem er nun aus der dumpfen Stille, 
mächtig und langgezogen, gleich dem Wehen eines Windes vom Himmel hervorbrach und die ganze 
Gewalt der Töne über seinem Haupte daherzog—da war es ihm, als wenn auf einmal seiner Seele große 
Flügel ausgespannt, als wenn er von einer dürren Heide aufgehoben würde, der trübe Wolkenvorhang vor 
den sterblichen Augen verschwände und er zum lichten Himmel emporschwebte” [Expectantly, he would 
await the first sound of the instruments—and when it came bursting forth, mighty and sustained, 
shattering the dull silence like a storm from Heaven, and when the sounds swept over his head in all their 
grandeur—then he felt as if his soul had suddenly spread great wings as if he were rising up from a 
desolate heath, as if the curtain of dark clouds were dissolving before his mortal gaze, and he were 
soaring up to the radiant Heavens]. Wackenroder, Wilhelm Heinrich. Herzensergiessungen eines 
kunstliebenden Klosterbruders. P. Reclam, 1964. p. 99. Translation mine. 
560 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 745 
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utopic cosmopolitanism of the medieval world and Novalis links the emergence of these nations 
to the emergence of opposing religious sects, calling it the “nothwendig Resultat”561 of the 
Reformation. According to Novalis, it was the reformers, or “Insurgenten” [insurgents] as he calls 
them, whose love of the letter (philology) “trennten das Untrennbare, theilten die unteilbare 
Kirche”562 [separated what could not be separated and divided the undividable Church]. Luther 
used the letter of religion to break with the traditions of the Catholic Church, but in so doing he 
paved the way for a “despotischer Buchstaben” [even more despotic letter] to sit on the empty 
throne. Because the bible wielded so much authority for the Reformation, understanding every 
letter in its margin became the new norm for Protestant theologians, who allowed philology to 
become the center of the religious universe, even at the expense of the many other ways of 
mediating religious experience that Novalis previously catalogued. In his final analysis, Novalis 
claims that philology was “dem religiöse […] höchst verderblich”563 [highly damaging to the 
religious sense] because it claimed a monopoly on religious mediation and dismissed other “earthly 
things” from acting as mediators, thereby anesthetizing Europe’s “sense” for religion. “Die 
Geschichte des Protestantismus,” Novalis laments, “zeigt uns […] keine herrlichen großen 
Erscheinungen des Überirdischen mehr564” [The history of Protestantism no longer shows us 
splendid visions of the supernatural]. Novalis’ observation about the primacy of the letter during 
the Reformation can also be observed in the artworks of that time. To mention just one, Lucas 
Cranach the Elder’s Heavenly Ladder of St. Bonaventure (1515) depicts St. Bonaventure’s spiritual 
                                               
561 Ibid., p. 736. 
562 Ibid., p. 736. 
563 Ibid., p. 736. 
564 Ibid., p. 738. 
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exercise, or ascent, into heaven through an image that is completely overwhelmed by (instructive) 
words, as if the image itself were incapable of communicating without the aid of the letter (figure 
3).565 In the aftermath of the Reformation, things only got worse for the religious sense. Novalis 
describes how enlightenment philosophy took the Reformation’s fetishization of the letter to new 
extremes. Consequently, enlightenment philosophy started to view religion as its enemy because, 
after running the letter of religion through its “ungeheure Mühle”566 [monstrous mill], many 
Aufklärer judged the contents of the bible to be indelibly superstitious: “Duckte sich ja irgendwo 
ein alter Aberglaube an eine höhe Welt und sonst auf, so wurde gleich von alle Seiten Lärm 
geblasen, und wo möglich der gefährliche Funke durch Philosophie und Witz in der Asche erstickt; 
dennoch war Toleranz das Losungswort der Gebildeten”567 [If somewhere an old superstitious  
 
                                               
565 For an account of the relationship between words and images in reformation artworks, see Koerner, 
Joseph Leo. The Reformation of the Image. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
566 Novalis. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hrsg. von Hans-Joachim Mähl 
und Richard Samuel. Carl Hanser Verlag: München, 2005. Band II, p. 741. 
567 Ibid., p. 742. 
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Figure 3: Lucas Cranach the Elder’s Heavenly Ladder of St. Bonaventure (1510-1515) 
 
belief in a higher world reared its head, the alarm was sounded at once on all sides, and whenever 
possible the dangerous spark was suffocated in the ashes by philosophy and wit; and yet tolerance 
was the slogan of the educated]. According to Novalis, modern philology, which had been adopted 
by eighteenth century Protestant theology, caused the enlightenment–in Marcusian fashion–to 
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betray its own policy on tolerance.568 He claims that “Haß gegen den Katholischen Glauben ging 
allmähig in Haß gegen die Bibel, gegen den christlichen Glauben und endlich gar gegen die 
Religion über569 [hatred of the Catholic faith gradually turned into hatred of the Bible, of the 
Christian faith, and finally even of all religion]. Thus, “Wissen und Glauben [traten] in eine 
entschiedenere Opposition”570 [knowledge and faith moved into more decisive opposition]. This 
polarization of faith and knowledge paved the way for the enlightenment’s campaign against 
religious superstition, which did not just stop at religion, but extended to “alle Gegenstände des 
Enthusiasmus […], Fantasie und Gefühl, Sittlichkeit und Kunstliebe, Zukunft und Vorzeit”571 [all 
objects of enthusiasm: imagination and feeling, rectitude and love of art, future and past]. During 
the eighteenth century, Novalis argues, enthusiasm was only permitted in a sublimated form: “Ein 
Enthusiasmus ward großmüthig dem armen Menschengeschlechte übrig gelassen und als Prüfstein 
der höchsten Bildung jedem Actionair derselben unentbehrlich gemacht. Der Enthusiasmus für 
diese herrliche, gorßartige Philosophie und insbesondere für ihre Priester und Mystagogen”572 
[One enthusiasm was generously left for the poor human race and made indispensable as a 
touchstone of the highest education for every practitioner of it. It was enthusiasm for this splendid, 
magnificent philosophy]. Against this process of spiritual disenchantment Novalis levels his 
counter-image of medieval history, which indexes a moment in time when objects of enthusiasm 
could freely mediate religious experience without fearing persecution. 
 In many ways Die Christenheit oder Europa serves as a kind of reeducation treatise that 
                                               
568 In his essay on “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse writes: “[…] what is proclaimed and practiced as 
tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression” in Wolff, 
Robert Paul. A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Beacon Press, 1965. p. 81. 
569 Ibid., p. 741. 
570 Ibid., p. 740. 
571 Ibid., p. 741. 
572 Ibid., p. 741. 
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accords history the task of restoring value and confidence to sensible forms of mediation like the 
“music, relics, locks of hair, incense, and monuments” described above. As far as Novalis is 
concerned, his narrative about the medieval world should have an alienating effect on modern 
(Protestant) readers, who have been trained to view these more “archaic” forms of mediation as 
superfluous, instead regarding the letter of religion to be the sole legitimate source of religious 
experience. During the modern age, Novalis writes, “man suchte der alten Religion einen neuern 
vernünftigen, gemeinern Sinn zu geben, indem man alles Wunderbare und Geheimnißvolle 
sorgfältig von ihr abwusch”573 [an attempt was made to give the old religion a newer, rational, 
more common meaning, by carefully washing away from it all the wonder and mystery]. And yet 
for Novalis, the rational content of the letter alone is not adequate for sustaining modern religious 
belief; it requires the very myths that enlightenment theology dispensed with and he turns to the 
spirit of history and the phenomenal world to reenchant Christianity. With respect to history, 
Novalis does not want Lessing’s insights about the limited function of historical truth in matters 
of faith to be misunderstood. He writes: “alle Gelehrsamkeit ward aufgeboten um die Zuflucht zur 
Geschichte abzuschneiden, indem man die Geschichte zu einem häuslichen und bürgerlichen 
Sitten—und Familien—Gemählde zu veredeln sich bemühte”574 [That all available learning was 
summoned to cut off the flight to history, while it was attempted to refine history so that it might 
become a portrait of domestic and bourgeois moral and family life]. That the enlightenment learned 
how to “cut off the flight to history” alludes to Lessing’s Beweis essay, which, as we have seen, 
demonstrates that the binding force of religion cannot simply be a matter of verifying the historical 
truth of the miracles and prophecies recorded in the bible. However, this in no way suggests that 
                                               
573 Ibid., p. 744. 
574 Ibid., p. 742. 
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history is powerless at facilitating religious conviction; for historical narration (i.e. the world 
created through the act of storytelling) still possesses the capacity to ignite the “electric spark” that 
Lessing speaks of, but that spark can only be achieved by allowing oneself to be pulled into the 
story. Moreover, history should not appear as a familiar “portrait” of modern bourgeois life; rather, 
it should estrange us from that image and show us alternative configurations of spiritual and social 
life. According to Novalis, the point is not to assimilate historical representations to the present 
moment but rather “zu studieren [ihr], ihr nachzugehn, von ihr zu lernen, mit ihr gleichen Schritt 
zu halten, gläubig ihren Verheißungen und Winken zu folgen—daran denkt keiner”575 [To study 
it, follow it, learn from it, keep in step with it, faithfully obeying its promises and its guidance—
no one thinks of that]. 
In the end, Die Christenheit oder Europa provokes the skeptical reader to reconsider the 
sources of their skepticism. To achieve this, the text asks modernity to entertain the standpoint of 
the believer in order to rekindle the “sense of religion” that has been forgotten since the 
Reformation. By recollecting this sense—albeit in a manner that corresponds more closely to the 
fairy tale than an archaeological excavation of empirical facts—Novalis imagines a critique of the 
enlightenment to be possible and hopes that a rebirth of religion will emerge. He argues, “Erst 
durch genauere Kenntniß der Religion wird man jene fürchterlichen Erzeugnisse eines 
Religionsschlafs, jene Träume und Deliria des heiligen Organs besser beurtheilen und dann erst 
die Wichtigkeit enes Geschenks recht einsehn lernen”576 [Only through closer familiarity with 
religion will one be better able to judge those fearful products of the sleep of religion, those dreams 
and deliriums of the holy instrument, and then for the first time to learn true insight into the 
                                               
575 Ibid., p. 744. 
576 Ibid., p. 746. 
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importance of that gift]. The “holy instrument” or human mind that archives both the myths of 
religion and the myths of enlightenment equally comes to be seen by Novalis as “der Herzschlag 
der neuen Zeit” [the heartbeat of the new age], which promises to secure peace both within the 
individual and the state. Thus, Novalis’ excursion into the annals of history yields a symbol of 
reconciliation that (however precarious and untenable) unifies reason and imagination; the material 
and immaterial; the past and future. Die Christenheit oder Europa prophecies: “eine große 
Versöhnungzeit, [in der] ein Heiland, der wie ein ächter Genius under den Menschen einheimisch, 
nur geglaubt nicht gesehen werden [kann], und unter zahllosen Gestalten den Gläubigen sichtbar, 
als Brod und Wein verzehrt”577 [a great time of reconciliation, in which a savior who like a true 
genius will be at home among men, who can only be believed in and not seen, and who is visible 
to the faithful in countless forms, consumed as bread and wine]. The “savior” who merges with 
the genius, and who can only be believed in yet remains unseen, returns modern faith to the figure 
of Doubting Thomas, but here Novalis reads tremendous value into the situation (of not knowing), 
which provides the “holy instrument” with innumerable ways to (re)shape and (re)generate 
religious experience so that it possesses real practical import. 
  
                                               
577 Ibid., p. 745. 
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